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Origins of Modern Professional Education:. The
Harvard Case Method Conceived As Clinical

Instruction In Law
by Anthony Chase*
INTRODUCTION

The following analysis attempts to resituate discussion about legal
education within the context of modem professionalism and the social
history of American education.1 Particular focus is given to the rise of
clinical instruction in legal education during the period after 1870.2
Section One reviews the genesis of clinical education at the
Harvard Medical School after 1870. Section Two reveals how the case
method of legal instruction was introduced as a clinical form of education at the Harvard Law School during the same period. Section Three
confronts the reasons why the case method of law teaching has failed to
be designated "clinical" instruction during the past fifty years. Section
Four demonstrates the close relationship between the rise of the case
method law school and the modernization of professional culture. Section Five displays the dynamic self-consciousness of Harvard's leadership in creating the new model law school which set an example for all
others. Section Six concludes with an evaluation of the need for regarding legal education as a social relation.
* B.A., Wisconsin, 1972; J.D., Wayne State, 1978; LL.M. Harvard Law School,

1979; Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law. I
would like to express my appreciation to Professors Elizabeth Mensch, Morton Hor-

witz, Duncan Kennedy, John Schlegel, and Robert Gordon for encouragement and criticism, and to Professor William Nelson and the Northeast group of the American Society for Legal History for an opportunity to present some of the ideas in this essay to a
regional meeting in New Haven. I would like to thank Ms. Robin Hornstein for typing
the manuscript.
1. See M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

(1977); B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALSIM (1976); S. Cohen, "The
History of the History of American Education, 1900-1976: The Uses of the Past" 46
HARV. ED. REv. 298 (1976); L. CREMIN, TADITIONS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION
(1977).

2. See A. Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIS329 (1979), an introduction to the genesis of case method instruction.
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I. MEDICAL EDUCATION
In his outline history of the Harvard Medical School, published in
1930, Dr. Frederick C. Shattuck indicates that up until Charles W.
Eliot's appointment as President of Harvard University in 1869, the
lectures offered to students at the Harvard Medical School were essentially designed to supplement the prevailing practice of apprenticeship
"whereby a student attached himself to an older physician and thus
learned the art from practical training."' Although most historical
writing on medical education at Harvard immediately after 1870 constitutes, in essence, a catalogue of the dramatic changes which Eliot
brought about in the school, it can be fairly stated that his whole reform program represented a kind of compromise between the lecture
and treatise method and the autonomous apprentice system. The result
was the first modern professional school of medicine in America.4
Drs. Henry K. Beecher and Mark D. Altschule, in their recent
history of medicine at Harvard, characterize the situation confronted
by Eliot:
Until Eliot arrived on the administrative scene in 1869, the Harvard
Medical School was a poor thing, unworthy to be associated with
Harvard College... Each candidate for a degree was obliged to buy
tickets to each of the courses for at least one year. Twice a week there
was a 'clinical medical visit' at the Massachusetts General Hospital for
one hour, and on Saturday morning an operative session. (Of the 127
students attending, 31 held a college degree.) There was no gradation of
studies, no laboratories, no private courses, no individual instruction.
There were two courses of lectures of four months each. The remainder
of the students' work was, theoretically at least, supervised by the
outside instructors to whom the students were apprenticed, more or less,
for three years. How much this apprenticeship amounted to depended
upon the habits and inclinations of the instructor involved. It might be
great or it might be essentially useless. Some students were able to see
many cases of disease, and some none at all. In the crucial year of 1871
the three-year graded course was adopted and the apprenticeship

3. F. Shattuck & J. L. Bremer, The Medical School, 1869-1929 in THE
OPMENT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY SINCE THE INAUGURATION

DEVEL-

OF PRESIDENT ELIOT

1869-1929 555 (1930).
4. See Chase, supra note 2, at 340-42, especially note 53.
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terminated.5

Rather than constituting a stride away from the concrete and the
practical in medical education, however, Eliot's termination of the apprentice system revealed his desire to bring direct experience with patients within the controlled and regularized structure of university medical education where it could be made systematic and could also be
guaranteed. Just as the lecture and treatise method of teaching gradually lost force in the Harvard Law School during Eliot's presidency, the
same method was gradually cut back in the medical school as well. It is
precisely the bringing of direct and practical experience with patients
from the realm of informal apprenticeship into the controlled environment of university professional education which constitutes the genesis
of clinical instruction in American pedagogy. Apprenticeship is uneven
and mundane while clinical education is sophisticated and special.
Addressing the Medical Society of the State of New York in 1896,
Eliot commented on the instructional changes which he brought about
in the Harvard Medical School:
Thirty years ago there were only two laboratories in the Harvard
Medical School - a dissecting-room, in which the manners and customs
were as rough and unwholesome as the room and its accessories, and a
little chemical laboratory in which no one was required to work. A small
minority of the students voluntarily sought some laboratory training in
chemistry. In our present medical school laboratory work of many sorts
demands a large part of the student's attention. There are laboratories in
finatomy, medical chemistry, physiology, histology, embryology, pathology, and bacteriology; and in all these some work is prescribed, and additional work is done by many. In clinical teaching, moreover, the change
is great. Formerly a large group of students accompanied a visiting physician on his rounds at the hospital, and saw what they could under very
disadvantageous conditions. Now instruction has become, in many
clinical departments, absolutely individual, the instructor dealing with
one student at a time, and personally showing him how to see, hear, and
touch for himself in all sorts of difficult observation and manipulation.
Much instruction is given to small groups of students, three or four at a
time - no more than can actually see and touch for themselves. A four
5. H. BEECHER & M. ALTSCHULE, MEDICINE AT HARVARD: THE FIRST THREE
HUNDRED YEARS 90-91 (1977).
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years' course of training such as I have described has a high degree of
training-power both for the senses and the reason. The old medical
teaching was largely exposition; it gave information at long range about
things and processes which were not within reach or sight at the moment. The new medical education aims at imparting manual and ocular
skill, and cultivating the mental powers of close attention through prolonged investigations at close quarters with the facts, and of just reasoning on the evidence.6
This long statement of Eliot's pedagogical faith in the concrete
and the practical as the basis of true education reveals his hostility to
the lecture and treatise method ("the old medical teaching") which be
sought to undercut throughout university instruction. Even in the college, Eliot replaced the "plain lecture, without carefully organized
aids," 7 with one supplemented by prescribed reading, periodic written
examinations, frequent recitations, and careful surveillance of student
production and performance by younger faculty.
"While some spoke nostalgically of training systems that prevailed
in the early nineteenth century," writes historian James Gilbert
not every observer had the same feelings. As Charles Eliot of Harvard
noted, the fashion of studying medicine by caring for the doctor's horse
and buggy or the study of law by copying deeds was, happily, gone forever. There were 'better ways of studying medicine or law, namely, by
going to professional school, where progressive, systematic instruction
rapidly developed is to be had.' 8
Thus Eliot's contribution to modern professional education consisted of a struggle on two fronts: against the expository lecture tradition in the schools, on the one hand, and against the independent apprenticeship outside the schools, on the other. The development of
laboratory, clinical, and case method instruction in the professional
schools ("cultivating the mental powers of close attention through pro6. C. Eliot, Medical Education of the Future, (Address before the Medical Society of the State of New York, January 28, 1896), reprinted in EDUCATIONAL REFORM
347-48 (1898).
7. C. ELIOT, UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION 180 (1908).
8.

J.

GILBERT, WORK WITHOUT SALVATION: AMERICA'S INTELLECTUALS AND

INDUSTRIAL ALIENATION,
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longed investigations at close quarters with the facts, and of just reasoning on the evidence") 9 dealt a fatal blow to both the lecture and
treatise academies and the apprentice system. Neither of the latter
could guarantee direct student participation in the professional project
as well as systematic and comprehensive instruction.
As Eliot knew, clinical education had developed within French
medicine during the Revolution of 1789 as a compromise between the
"Gothic universities and aristocratic academies" whose lecture system
had trained French doctors under the ancient regime, and the temporary experiment in total liberty under which there was no organization
of or control over professional education in medicine. 10 In a very interesting passage concerning the birth of the clinic, Michel Foucault
points out:
On what was the distinction based among those practising the art of
healing? The most important part of the training of an officer of health
was his years of practice,which might be as many as six; the doctor, on
the other hand, complemented his theoretical training with clinical experience. It was no doubt this difference between the practical and the
clinical that was the most innovatory factor in the legislation of the Year
XI. The practice required of the officer of health was a controlled empiricism: a question of knowing what to do after seeing; experience was
integrated at the level of perception, memory, and repetition, that is, at
the level of the example. In the clinic, it was a question of a much more
subtle and complex structure in which the integration of experience occurred in a gaze that was at the same time knowledge, a gaze that exists,
that was master of its truth, an4 free of all example, even if at times it
had made use of them. Practice would be opened up to the officers of
health, but the doctors would reserve the initiation into the clinic to
themselves.1 1
Thus, marvellously Janus-faced since its inception within the European bourgeoisie's, struggle against the older order, the clinic
presented itself as practical and popular in relation to the old lecture
academies as well as transcendent and knowledgable when confronted
by the radically democratic effort to completely destroy restrictions
9. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
10. See Chase, supra note 2, at 343-44.
11. M. FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC 81-82 (1973).
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upon professional entry. It was just this sort of passage which Charles
Eliot attempted to steer for clinical medicine through the competing
obstacles of the entrenched lecture faculties in the schools and the surviving apprentice tradition among practitioners of the art. Against apprenticeship, the contrast would be drawn between art and science, between artisans and professionals. Against the established schools, the
contrast was between mental laxity and rigour, between abstract theory
12
and the kind of judicious reasoning courted by practical men.
Although the early victories won by clinical instruction at the
Harvard Medical School made it the model for all subsequent medical
education in the United States, the medical school never achieved during the nineteenth century or early twentieth the kind of preeminence
secured by the Harvard Law School. The reason was simply that the
medical school failed to develop its own teaching hospital (or relations
with Boston medical facilities) which would have permitted the clinical
program to fully blossom.
Dr. Shattuck observed at a meeting of the Boston Society for
Medical Improvement in 1900 that "(t)he fact that the Harvard Medical School has no hospital of its own, not even an out-patient clinic, is
an obtrusive fact. However welcome, the school is still a guest of the
hospitals and must adapt itself to rules and regulations which are not
necessarily uniform." I s Thirty years later, after favorable relations had
been developed with the Massachusetts General Hospital and Boston
Children's Hospital, and an Out-Patient Department was set up in one
of the school buildings, Shattuck remarked that the construction of Peter Bent Brigham Hospital signaled the eventual resolution of the
clinical teaching problem at Harvard. The school's potential was finally
realized.14
The significance of Eliot's successful struggle against both the old
Harvard medical faculty and the surviving apprentice system cannot be
sufficiently emphasized. In spite of their apparent recognition of the
disastrous state of medical apprenticeship afte the Civil War,' 5
12.

See Chase supra note 2, at 336-40. See also the text of sections II and V

infra.
13.

F. Shattuck, Reports of Societies: Boston Society for Medical Improvement,

142 B. MED. & SURGICAL J. 567, 568 (1900).
14. See Shattuck, supra note 3, at 569-80.
15. See Beecher & Altschule, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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Beecher and Altschule nevertheless make the following inexplicable
argument:
Eliot had two definite avenues in mind for the rehabilitation of the
Harvard Medical School. Both had to do with quality: of students and of
the teaching. . . . In the second category he intended to eliminate the
apprenticeship. Although these goals seemed laudable then, with the passage of time the second has been found to be not entirely sound. It is a
curious thing that the apprentice system was (and sometimes still is) spoken of in terms of disdain, yet it still cares for at least 50 percent of
medical education through the four to six years of intern and resident
programs. The difference is that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the student was guided usually by a single preceptor, whereas in the
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries there were and are multiple
preceptors for each student. The principle is the same, and the difference
is not important.16
On the contrary, the principles underlying apprenticeship and
modern clinical medicine are not the same. As Eliot understood perfectly, the difference was of extraordinary importance. Guided by a single preceptor, as even Beecher and Altschule seem to agree, in the
nineteenth century meant often enough that the medical student was
not guided at all. Yet professional supervision and individual instruction were for Eliot essential to clinical teaching. Under a single practitioner, what range of cases could a student hope to see? Only clinical
experience in university hospitals and laboratories could secure systematic and comprehensive instruction. Indeed, doctors trained under the
apprentice system frequently lacked even the manual and ocular skills
necessary to carry out a diagnostic examination, given the advance of
17
medical science and clinical instruction by the turn of the century.
Having indicated that Eliot terminated apprenticeships for
Harvard Medical students in 1871, Beecher and Altschule then assert
that the apprentice system "still cares for at least 50 percent of medical
education through the four to six years of intern and resident programs."1' 8 Thus, the authors seem uncertain of what they mean by "ap-

16. Id. at 93-94.
17. See Eliot, supra note 6 and accompanying text.

18. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
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prenticeship." The relation between clinical rotations and clinical residencies, between medical schools, teaching hospitals and the medical
profession appears to have rather little in common with the old apprenticeship training. Modern clinical medicine may be described as just
one more version of apprenticeship only if one is willing to remove the
designation "clinical" from its historical context and allow it to represent any educational system whatsoever, so long as there is at least
some direct patient exposure involved. As in Foucault's illustration
drawn from French medicine, 19 what was significant about clinical
medical instruction was not what it had in common with apprenticeship
(i.e., practical experience) but the way in which it was different: the
clinic brought first hand training "for the senses and the reason" within
the systematically organized and controlled space of professional
institutions.
II. LEGAL EDUCATION
Initially, the clinical form of medical instruction at Harvard was
presented as a model for the case method's development. 20
When defending the case method of instruction in the law school
by comparing it to clinical instruction in the medical school, President
Eliot urged that the analog within legal education to the hospital in
medical education was not the court or law office, but rather the law
library; law books were to the law student what the bodies of the sick
and wounded were to the medical student. Only systematic study of
case reports and their mode of reasoning could provide the law student
with a professional education. This was implicitly, of course, an expression of contempt for the legal apprenticeship system whereby students
prepared for the bar by studying in the office of a practicing attorney.
Students, observed Eliot, who should habitually spend their time in
courts or law offices would waste it. Like clinical instruction in
medicine, the case method of teaching law constituted a compromise
between the prevailing lecture and treatise method in the schools and
the apprenticeship system outside the schools. Indeed, by bringing together cultivation of "mental powers of close attention through pro-

19. See Foucault, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
20. See Chase, supra note 2, at 333-36, 341-43, especially note 54.

Published by NSUWorks, 1981

11

Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 1
5:1981

331

Origins of Professional Education

1

longed investigations at close quarters with the facts"2 with a systematically organized institutional framework, the case method could be
conceived as clinical instruction in law.
That the case method was perceived (following Eliot's analogy) to
constitute clinical education in law is suggested by one critique of the
method, advanced by an opponent. Professor Christopher G. Tiedeman
of the Law Department of the University of the City of New York
developed his analysis in the first volume of The Yale Law Journal.A
special issue, published in 1892, was devoted to the increasingly controversial debate over "methods of legal education."
"Like the student of the different sciences," remarked Tiedeman,
the law student must learn how to make original investigations for himself, and diagnose, so to speak, the principles of law from the cases in
actual litigation. But no reason can be given why he must learn the
whole science of the law by his own investigations in the undigested mass
of raw material in the shape of adjudicated cases. 2
Tiedeman further argued that because students of clinical medicine
had not been altogether denied the treatises within which previous research was recorded, law students under the case method should not be
denied the use of "theoretic" or treatise material within their studies.
This illustrates how far the case books had come to be the exclusive
classroom textbooks under case method instruction.2
Tiedeman felt the issue was one of "finding the middle and true
ground of a controversy":
Impressed by the defects of the older systems of instruction, in
which the law student was presented with more or less abstract propositions of law, with the aid of textbooks, which often were either nothing
more than digests of the cases, and put together in an illogical and disorderly manner, or whose statements of the law were so loose and inaccurate as to prove misleading; and more impressed with the necessity of
'legal clinics' in the course of instruction in the law school instead of
being left for acquisition in the law office, the advocates of instruction by
21. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
22. C. Tiedeman, Methods of Legal Education III, 1
(1892).
23. See notes 30 & 31 infra and accompanying text.
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cases have gone to the opposite extreme or placing too high a value upon
the study of cases, and of unduly depreciating the value of the study of
law, apirt from learning it through the medium of practical
theoretic
24
law.
Thus, Tiedeman acknowledges the improvements made by the case
method law school and perceives the inadequacy of the previous abstract presentation in the old law schools, on the one hand, and of leaving the study cases to the law offices, on the other. He fully appreciates
the kind of compromise which the case method law school represents.
Yet Tiedeman asserts that, in effect, a good thing has been carried
too far. Without questioning the consolidation of professional legal education within the schools or the wisdom of placing case reports at the
center of legal study, Tiedeman urges that secondary or discursive work
should no more be eliminated from clinical legal education than it had
been in clinical medical education. He concludes:
The advocates of instruction by the use of cases have effected an
important reform in legal education by arousing the law schools of the
country to the importance of infusing more life into their instruction, and
of introducing into their curricula what I would call 'legal clinics',2 and
5
for this great good the legal profession should be grateful to them.
Like a scientist or doctor, the law student needed to learn to 'diagnose' principles of law from case reports. Many observers of American
legal education, doubting that law constitutes a science in any rigorous
way,26 have failed to recognize the relationship between clinical or laboratory instruction and case method teaching. The relationship was less
between law and science than between systematic instruction in law
and systematic instruction in medicine or the scientific disciplines.
What these departments of the university had in common was their
uniformly practical and systematic professional organization under
President Eliot. Scientific study referred to practical and concrete instruction within a rationalized professional institution which shunned

24.

Tiedeman, supra note 22, at 156-57.

25. Id. at 157.
26. See text at sections IV and V infra.
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everything arbitrary and local (i.e., apprenticeship).2
Part of the confusion on this issue no doubt stems from the indirect form in which the case method was analogized by its sponsors to
clinical instruction. Eliot, for example, analogized the law library (not
the case method itself) to the hospital in clinical medicine.2 8 Dean
Christopher Langdell deployed a similar metaphor thirteen years later:
[It] was indispensable to establish at least two things; first that law
is a science; secondly, that all the available materials of that science are
contained in printed books. . . . If it be not a science, it is a species of
handicraft, and may be learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who
practices it. . . . But if printed books are the ultimate sources of all
legal knowledge; if every student who would obtain any mastery of law
as a science must resort to these ultimate sources; and if the only assistance which it is possible for the learner to receive is such as can be
afforded by teachers who have travelled the same road before him, - then
a university, and a university alone, can furnish every possible facility for
teaching and learning law. . . We have also constantly inculcated the
idea that the library is the proper workshop of professors and students
alike; that it is to us all that the laboratories of the university are to the
chemists and physicists, all that the museum of natural history is to the
29
zoologists, all that the botanical garden is to the botanists.
Langdell's remarks may be read as an effort to bestow upon the
law a conceptual character identical to that of the physical and biological sciences; in that event, the relation between the law school and the
scientific and medical departments of the university might appropriately be viewed as one whose nature Langdell misunderstood. But
Langdell was as committed as Eliot to the construction of universitybased, professional legal education. If the practice of law was not a
handicraft, and systematic professional education could not be secured
through apprenticeship, then it would become necessary to regard law
as a university science.
Eliot and Langdell both know well enough that the law library was
27. See note 108 infra and accompanying text.
28. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
29. C. Langdell, Record of the Commemoration, November fifth to eighth, 1886,
on the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the founding of Harvard College 97-98
(1887) (quoted in A.

SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD
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not the proper workshop of professional legal education nor were the
printed books which were, in effect, the laboratory manuals 0 of case
method teaching to be found in the library. Eliot made this point
clearly in his description of the case method's development at Harvard:
Professor Langdell's fundamental idea was that the law should be
taught, not from treatises or from lectures which would probably be either imperfect treatises or commentaries on treatises, but at first hand
from the records of actual cases in which important principles or practices had been laid down and established by judicial tribunals .... It
soon appeared that it was highly inconvenient for the many students to
get timely access to the few copies of the reports to which Professor
Langdell referred them, and he therefore undertook the preparation of a
collection of select cases on contracts. This selection was followed in a
few years by a series of volumes of select cases on the subjects of instruction in the Harvard Law School, almost all of which were prepared by
Professor Langdell's colleagues; and his method was gradually adopted
by most of the teachers in the School. The possession of these volumes of
cases makes it unnecessary for the student to resort incessantly to the
volumes of reports on the library shelves, unless the professors revise
their selections of cases, or wish to add cases of a date later than that of
the volumes in use. 1
Thus it was primarily with their casebooks (rather than in the library) that law students prepared for classes and it was in the case
method classroom itself (Tiedeman's 'legal clinics') where students not
only demonstrated but in fact developed "the mental powers of close
attention through prolonged investigations at close quarters with the
facts, and of just reasoning on the evidence." 82 Langdell's fundamental
idea (as Eliot indicates) was that law should be taught systematically
from concrete cases, by "teachers who have travelled the same road," 33
and only in rationally organized, national professional schools."
Langdell sought to steer the same course as Eliot between the ab-

30. See Chase, supra note 2, at 332-336.
31. ELIOT, EDUCATIONAL REFORM 199-201 (1898).

32. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. *
33. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 61 & 81 infra and
accompanying text.
34. See note 108 infra and accompanying text.
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stract, expository lecture and treatise tradition and the artisan apprentice system, neither of which could guarantee a professional education.
His and Eliot's definition of scientific discipline itself may have been
exhausted by the kind of systematic and concrete instruction which
everywhere came to supersede the conservative academies and discredited apprenticeship tradition as the fundamental organizing structure of
modern professionalization. As one of Langdell's early students later
made plain in The American Law Register:
In order to judge of Professor Langdell's success it is necessary to keep
clearly in mind what was his aim. He asserted and believed that law is a
science, but his vital proposition (for the purpose of weighing his work as
a teacher) is not that law is a science, but that there is a scientific
method of teaching and studying the law.35

III. THE REAL CLINIC IN LAW
Skepticism regarding the status of law as a science frequently amplifies a casual inattention to the relation between case method instruction and clinical education. For those less hostile to the association of
law and science, misconceiving the law library as the laboratory of legal education has also contributed to the obscurity of the case method's
role as clinical instruction in law.
Law librarian Edward F. Hess, Jr., for example, introduces the
1977 University of Illinois College of Law Law Library Guide with the
following statement: "Beyond any other group on the campus law students make use of the library as the heart and soul of their education.
It is trite but nevertheless true to say that the Law Library is the counterpart of the laboratory in medical or scientific education." 3 So long
as the law library is superficially apprehended as the law school's laboratory, the real link between case instruction and clinical teaching will
be rendered less visible. Indeed, for the past fifty years the reference to
clinical teaching in the law schools has oddly been reserved to survivals
35. W. Schofield, Christopher Columbus Langdell 55 O.S. 46 N.S. THE AMERI281 (1907).
36. E. HESS, Introduction to UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF LAW: LAW
LIBRARY GUIDE (August 1977).
CAN LAW REGISTER
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and rediscoveries of various kinds of apprenticeship.
Thus, during the 1930s, Jerome Frank was able to attack the case
method law school (in behalf of what might be described as a regression to a form of apprentice system) and call his alternative a "clinical
lawyer school."137 It is not unreasonable to argue that because Frank
continued to feel that legal education should be confined to professional
schools, his option was not so much a reversion to apprenticeship as it
was a refinement of the modern professional school, with a greater tilt
toward the "concrete and practical" (or perhaps a different conception
of what was, after all, "practical").
Yet Frank seems not to have sensed at all the relationship between
Langdell's (and Eliot's) transformation of the Harvard Law School and
the development of systematic instruction throughout professional education. In perceiving the case method as fundamentally arcane rather
than systematic and practical (in relation, alternatively, to the apprenticeship and the lecture method), Frank seems hardly to have understood the successful professional institution which he was criticizing
and within whose ideological terrain he would have to justify his reforms so long as he believed law school should remain selective points
of entry to the profession.
Certainly Frank was right to argue that the law schools did not
provide their graduates with many practical skills essential to the practice of law. But the new professional schools did not pretend to provide
that sort of training. However concrete and practical clinical instruction might be, it did not duplicate the character of merely artisan training. As Foucault points out 8 clinical instruction was a species apart, a
form of simultaneously direct and mediated experience, less a kind of
artisan training than initiation into professional life.39
The following observation by Boalt Hall Professor Preble Stolz
from a 1969 paper on the failure of "clinical experience" in American
legal education typifies the conceptual reduction of clinical instruction
to merely artisan or practical experience, and its total divorce (as a
term of reference) from the case method:
37.

See J. Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyers-School 81 U. PA. L. REv. 907

(1933). See also Chase, supra note 2, at 330-31.
38.
39.

See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
In reference to the notion of "initiation", see Chase, supra note 2, at 344.
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Modern legal education in this country begins at Harvard in 1870,

but it was not until about the turn of the century that the model Langdell created at Cambridge began to be copied generally. Legal clinics

have been associated with law schools since that time. As the name suggests, they were conceived on analogy to the medical school clinic where
medical students were given exposure to sick people in the context of

practice rather than the classroom. Clinical experience rapidly became a
central part of medical education but a comparable kind of exposure to
the real world of law practice, although repeatedly tried, has never been
40

anything more than a fringe activity in legal education. Why?

Stolz answers his question with two assertions: first, "until quite recently clinical or practical experience ranked very low in the value
structure of legal educators";"' and second, uncertainty about the appropriate "form of the non-classroom experience, ' 42 given the poor reputation of "legal aid" bureaus, etc., has discouraged the development of
clinical legal education.
At least Stolz's first sentence is correct: the case method originated
as the fundamental organizing principle of an entire law school at
Harvard, as we have pointed out.43 Yet Stolz places the birth of "legal
clinics" thirty years later, and seems unaware of the earlier characterization of the case method as a "legal clinic" and as the appropriate
equivalent to the medical school clinic or hospital. He seems to equate
clinical education in medicine with apprenticeship, not realizing that
the clinic stands precisely between the classroom (the old lecture
method) and practice (the daily rounds of a practicing physician).
Coming at the turn of the century, then, what actually did constitute Stolz's "legal clinics"? He explains in a footnote: "There were student-organized 'Dispensaries' at the University of Pennsylvania and at
Harvard before the turn of the century. '44 Now if the case method has
been introduced at Harvard as a clinical or laboratory way of teaching
law, a kind of legal clinic, and a very different kind of instruction is
40. P. Stolz, Clinical Experience in American Legal Education: Why Has It
Failed?

CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE

54, 54 (E.

Kitch, ed. 1969).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 55.
43. See Chase, supra note 2, at 336-40.
44. Stolz, supra note 40, at 54 n.1.
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introduced under the same name while Eliot and Langdell are both still
on the scene, we might reasonably doubt the character of our analysis
to this point. Stolz indicates that his information comes from A.Z.
Reed's Present-Day Law Schools in the United States.45
References to Reed, however, reveals the lameness of Stolz's theorization. What Stoltz calls "legal clinics," Reed describes as a response
to the legal profession's concern for social service. He indicates that the
earliest manifestation of this interest "was the establishment of a 'Dispensary' by a law club of the University of Pennsylvania law school in
1893. Later, independent legal aid societies were started among the
students at Harvard and at several other schools." '46 Harvard's legal aid
society, Reed indicates, was begun in 1913 - not "about the turn of the
century" as Stolz indicates. 47 Were these legal aid societies "conceived
on analogy to the medical school clinic," as Stolz proposes? According
to The Centennial History of the Harvard Law School:
In 1913 the Legal Aid Bureau was formed, as part of the activity of
the Law School Society of Phillips Brooks House; it is now an entirely
independent organization. It offers some of the older students an opportunity of engaging in welfare work while at the same time they acquire
can be gained in
professional experience often more enlightening than
48
the specialized practice of the modern city office.
The legal aid societies would seem to have been modelled on private welfare and charitable organizations rather than clinical education
in medicine. The systematic and comprehensive organization of concrete and practical experience in the case method law school presents a
much sharper reflection of the clinical approach to medical instruction
than the work of legal aid societies, Stolz's "legal clinics." Indeed, the
attraction of legal aid work suggested by the law school's Centennial
History is not its compensation for the absence of clinical legal instruction in the law school, but rather its advantages over other forms and
45. See A. Reed, Present-Day Law Schools in the United States and Canada
(Carnegie Foundation Bulletin No. 21 (1928)).
46. Id. at 217.
47. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
48.

HARVARD

LAW

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
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ways of acquiring "professional experience. '49 The law school sought to
provide its students with professional education, not professional experience, and the legal aid bureau's "older students" did not appear to confuse the two.
Stolz's second reply to his query regarding the "failure" of clinical
experience in legal education refers to the low repute of student legal
aid bureaus conceived as "teaching institutions" resulting from their
limitation "basically to the crisis needs of the very poor."5 0 Could the
problem be less that such clinical experience is not valued by many
legal educators than that such experience is not clinical in the context
of Eliot's transformation of modem professional education? Is such experience brought within the carefully administered process of professional transformation which is the essence of those programs sponsored
by Eliot and which liquidated the apprentice system? What Stolz actually describes is not the failure of clinical experience in legal education
but rather the ineffectual resurgence of apprenticeship within a modern
professional school system.
The modulated degree of "exposure to the real world of law practice," 51 which the case method has always represented, may simply
constitute the closest relationship to actual practice within which the
noviciate law student may be safely placed with a certain guarantee of
administrative control over the structure of professional education.
Moot courts and law clubs, actively promoted by Dean Langdell, have
long been a part of Harvard legal education and constitute, like the

case method classroom, a concrete and practical experience which can
be effectively controlled.5 2
Stolz's assertion that "practical experience" has ranked low among
the pedagogical values of American legal educators certainly does not
apply to the originators of the case method at Harvard, who gradually
foreclosed the lecture and exposition tradition within American legal
education. Professors Ames, Keener, Gray and Thayer 5s frequently

49. Id.
50. Stolz, supra note 40, at 55.
51. Id. note 40 and accompanying text.
52. See C. WARREN, 2 HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 327-31, 413-16
(1908). During the Langdell period, law clubs gradually replaced the moot courts as
the center of Harvard's oral advocacy program.
53. See id. at 419-27; Sutherland, supra note 29, at 162-299.
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found themselves defending the case method from an opposite claim:
the charge that the case method was too practical and specific to actual
adjudicated cases and the legal arguments advanced within them to be
useful. "This method of studying law," asserted New York attorney
James C. Carter in Langdell's defense,
by going to its original sources, is no royal road, no primrose path. It is
full of difficulties. It requires struggle. If there is anything which is calculated to try the human faculties in the highest degree it is to take up
the complicated facts of different cases; to separate the material from
the immaterial, the relevant from the irrelevant; to assign to each element its due weight and limitation and to give to different competing
principles and rules of law their due place in the conclusion that is to be
formed, and I know on the other hand of no greater intellectual gratification than those which follow from the solution in this way of the great
problems of the law as they successively present themselves."

Carter was convinced: the case method worked.
IV. SYSTEMATIC INSTRUCTION AND MODERN PROFESSIONALISM

The most recent, and perhaps most elaborate ever, statement of
the proposition that Langdell's main idea was that law must be considered a science is found in Professor Grant Gilmore's The Death of
Contract and The Ages of American Law. Without considering the
possibility that Langdell's major contribution was an institutionalization of the idea that modern professional education in law requires systematic instruction comparable to that in the sciences and clinical
medicine, Gilmore asserts:
Langdell seems to have been an essentially stupid man who, early in
his life, hit on one great idea to which, thereafter, he clung with all the
tenacity of genius. Langdell's idea evidently corresponded to the felt necessities of the time. However absurd, however mischievous, however
deeply rooted in error it may have been, Langdell's idea shaped our legal
thinking for fifty years.
54. Carter's comments, made at the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of
Harvard College celebration in Cambridge, are quoted in W.A. Keener, Methods of
Legal Education II, 1 YALE L.J. 147 (1892).
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Langdell's idea was that law is a science. . . . From that basic proposition several subsidiary propositions followed.
Ideologically, it followed that legal truth is a species of scientific
truth. The quality of scientific truth, as most nineteenth-century minds
understood it, is that once such a truth has been demonstrated, it endures. It is not subject to change without notice. It does not capriciously
turn into its own opposite. It is, like the mountain, there. 55
Gilmore seems to base his analysis upon an extremely limited sampling of Langdell's ideas. He suggests that "[a]part from the casebook
on Contracts (plus the Summary) and a second casebook on Sales
(1872), [Langdell] seems to have written little or nothing.""6 Although
it is true that Langdell rarely defended the case method of law teaching itself, his annual reports on the development of the Harvard Law
School between 1870 and 189557 encompass a greater number of total
pages than his Contracts casebook which, of course, was a collection of
case reports rather than original writing. Gilmore makes no mention of
these interesting reports.
In the major biographical essay on Langdell (to which Gilmore
does not refer), James Barr Ames5 8 spends two pages discussing (without exaggerating their impact) Langdell's books and essays, including
at least twelve articles in The Harvard Law Review. The last of these
constitutes an intriguing study of the relationship between law and society in nineteenth century Britain. 59 Langdell even published a short
history of the Harvard Law School between 1869 and 1894, the period

55. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42-43 (1977).
56. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 109 (1974).
57. See FORTY-SIxTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF HARVARD COLLEGE: 1870-1871 (1872) through ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENT AND TREASURER OF HARVARD COLLEGE 1894-95 (1896) Langdell's portion of these quite extensive reports on university life and politics as well as growth and development, always
begins: "Sir, - I beg to submit the following report upon the Law School for the
Id.
academic year _"
58.

J. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS

467-82 (1913).
59. Id. at 474-75. See C. Langdell, Dominant Opinions In England During The
Nineteenth Century In Relation To Legislation'AsIllustratedBy English Legislation,
Or The Absence Of It, During That Period, 19 HARV. L. REV. 151 (1906). See also
note 112 infra.
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of his deanship.eo
In his sketch of the law school, Langdell discussed the following
changes in legal education which he conceived to be most significant:
(1) the development of a new course of study; (2) conferring degrees
only upon examination; (3) improvement of the library and appointment of a permanent librarian; (4) development of a new method of
study and instruction, utilizing casebooks rather than treatises; (5)
holding regular faculty meetings; (6) the gradual increase of tuition
fees; (7) establishment of examinations regulating advancement from
one year to the next; (8) hiring J.B. Ames as an assistant professor in
the law school while he was only a student; (9) establishment of the
distinction between ordinary and honor degrees; (10) final extension of
the degree program to three required years of study; (11) establishment
of entrance examinations for those without college degrees; (12) completion of Austin Hall; (13) founding of the Harvard Law School Association; (14) establishment of The HarvardLaw Review; (15) issuing a
complete catalogue of all the graduates of the law school; (16) listing
108 colleges from which prospective law degree candidates should have
graduated; (17) increase in the number of faculty and students in the
law school."'
The single most important change, Langdell seemed to believe,
was the establishment of law school teaching as a career in its own
right, as well as the hiring of Harvard graduates as law teachers not
only at Harvard but in schools across the country. Indeed, the professionalization of law teaching was a prerequisite to the realization of
Langdell's "main idea" (which he shared with Eliot); the development
of systematic and comprehensive, university-based professional education. Langdell argued that the law should be studied not from treatises
but directly and in a rigorous way from the reported case decisions
themselves. "The method," asserted Eliot,
was much derided at the start by lawyers who had been brought up on
treatises and commentaries on treatises; but it soon justified itself in a
conclusive way. After a few years it was demonstrated that young men
who had been thus trained to the practice of the law could make them60. C. Langdell, The Harvard Law School, 1869-1894, 2

THE HARV. GRADU-

490 (1893-1894).
Id. at 494-98.

ATES MAGAZINE

61.
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selves more useful to their seniors in the offices they entered than fresh
law graduates had ever been before, and than young men contemporaneously trained in other methods. There followed a rapid growth of the

Harvard Law School which has continued to this day, in spite of numerous restrictive measures which demanded better preparation for admisdegree in arts or
sion, more years of residence and finally a preliminary
62

science as a condition of entrance to the School.

Did these momentous changes occur in the wake of a new gospel,
a spreading faith in the scientific quality of law or was the transformation of the American legal profession at the heart of things?
The changes which were taking place in the practice of American
law toward the end of the nineteenth century were closely related to
the growth of industrialism and urbanism under the direction of corporate capitalism. The birth of new professions and the transformation of
older ones within the matrix of industrial society constitute, according
to sociologist Magali S. Larson, one aspect of the process of social
modernization. 'Most research analyses, Larson asserts,
implicitly or explicitly present professionalization as an instance of the
complex process of 'modernization.' For professions, the most significant
'modern' dimensions are the advance of science and cognitive rationality,
and the related rationalization and growing differentiation in the division
of labor. From this point of view, professions are typical products of
modern industrial society. The continuity of older professions with their
'pre-industrial' past is therefore more apparent than real.68
The effort to maintain continuity of appearance against the real
background of discontinuity and transformation provoked, by the beginning of the twentieth century, a crisis of self-image within the legal
profession. "In the opening decades of the century," historian Richard
Hofstadter points out, "the American legal profession was troubled by
an internal crisis, a crisis in self-respect precipitated by the conflict between the image of legal practice inherited from an earlier age of more
independent professionalism and the realities of modern commercial
62.

Eliot, supra note 7, at 202-03. See also C.

CONCRETE AND PRACTICAL IN MODERN EDUCATION

63.

ELIOT, THE TENDENCY TO THE

(1913).

Larson, supra note 1, at xvi.
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practice."
It is important to add that the movement away from what Hofstadter calls a "more independent professionalism" constituted a movement toward deployment of a model of "cognitive rationality" (e.g., the
spread of case method legal education as standarized professional training), and sharper internal stratification or what Larson describes as
"growing differentiation in the division of labor." 5
In Hofstadter's view, the older and more independent professionalism among attorneys had been characterized by lawyers whose status
and reputation derived from the quality of their courtroom advocacy
and broad learning; men of considerable public influence and power
within a widely remarked tradition of American statesmanship, whose
sense of public responsibility was bound up with a self-conception of
being officers of the court as well as agents of particular clients, and
who were members of a democratic profession, access to which was
open to virtually all as a kind of "natural right.""8 By the end of the
century, however, the status and fortune of leading members of the bar
came increasingly to depend upon effective counsel and advice rather
than courtroom forensics. The public influence of attorneys also resulted more from their close relationship to concentrations of private
capital rather than from having provided the rank and file of practicing
politicians. Lawyers saw themselves less and less as officers of the court
and increasingly (in the words of one troubled attorney) as "clerks on a
salary" to those paying the most generous retainers. And the development towards higher standards in the law schools and promulgation of
codes of ethical conduct in the new professional organizations signalled
both sharper distinctions between the various echelons within the
67
profession.
"At the turn of the century," Hofstadter argues,
lawyers as a group were far less homogeneous than they had been fifty
years before. The large, successful firms, which were beginning even then
to be called 'legal factories,' were headed by the wealthy, influential, and
normally very conservative minority of the profession that tended to be
64.
65.
66.
67.

R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 156 (1955).
See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 64, at 157.
See id. at 156-64. See also Larson, supra note 1, at 166-77.
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most conspicuous in the Bar Associations.6 8
"There was a second echelon of lawyers," Hofstadter continues,
in small but well-established offices of the kind that flourished in smaller
cities; lawyers of this sort, who were commonly attached to and often
shared the outlook of new enterprisers or small businessmen, frequently
staffed and conducted local politics. A third echelon, consisting for the
most part of small partnerships or individual practitioners, usually carried on a catch-as-catch-can practice and eked out modest livings. As
the situation of the independent practitioners deteriorated, they often
drifted into ambulance-chasing and taking contingent fees. Much of the
talk in Bar Associations about improving legal ethics represented the unsympathetic efforts of the richer lawyers with corporate connections to
improve the reputation of the profession as a whole at the expense of
their weaker colleagues.6 9
Hofstadter's concluding sentence is quite important: it remained
necessary for elite lawyers to improve the reputation of the profession
"as a whole" in order to improve their own standing within public opinion. At the level of formal professional status, elite attorneys were indistinguishable from the very bottom rung of the professional hierarchy. This fact resulted from an important difference between the
formal organization of the American and English bars.
Legal historian J. Willard Hurst points out that the colonial
American bar had before it the example of England's distinction between a higher order of barristers or courtroom advocates and lower
echelon of solicitors or client-caretakers. 7 0 The barrister-solicitor distinction in England, according to Hurst,
brought the ablest practitioners together, to form the Inns of Court. Legal education was controlled by the members of the Inns, and these lawyers early began to specialize in advocacy, which was then the most desirable part of law practice. Despite its chance beginnings, the barristersolicitor distinction grew into a maze of social, legal, and economic

68.

HOFSTADTER,

supra note 64, at 157.

69. Id.
70. See

J.

HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 252-

54, 309-11 (1950).
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In Colonial Virginia, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, Hurst observes the initial American replication of the English bifurcation of formal status within the legal profession. But the combination of a highly
mobile class structure in the United States with the specific circumstances surrounding the Revolution (e.g., popular revulsion against the
English, the end of formal training for American lawyers at the Inns of
Court, hostility to leading members of the bar who had maintained
Royalist sympathies) broke up the early influence of local bar associations and professional groups. "In 1790," Hurst concludes, "the country was poor, scattered and sparsely settled, and engrossed in exploiting
its natural wealth; conditions would not allow law practice to develop
according to the costly etiquette of the peculiar English type of lawyers' specialization. 7 2
Indeed, we may even argue that (as Larson suggests) modem professionalism is so closely wedded to industrialization that the first efforts at professional organization in American law filed as consequence
of their prematurity in relation to social and economic conditions.
Thus, if the nineteenth century (in its industrial phase) is marked by
waves of professionalization, it is also (in its pre-industrial phase)
marked by waves of deprofessionalization which constitute the
equivalent in the United States of decolonization in the professions.
This is the sort of historical contour outlined by Robert H. Wiebe, who
suggests that "[e]arly in the nineteenth century educational and apprenticeship requirements had still restricted the practice of law in
many parts of the East."'73
"As in medicine," continues Wiebe,
deprofessionalization moved apace in the second quarter of the century,
when democratized, decentralized admission to the bar demolished practically all standards. Training passed from the colleges to a convenient
law office, and along with thousands of others, John Peter Altgeld, an
indifferent student, passed the bar examination after reading for a few
months in his spare time. A great many practiced law as a sideline. ...
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 310.
R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 at 116 (1967).
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It was [an elite of legal experts], partly to honor themselves, partly to
work for higher standards, who in the seventies began organizing city
and state bar associations, capped in 1878 by the American Bar Association. What started gradually became a flood after 1890. The expanding
need for carefully trained lawyers shifted education back to the classroom, where in the better schools the quality of instruction rose
rapidly. .. 7
If the shift in legal education brought law students into the classrooms of the rising university professional schools (increasingly adopting the case method of instruction), and if the shift in professional organization brought attorneys in increasing numbers within city and
state bar associations, the shift in legal practice itself brought greater
numbers of lawyers into the employment of large corporations and
financial institutions. It was true, of course, that as early as the 1850's
attorneys such as Richard Blatchford had brought business to their
firms from corporations involved with railroad consolidation or other
commercial transactions.75 But it was not until the Civil War that corporations, in conjunction with expanding transport and communications
infrastructures and the growth of great cities, began to provide the major retainers for America's elite lawyers.
The concentration of industrial and financial power which accompanied the growth of corporate capitalism transformed the conventional
practice of estate planning into a major business speciality and both
patent and personal injury law became of sufficient importance to warrant their own practicing bars.7
The gradual expansion of government regulation of private corporate activity during the Progressive period 77 created challenging work
for attorneys who could safely guide their clients through the statutory
obstacle course. "Within this purely professional frame of reference,"
writes Hurst, "the most basic change in the nature of lawyers' professional work was the shift in emphasis from advocacy to counseling...
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 116-17.
See HURST, supra note 70, at 298.
Id. at 298-99.
See HOFSTADTER, supra note 64. See also G.

KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF
CONSERvATIsM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963); J.
WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE 1900-1918 (1968).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss3/1

28

et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue
348

Nova Law Journal

5:1981

The years after 1870 showed a more matter-of-fact attitude, a prevailing distaste for litigation as a costly luxury, and increasing effort to use
law and lawyers preventively. 7 8
The implication of these changes for legal education was not that
law students should be graduated as patent or railroad lawyers, or as
experts in various kinds of "legal prevention." What rising standards
for the profession "as a whole" and legitimation of stratification within
the profession on the basis of competence and credentialism meant was
that the older lecture system of instruction in the schools as well as the
apprentice system (or any system, for that matter) outside the schools
could not be effective. The broad sweep of these changes is explained
by Magali Larson:
[T]he passage from restricted monopolies of practice to the organization and control of expanded and competitive markets was a necessary
one for the professional sectors of the middle class, seeking to improve
their position in the emergent stratification systems of capitalist society.
Their task presupposed the abandonment - deliberate or involuntary - of
the restrictive corporate warrants of professional credibility. It tended
toward the reconstruction of monopoly on the universalistic principles
dictated by the new dominant ideology. The crowning of this monopolistic project appears to be a set of legally enforced monopolies of practice.
However, the actual effectiveness of such sanctions depends on the parallel construction of a 'monopoly of credibility' with the larger public. The
conquest of official privilege and public favor was, for the professions, a
double external task of ideological persuasion, which had an internal
precondition: the unification of the corresponding areas of the social division of labor under the direction of a leading group of professional
79
reformers.
And with special relevance to the emergence after 1870 of the case
method law school, Larson concludes: "The crucial means for this unification, and therefore the concrete core of the professions' organizational task, was systematic training - or, in my terms, the standardized
and centralized production of professional producers." 8 0 The case
method (which made possible for the first time the standardized in78.

79.

supra note 70, at 302.
Larson, supra note 1, at 16-17.
HURST,

80. Id. at 17.
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struction of large numbers of students) in the hands of full-time professional law teachers secured a spectacular centralization of the professional training of attorneys. It is thus hardly surprising that Langdell,
as we have seen, regarded the initiation of the law teaching profession
at Harvard to be of singular importance. Indeed, even beyond the project of general standardization for the profession as a whole, a relative
handful of prominent law professors spread through a number of prestigious university law schools could train the leading members of bench
and bar for generations."1
At a time when enrollments were still limited to handfuls of students and university professional schools were struggling to stay alive,
Charles Eliot already perceived the case method's potential as an instrument of standardization and controlled expansion. "It should be the
aim of a University's Law School," he wrote in 1874-75, "to train
young men of good preliminary education and average ability, taken by
the hundred. . ."I"

".

The rigorous training of large numbers of law

students, who would carry with them the network of professional relations developed in Cambridge, remained a trademark of the Harvard
Law School long after Eliot and Langdell had turned the responsibility
of educational leadership to their successors.
V. HARVARD ON THE OFFENSIVE
If, in retrospect, the case method law school appears to be the almost inevitable solution to the problem of "standardized and centralized production of professional producers"83 confronted by the American legal profession during its period of historic "modernization,""
nothing was quite so simple or transparent to American lawyers and
educators in 1870. On the contrary, Eliot and Langdell initially met
considerable opposition to their reform program. Any notion of a kind
of fatalistic determination by which the social and structural transfor81. See Langdell, supra note 60. See also the interesting discussion in GILMORE,
supra note 55, at 57-58 and J. Auerbach, Scientific Expertise: The Triumph of the
New Professoriat, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 74-101 (1976).
82. Warren, supra note 52, at 396-97 (quoting C. Eliot).
83. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
84. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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mation of the professions automatically precipitated a rationalization of
the professional training programs would entirely exclude the actual
factor of human agency, the intervention by relatively autonomous individuals within the movement of things. History may present a certain
configuration of circumstances, but that totality must still be accurately
comprehended by willful individuals capable of initiating change.
When considering the role of human agency in social transformation,
theorist Antonia Gramsci remarked:
Real will is disguised as an act of faith, a sure rationality of history,
a primitive and empirical form of impassioned finalism which appear as
a substitute for the predestination, providence etc., of the confessional
religions. We must insist on the fact that even in such cases there exists
in reality a strong active will. .

.

. We must stress the fact that fatalism

has only been a cover by the weak for an active and real will. This is
why it is always necessary to show the futility of mechanical determinism, which, explicable as a naive philosphy of the masses, becomes a
cause of passivity, of imbecile self-sufficiency, when it is made into a
reflective and coherent philosopy on the part of the intellectuals .... 85
Neither Eliot nor Langdell were willing to leave the orchestration
of modern American legal education to providence, and their pedagogy
was a reaction against the "imbecile self-sufficiency" of apologists for
the educational status-quo.
Their self-consciousness regarding the relationship between a restructuring of American legal education and the transformation of the
legal profession itself is clearly revealed in their annual reports,8 6 particularly Langdell's reports on the condition of the law school for the
years 1876-77 and 1880-81.
Beyond recapitulating the enrollment and financial figures for the
year in relation to previous years, Langdell's main focus in his annual
report for 1876-77 was the peculiar situation of law in relation to the
other professional disciplines and how it had led Harvard into a serious
conflict with the state (i.e., public authority, particularly state courts
85. L. ALTHUssER, FOR MARX 105 (1977) (quoting A. Gamisci, I/ Materialismo Storico E La Filosofia De Benedetto Croce, 2 OPERE 13-14; THE MODERN
PRINcE

86.

69-70).
See note 57 supra.
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and legislatures) regarding the future of legal education. Langdell referred to the fact that while admission to the clerical, medical, and
scientific professions was controlled by the professions themselves, admission to the legal profession was controlled by the state which gave
neither "recognition [n]or countenance"' 7 to the Harvard Law School.
The only "privilege" 88 the school received, even in Massachusetts, was
that of having time spent by a student in the school accepted as an
equivalent to the same amount spent as an apprentice in a lawyer's
office.
Although Langdell pointed to recent movements in New York and
Massachusetts to raise standards of admission to the legal profession,
he was worried by the fact that such movements were not under the
control of the law schools nor designed to make university legal education essential to preparation for the bar. "[N]either this Law School
nor any other," stated Langdell, "has participated at all in this movement, nor directly exercised any influence over it; nor was it in any
degree the aim or object of the movement either to support and
strengthen law schools, or to make use of them in furtherance of the
objects in view." 8 9
The special situation of the legal profession was precipitated not
only by its subordination to state control of admissions but the kind of
control enforced which represented a special way of interpreting the
relation of the American to the English legal profession. "The true
cause" of the problem, asserted Langdell,
will be found primarily in the fact that the American lawyer represents
two professions, which, in their nature, are distinct, which call into exercise different qualities of mind and character, and which require different kinds and degrees of education and training for their successful pursuit; namely, the professions of attorney and counsellor respectively. One
reason why these two professions have always been pursued in this country by the same persons, undoubtedly is that they have generally been
supposed to be one and the same profession. Sometimes, indeed, it is
assumed that a lawyer is only an attorney, and at other times that he is
87.

C. Langdell, Annual Report on the Law School, FIFrY-SEcoN.-D
1876-77 at 87 (1878).
Id.
Id. at 87-88.
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88.
89.
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only a counsellor; but the fact is seldom intelligently recognized that he
is both. Moreover, the State has commonly treated the legal profession,
especially as regards every thing relating to the preparation for it and
the admission into it, as if its members were attorneys merely; and this
view has not been regarded with disfavor by the profession itself, for the
idea is deeply rooted that every young man should begin as an attorney
merely, and that age and experience alone are a sufficient warrant for
assuming the position of a counsellor. Accordingly, our States, in dealing
with the legal profession, have copied the English practice relating to
attorneys. 9o
The distinction which Langdell draws between attorneys and counsellors is, of course, identical to the English distinction between solicitors and barristers (Langdell uses the words "counsellor" and "barrister" interchangeably).91 What is extraordinary is Langdell's assertion
that the two are separate "in their natures," and not merely in England. He does not deny that the two "professions" of attorney and
counsellor have been pursued in the United States "by the same persons," but he implies that this practice confuses two quite different
legal roles.
The reason that Langdell offers for the two professions having
been pursued in the United States by the same persons "isthat they
have generally been supposed to be one and the same profession." 92 But
why, then, the general supposition in favor of a formally unified legal
profession in America? Langdell does not pursue the historical contour
beyond this initial tautology. He is more interested in exploring the
implications of confusing the two professional identities.
The most serious consequence would appear to be adoption on the
part of the State of the English practice relating to attorneys. In its
initial form, this practice provides the basic justification for State control over admission to the profession. The State had no claim over the
loyalty of barristers who were subordinate only to their colleges from
which they were "called" to the law. Beyond this necessary first step,
treating all American lawyers like members of the lower order in the
English profession resulted in dramatically limited restrictions upon
90. Id. at 88.
91. Id. at 88-90.
92. Id. at 88.
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ways of preparing for the American bar.
Langdell obviously admired the independence of the English
barrister,
[who] is not an officer of the courts, and the latter have neither more nor
less authority over him than they have over litigants who conduct their
own causes without the assistance of counsel. Such being the status of
English barristers, it is needless to -say that there is nothing analogous to
it in the condition of the legal profession in this country. On the other
hand, if we inquire into the status of attorneys in England, we shall find
ourselves on familiar ground. While barristers are supposed to constitute
a learned and liberal profession of the highest grade, attorneys have always been regarded and treated more as artisans than as professional
men; and their chief marks of distinction from the public at large, so far
as regards their legal status, consist in their receiving their appointment
from the State, in their being liable to have this appointment revoked at
any moment, and in their being constantly subject to the surveillance of

the courts.

...

93

If there was a gradual development within the upper echelons of
the American legal profession of a shift from predominantly advocacy
practice to that of counsel and legal prevention, there never developed
in the American legal profession (even at the corporate firm level) a
functional split equivalent to that between solicitors and barristers in
England. Indeed, in regard to practical lawyering functions, J. Willard
Hurst argues:
In the nineteenth century the advocate emerged as the model of the
leader of the bar in the United States, and successful firms typically included a 'court' lawyer and an 'office' lawyer. Such a partnership was
itself a development that differed basically from the English pattern.
Neither in fact nor in form was the advocate in this country confined, as
was the English barrister, to appearing in court and giving 'opinions.'
After 1870 leadership at the bar in the United States went to men
who more resembled the solicitor. But, as in the early case of the advocate, these 'solicitors' were not confined to the role that English etiquette
would have assigned them. In such men as Elihu Root or Louis D. Brandeis the bar of the United States developed a type of leader peculiarly its

93. Id. at 89.
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own. Such men94mingled the roles of barrister, solicitor, business adviser,
and statesman.
In short, the English categories so poorly fit the American reality
that the shift from advocacy to counsel functions might just as well be
designated as a shift from "counsellor" (or barrister) to "solicitor," so
long as one spoke in terms of specific functions performed rather than
in terms of relative access to official privilege. But it is precisely the
latter which was of paramount concern to Dean Langdell. Indeed, his
whole conception of the distinction "in their nature" between attorneys
and counsellors revolved not upon differences in function but rather
upon distinctions in social background, formal status, and recognized
privilege.
It was "different qualities of mind and character" which required
"different kinds and degrees of education and training"9 5 which attracted Langdell to the English professional categories. Echoing Foucault's comparison of doctors educated through clinical experience to
health officers trained through apprenticeship, 96 it was the English distinction between a "learned and liberal profession of the highest grade"
and a lower order "treated more as artisans than as professional
men" 97 to which Langdell was drawn, like a moth to the luminous gaslamps of Victorian English stability. And it was England which revealed most strikingly the ultimate rewards of distinguishing between
art and science, between apprenticeship and professional education:
Indeed, it is doubtful if ever, in any country, any profession has occupied a position so exalted as the higher branch of the legal profession
in England. In consequence of a very highly centralized judicial system,
and in consequence of the profession being divided by law into two
branches (counsel and attorneys), all the members of the higher branch,
at least with few exceptions, reside in the metropolis and form a large,
compact, distinguished, and influential body of men, inheriting great traditions, endowed with great privileges, and clothed with great powers, with the power, among others, of determining, without appeal, what new
members shall be admitted into the body, and whether existing members
94. HURST, supra note 70,
95. See note 90 supra and
96. See note 11 supra and
97. See note 93 supra and
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shall remain in it, and upon what terms. I say without appeal; for,
though the judges have a visitorial power over the body, yet the judges
are all taken from the body and continue to be members of it. Every
member of this body, on the one hand, feels the influence, shares the
advantages, and enjoys the support and protection of the entire body,
and, on the other hand, has all the members of the body to compete
with; and upon those who succeed in struggling to the front the State
showers its honors and rewards to an extent absolutely unprecedented.
Under such a system, legal education will take care of itself in a great
measure, at least so far as the interests of the public are concerned. In
this country, on the other hand, the State has, upon the whole, done its
best to reduce the legal profession to the level of an ordinary pursuit; it
has neither done anything for it, nor permitted it as a body to do anything for itself.98
If the State would not formally distinguish and endow an upper
echelon of American lawyers, then that professional project would be
carried forward by "the body" itself or, at least, a leadership cadre
from within it. At the level of professional training, this meant that law
schools would have to take the initiative themselves (with whatever risk
of declining enrollments) in raising standards and providing national
and systematic (rather than local or arbitrary) professional education.
At the level of professional organization, this meant that lawyers would
have to be persuaded of the potential influence which arose from common association. "The profession does not constitute one organized
body at all;" asserted Langdell, "and if it can be said to have any organized bodies within it, they are of the slightest and feeblest description, and do not embrace respectively more than a single city or
county." 99
Langdell, of course, did not have long to wait for the nascent bar
associations to begin to discover their strength and assert their demands for professional self-regulation. 100 What he and Eliot had realized (somewhat ahead of everyone else) was the necessary relationship
between modem professionalism and the educational process through
which new members of the professions would be recruited and trained,
C. Langdell, Annual Report on the Law School, ANNUAL REPORTS
1880-81 at 80-81 (1881).
99. Id. at 81.
100. See, e.g., HURST, supra note 70 and Auerbach, supra note 81.
98.

OF THE

PRESIDENT AND TREASURER OF HARVARD COLLEGE
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then funnelled into various organized strata within the profession. "The
only sure way of raising the professional standard," argued Langdell,
"is by raising the standard of legal attainments, education, and character in the men by whom the profession is recruited, or at least in the
better class of them."101 And it was the case method law school elaborated at Harvard during this period which proved the most effective
device for "raising the standard of legal attainments" among those who
would assume new roles in determining "what new members shall be
°
admitted into the body. 102
The anachronistic and inefficient apprentice system could never
provide the "standardized and centralized production of professional
producers" required by modern professionalism. "In short," Langdell
claimed, retaining his distinction between artisans and professionals:
while a lawyer's office is the only place in which an expert attorney can
be made, it cannot be too clearly understood that it is not a fit place in
which to learn anything relating to the profession of a counsellor or advocate. .

.

. The art of the attorney, being in its nature local, should be

acquired in the place where it is to be practised; while the science of the
advocate, being confined within no narrower limits than the system of
English and American law, may be best acquired, other things being
equal, in the place where that system of law is studied and taught most
exclusively as a science, i.e., exclusively of every thing local, temporary,
or arbitrary. This consideration alone is sufficient to settle conclusively
the destiny of this school; and accordingly, from the time of its first establishment on its present basis, the policy has been uniformly declared
and acted upon of making it national, not local. To depart from this
policy voluntarily would be madness; to be forced to depart from it
would be ruin."'
Just as Eliot's contribution to modern professional education consisted of a struggle on two fronts (against the expository lecture tradition in the schools and against the independent apprenticeship outside
the schools), 104 the survival of the Harvard Law School (by the 1870s
required a struggle against both madness and ruin, against (respec101.

Langdell, supra note 98, at 82.

102.

Id. at 80-81.

103.
104.

Langdell, supra note 87, at 91-92.
See text at sections I and II supra.
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tively) the local bar and the state. This involved a defense of the "study
of law as a science" as much in terms of what it excluded ("everything
local, temporary, and arbitrary") as what it included (the systematic
study of individual case reports).
Defending the case method from voluntary abandonment under
pressure included convincing the local bar of its superiority to the apprentice system. Additionally, it meant preservation and enhancement
(against parochial interests) of Harvard as a national law school preparing lawyers for practice in New York, the Middle West, and
throughout the country, rather than only in Boston or other New England communities.
Defending the case method from forced abandonment at Harvard
meant convincing the state (particularly New York) to admit Harvard
Law School graduates to licensed practice on the same basis as graduates of state schools. If individual states gave preference in admission
to the bar (through a variety of means including reduction of standards) to graduates of state schools, then students would attend law
school where they planned to practice. This would not only defeat
Harvard's national aspirations and tend to reduce the capacity of the
profession to develop national organizations, but it would specifically
reduce the numbers of students planning to practice in New York City
who would study for a law degree at Harvard. Eliot and Langdell go to
great lengths in their annual reports to underscore their sense of propriety in requesting equal treatment from the states: it was not a question
of anyone favoring Harvard but rather of the state merely permitting
the legal profession (with Harvard playing a leadership role) to improve its own standards and practices. "The Law School," Langdell
indicated,
therefore, has all the reasons for continuing its present policy that it has
for continuing to exist; and what is required, therefore, is that the State
should realize its need of the service which the Law School is seeking to
render it, and that it should recognize in the Law School (and in institutions of similar character and aims) an instrument (and the only one
within its reach) by which this service can be secured without expense or
charge to the public. All that the School asks of the State, in the way of
action, is that it give to candidates for the legal profession the option of
preparing themselves for its higher branch, and that it recognize an institution which furnishes the means and facilities for such preparation as

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss3/1

38

et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue
Nova Law Journal

I 358

5:19811

doing a national and not a local work.10 5
Did Harvard Law School under Eliot and Langdell prepare students for the "higher branch" of the profession because, at Harvard,
law was taught and studied as a science? Or did Langdell consider the
case method "scientific" because it was the best means of training professionals, as opposed to mere "attorneys"? Did case method study in a
national law school exclude "everything local, temporary, and arbitrary" because it was taught as a science, or was the reverse true?
Langell's principal commitment was to the construction of a firstclass professional law school which would contribute to the standardized and centralized production of upper echelon lawyers. He seemed
willing to recruit the language of science, or of England's professional
traditions, and impose them upon the ensemble of immediate circumstances and options which Harvard confronted, always with his goals
clearly in view. Indeed, without elaboration, Langdell asserted that the
development of national law schools and the consolidation of power
within national professsional organizations constituted a service to the
state (without mentioning the profession itself) for which the state
should be grateful because the public was not being charged. Obviously, Langdell was single-minded in his faith in the professional
project.
In his annual report for 1876-77, Langdell stated:
The difficulty of examining in a given subject is in proportion to the
difficulty of teaching it; and there can be no doubt that English and
American law is one of the most difficult subjects to teach. The opinion
has, indeed, been prevalent that it is incapable of being taught as a science; and, though the correctness of this opinion will not be admitted by
those who represent this School, it may be supported by plausible arguments. Law has not the demonstrative certainty of mathematics; nor
does one's knowledge of it admit of many simple and easy tests, as in
case of a dead or foreign language; nor does it acknowledge truth as its
ultimate test and standard,like natural science; nor is our law embodied
in a written text, which is to be studied and expounded, as is the case
with the Roman law and with some foreign systems. Finally, our law has
not any long-established and generally recognized traditions which will
105.

Langdell, supra note 87, at 92.
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indicate to the examiner what his examination ought to be, and to the
student what it will be; .. .10
Situated within Grant Gilmore's theoretical outline of the development of American law, Christopher Langdell would appear to be (on
the basis of the statement above) an anti-Langdellian, crypto-Legal
Realist. The one idea to which Gilmore leads us to believe Langdell
will cling tenaciously, the Harvard Dean hurls to the winds. How can
such things be?
In fact, Langdell was once again confronted with a challenge to
the professional project being developed at the Harvard Law School.
The progressive development of state requirements regarding legal education ("making a reasonably long period of pupilage a sine qua non of
admission to the profession")10 7 appeared threatened by the idea that a
sufficiently objective and scientific bar admissions examination could be
administered that would provide entry to the profession for those who
were qualified and would reject those who were not, rendering unnecessary any reference to whether or not the candidate had studied in a law
school.
Here, for the first time, the "law as science" philosophy (which
Langdell had deployed so effectively in distinguishing apprenticeship
from professional education) suddenly (borrowing Gilmore's phrase)
"turned into its opposite"'10 8 and cut directly against the elaboration of
university-based, three-year professional schools as the heart of the professional project's initiation program. And, in a stroke, Langdell effectively abandons the philosophy. To be sure, the weight of his "other"
position rests heavily enough upon his words that he goes to the trouble
of finessing the discontinuity ("though the correctness of this opinion
will not be admitted by those who represent this School," etc.). 10 Nevertheless, there can be no mistaking Langdell's intention: he seeks to
downplay the presumed identity between law and science sufficiently
that no argument can be advanced in behalf of passing "scientific" examinations as the exclusive prerequisite to admission to the legal
profession.
106. Id. at 96-97 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 95.

108. See

GILMORE,

note 55 supra and accompanying text.

109. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
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In conclusion, at times Langdell makes scientific knowledge analogous to systematic (as in the German sense of Wissenschaft, knowledge
which can be studied systematically) 10 and legitimately describes the
case method as scientific study because the case method law school (in
relation to the old lecture academies and the apprentice system) constituted systematic and standardized professional training. At other times,
he leaves room for a different relation between law and science to be
read into his words, one where the analogy to the rigour of the physical
sciences seems implied. But as soon as it appears such a reading may
jeopardize the developing professional project at the Harvard Law
School, the "law as science" position is dramatically undercut.
This conclusion is reflected in relation to the broader structure of
nineteenth century American legal development by Professor Morton
Horwitz:
Perry Miller has shown the dominance of the equation of law with
science in all antebellum legal theorizing. Except for the identification of
'science' with systematization and classification, however, there is no coherent content or methodology to be found in these persistent claims to
the scientific character of law. What does seem extremely clear, nevertheless, is that the attempt to place law under the banner of 'science' was
designed to separate politics from law, subjectivity from objectivity, and
laymen's reasoning from professional reasoning." 1
Thus, Eliot and Langdell's "subjective" vision of how the American legal profession should be organized (and what methods should be
employed to secure professionalization in the schools) could be made to
appear "objective" and (at least in theory) appeal to the modern mind,
by characterizing the case method law school as a scientific enterprise.
But a somewhat different (and equally subjective) vision of the legal
profession, promoted by state courts or legislatures, could just as readily be made to appear "objective" and above politics through utilization
of "scientific" bar examinations to determine admission to the profession. In that instance, Langdell was as adroit as Professor Gilmore in
debunking an easy identification of law with the physical sciences. "A
110. See R.W. FRIEDRICHS, A SOCIOLOGY
111. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
257 (1977).

Published by NSUWorks, 1981

OF SOCIOLOGY 204-05 (1970).
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860,

at

41

Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 1

I

5:1981

Origins of Professional Education

361 1
I

better symbol could hardly be found;" suggests Gilmore, "if Langdell
had not existed, we would have had to invent him." 11 2 Langdell did
exist, of course. But that did not prevent Professor Gilmore from inventing him anyway.
VI. LEGAL EDUCATION REGARDED As A SOCIAL RELATION
It is reasonable to argue that Charles Eliot and Christopher Langdell were at times willing to associate law with science as a kind of
rhetorical device, clever salesmanship on the part of premier educational entrepreneurs.11 3 Obviously, they were also capable of regarding
112. GILMORE, supra note 55, at 42.
113. Besides its genuine contributions to intellectual argument, Darwinism
was also used as a popular rhetorical device. Though it might explain nothing, intellectuals found that an illusion to the theory of evolution was an
interesting way to say something quite ordinary, or to provide a scientific
explanation for change. In his fascinating essay Individualism and Collectivism, for example, Charles W. Eliot of Harvard used the concept of a
biological sport - a departure from predictable heredity - to explain how an
intelligent student might have poorly educated, lower-class parents.
J. GILBERT,

DESIGNING THE INDUSTRIAL STATE: THE INTELLECTUAL PURSUIT OF COLLECTIVISM IN AMERICA 1880-1940 at 45 (1972).

The chapter of Dicey's Law and Public Opinion described by Langdell as most
clearly belonging in a "law book" includes a warning against overstating the law's relation to science similar to Langdell's own disclaimer quoted in the text accompanying
note 106 supra.
If one may be allowed to apply the terms of logic to law, one is tempted to
assert that judicial legislation proceeds by a process of induction, whilst parliamentary legislation proceeds, or may proceed, by a process of deduction. This
contrast contains an element of truth. . . but the suggested contrast, unless its
limits be very carefully kept in mind, is apt to be delusive. The Courts no doubt
do not begin by laying down a general principle, but then a great deal of their
best work consists in drawing out the conclusions deducible from well-established
principles, and has therefore a deductive character. . . ordinary judicial legislation is logical, the best judicial legislation is scientific.
A.V. DICEY, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND 370, n.1 (2d ed. 1962).

If much of legal realism contends that courts do, indeed, often argue from predetermined principles or bias, Dicey has broken sufficiently in his analysis with any
"delusive" belief in the inductive science of law that Gilmore's Langdell should reasonably be expected to respond with angry disagreement. Instead, Langdell praises Dicey's
social-historical orientation and concludes: "Any American who wishes to know the
England of the nineteenth century as if he were a native will find in Professor Dicey,
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legal education at Harvard as a science precisely because it was systematic professional preparation of counsellors who would join a "compact, distinguished, and influential body of men" 114 - just the opposite
of merely artisan training turning out legal handicrafters like wooden
tops.
But that is not what is important. In the end, it does not make
much difference exactly how or why Eliot and Langdell regarded law
as science. Indeed, for our purposes, it is not even necessary to decide
whether the equation law equals science is true.11 5 Our analysis must
be carried out on a different level. Recall Professor Gilmore's focus
upon an ideological demystification of Langdellian scientism. Yet why
was Langdell so successful? Gilmore hardly seems interested. He asserts that "Langdell's idea evidently corresponded to the felt necessities
of the time," ' 6 and adds that
[s]ooner or later a Blackstone or a Langdell appears .... If a Black-

stone or a Langdell comes at the right time, he will be heard and his
words will, for a generation, be devoutly believed: his message is a comforting one and ought to be true even if it is not. Since Langdell was
heard and was believed, he evidently came at the right time.'
From the point of view of serious social thought, nothing is "evidently" or obviously correct and virtually nothing can be relied upon to
happen "sooner or later." No explanation of social reality makes any
sense absent reference to the concrete structure of social relations. "In
other words," asserts Pashukanis,
we must determine whether or not legal categories are such objective
forms of thought (objective for an historically specific society) which correspond to objective social relationships. Consequently, our question is: is
it possible to understand law as a social relationshipin the same sense

who is a worthy successor of Blackstone, an incomparable instructor." Langdell, supra
note 59, at 167. See also E.J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF CAPITAL 1848-1875, at 251-76
(1976).
114. See Langdell, note 98 supra and accompanying text.
115. For brief but convincing arguments that it isn't, see W. SEAGLE, THE
QUEST FOR LAW 13-15 (1941) and R. POUND, 2 JURISPRUDENCE § 64 (1959).
116. GILMORE, supra note 55, at 42.
117. Id. at 64.
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in which Marx termed capital a social relationship?Such a statement of

the question pre-empts reference to the ideological nature of law, and all
our consideration is transferred to an entirely different level. 118
Therefore, it is necessary to conceive the theorization of "law as
science" as an objective form of thought with reference to objective
social relations. And it is the correspondence between the social relations of the American legal profession and categories of discourse about
professionalism and legal education which must be explained.

118. PASHUKANIS: SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW 55 (P. Beirne &
R. Sharlet, eds. 1980). See E.J. Hobsbawm, From Social History to the History of
Society, DAEDALUS 20-45 (Winter, 1971); L. GOLDMANN, CULTURAL CREATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY 76-88 (1976); M. AGErrA, A THEORY OF CAPITALIST REGULATION: THE U.S. EXPERIENCE (1979).
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Personal Jurisdiction in Florida: Some Problems and
Proposals
by Marc Rohr*

As any well-taught law student knows, two things must generally
be true in order for an American court to render a binding in personam
judgment against a party who does not reside within the borders of the
state in which the court is located:' (1) the party's conduct must fall
within the terms of a statute of that state, universally known as a "long
arm statute," conferring power upon that state's courts to hear cases of
the kind described therein, and (2) the assertion of personal jurisdiction
under the long arm statute must satisfy the "minimum contacts" test
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington. Florida attorneys are presently blessed
with a patchwork quilt of long arm statutes, 3 some of which contain
obviously duplicative provisions and each of which is tied, not always
with clarity or reason, to one or another method of service of process on
nonresidents. This collective result of sporadic legislative activity is, at
best, aesthetically displeasing, and, at worst, confusing and productive
of some judicial decisions that seem wholly without a basis in reason.
My primary purposes in writing this article are (1) to explore the interrelationship of Florida's long arm statutes and to recommend amendments which would make them simpler and more sensible, (2) to consider some of the decisions interpreting those statutes, in the light of
the recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 4 and (3) to evaluate the continuing vitality of quasi in rem jurisdiction in Florida in the aftermath of the
* Associate Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law; B.A.
1968, Columbia; J.D. 1971, Harvard University.
1. Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1980).

2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 48.011 et seq. & 49.011 et seq. (1979).
4. 444 U.S..286 (1980).
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United States Supreme Court opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner.5

I.

THE STATUTORY SCHEME

Florida's "general" (i.e., most comprehensive) long arm statute, §
48.193,6 was enacted in 1973. Most significantly, it asserts the jurisdic-

5. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
6. 48.193 Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in
this subsection thereby submits that person and, if he is a natural person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the
following:
(a) Operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a business or business venture in this state or has an office or agency in this state.
(b) Commits a tortious act within this state.
(c) Owns, uses, or possesses any real property within this state.
(d) Contracts to insure any person, property, or risk located within
this state at the time of contracting.
(e) With respect to proceedings for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or
with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, maintains a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding
the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time
or not. This paragraph does not change the residency requirement for
filing an action for dissolution of marriage.
(f) Causes injury to persons or property within this state arising
out of an act or omission outside of this state by the defendant, provided that at the time of the injury either:
1. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities
within this state which resulted in such injury; or
2. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this
state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use, and the use or
consumption resulted in the injury,
(g) Breaches a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.
(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as provided in this section may be
made by personally serving the process upon the defendant outside this
state, as provided in § 48.194. The service shall have the same effect as
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tion of the Florida courts over any "person" who commits a tortious act
within Florida, 7 causes injury in Florida resulting from an act or omission outside the state (provided that certain other facts are true),8
breaches a contract in Florida by failing to perform acts required by
the contract to be performed in Florida,9 or engages in a "business or
business venture in this state or has an office or agency in this state." 10
In any of such cases, the statute provides for jurisdiction only with respect to a cause of action "arising from" one of the enumerated activities." The statute is typical and essentially unobjectionable. But when
the Florida legislature enacted § 48.193, it did not repeal any of five
pre-existing statutes which are arguably unnecessary in light of §
48.193.
Section 48.17112 provides for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident motor vehicle owner or operator with respect to civil actions arising out of any accident or collision occurring within the State of Florida in which the motor vehicle is involved. Section 48.19"s makes
similar provision with respect to operators of aircraft or watercraft in
if it had been personally served within this state.
(3) Only causes of action arising from acts or omissions enumerated in this section may be asserted against a defendant in an action in
which jurisdiction over him is based upon this section, unless the defendant in his pleadings demands affirmative relief on other causes of action, in which event the plaintiff may assert any cause of action against
the defendant, regardless of its basis, by amended pleadings pursuant to
the rules of civil procedure.
(4) Nothing contained in this section shall limit or affect the right
to serve any process in any other manner now or hereinafter provided
by law.
FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1979).
7. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(b) (1979).
FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(f) (1979).
9. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(g) (1979).
10. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(a) (1979). Very few decisions have construed the
other subsections of § 48.193. With respect to § 48.193(1)(d), see Atlantic Lines, Ltd.
v. M/V Domburgn, 473 F. Supp. 700 (S.D. Fla. 1979). With respect to §
48.193(1)(e), see Estanislao v. State of Florida Dep't of HRS, 368 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1979).

8.

11.
12.
13.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.
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the state. These statutes obviously make primary reference to conduct
which is encompassed by § 48.193 (1)(b), which confers jurisdiction
over one who "[c]ommits a tortious act within the state." A few Florida cases have held § 48.171 applicable to contract disputes arising out
of automobile accidents in the state, 14 but such cases should easily fall
within the coverage of § 48.193(1)(g). Both § 48.171 and § 48.19 expressly include cases of vicarious liability by nonresidents, but so does §
48.193(1), although admittedly not in the same words; it is therefore
possible that the statutes do not completely overlap. 5 Another situation
to which § 48.171, but not § 48.193, might apply, although apparently
there is no reported decision of this kind in Florida, is an action against
a nonresident motorist based upon his allegedly negligent omission,
outside of Florida, to repair his vehicle prior to driving it into this state;
such conduct might well fail to satisfy the terms of either §
48.193(1)(b) or (f). Still, the typical cases under § 48.171 and § 48.19
are now covered by § 48.193.
Another pre-1973 long arm statute which has survived is §
48.181.116 This was by far the most useful and most frequently utilized
14. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 264 So. 2d
842 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Marion County Hospital Dist. v. Namer, 225 So.
2d 442 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Miller, 172 So.
2d 11 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
15. Section 48.171 confers jurisdiction over one who permits a motor vehicle
owned by him to be driven in the State of Florida. Young v. Young, 382 So. 2d 355
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Section 48.193(1) confers jurisdiction over one who
"personally or through an agent" does any of the acts enumerated in the statute. The
mere fact that the owner of a vehicle has given the driver his permission may not
suffice to render the driver the "agent" of the owner, within the meaning of §
48.193(1), although it has generally been held that the owner of an automobile is liable
for the negligence of one driving with his consent. E.g., Skroh v. Newby, 237 So. 2d
548 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Slitkin v. Avis Rent-a-Car Syss., Inc., 382 So. 2d
883 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Langstron v. Personal Serv. Ins. Co., 377 So. 2d 993
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
16. 48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state
(1) The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country, and all foreign
corporations, and any person who is a resident of the state and who
subsequently becomes a nonresident of the state or conceals his whereabouts, of the privilege extended by law to nonresidents and others to
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statute prior to the enactment of § 48.193, and it continues to be utilized today. It provides for personal jurisdiction over any nonresident
legal entity who accepts "the privilege extended by law.
to operate,
conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in the
state, or to have an office or agency in the state" with respect to any
civil action "arising out of any transaction or operation connected with
or incidental to the business or business venture."1 7 Aside from the
grammatical reconstruction of the sentence, the language in §
48.193(l)(a) is identical, and indeed Florida courts have held that the
language of § 48.193(1)(a) means exactly the same thing as the language of § 48.181(l).18 Again, however, there is at least one potential
difference between the statutes. Section 48.181(3), added in 1957, provides that any person who sells or leases property through "brokers,
jobbers, wholesalers or distributors" to anyone in Florida "shall be conclusively presumed to be operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying
on a business venture in this state." To my knowledge, no reported decision has yet considered the question of whether the principle exoperate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture
in the state, or to have an office or agency in the state, constitutes an
appointment by the persons and foreign corporations of the secretary of
state of the state as their agent on whom all process in any action or
proceeding against them, or any of them, arising out of any transaction
or operation connected with or incidental to the business or business
venture may be served. The acceptance of the privilege is signification
of the agreement of the persons and foreign corporations that the process against them which is so served is of the same validity as if served
personally on the persons or foreign corporations.
(2) If a foreign corporation has a resident agent or officer in the
state, process shall be served on the resident agent or officer.
(3) Any person, firm or corporation which sells, consigns, or leases
by any means whatsoever tangible or intangible personal property,
through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors to any person, firm
or corporation in this state shall be conclusively presumed to be operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business venture in this
state.
FLA. STAT. § 48.181 (1979).
17. FLA. STAT. § 48.181(1) (1979).
18. Bank of Wessington v. Winters Gov't Sec. Corp., 361 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Escambia Treating Co. v. Otto Candies, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1235
(N.D. Fla. 1975).
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pressed in § 48.181(3) is also applicable, by implication, under §
48.193(1)(a); possibly it is not, and possibly that could lead to different
results under the two statutes, but certainly it would be simple enough
to add the language of § 48.181(3) to § 48.193(1)(a).
The most important distinction, however, between § 48.193, on the
one hand, and § 48.181, § 48.171, and § 48.19, on the other, concerns
the methods of service of process authorized by these statutes. Section
48.193(2) states that service upon anyone who is subject to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts under § 48.193 "may be made by personally
serving the process upon the defendent outside this state, as provided in
§ 48.194." Regrettably, the Florida courts have, with virtual unanimity, interpreted this section to mean that nonresidents sued in Florida
under § 48.193 must be personally served outside the state in the manner described in § 48.194.19 This conclusion has led to absurd results,

as, for example, where service of process upon a Panamanian corporate
defendant was held invalid, in a suit in which jurisdiction was based
upon § 48.193(1)(g), because service was made upon the corporation's
president at his home in Dade County. 0
According to the three older statutes, in contrast, the defendant's
relevant activity in the state constitutes an appointment of the Florida
Secretary of State as his agent for service of process. One must then
look to § 48.161,1 which prescribes the method of service upon the
Secretary of State and requires that a copy of the process be mailed or
delivered to the nonresident defendant as well. From the face of the
statutes it would appear that § 48.161 represents the exclusive method
for service in cases in which personal jurisdiction is predicated on §
48.171 or § 48.19. Section 48.181(2) provides a preferred alternative
method in "business or business venture" cases: if a foreign corporation

19. Underwood v. University of Ky., 390 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Tucker v. Dianne Elec., Inc., 389 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
A.B.L. Realty Corp. v. Cohl, 384 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Bradford
White Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 372 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); P.S.R.
Assocs. v. Artcraft-Heath, 364 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); but see Rosen
v. Rosen, 306 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (dictum); Poston v. American
President Lines, Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 568 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (no discussion of this issue).
20. Caribe & Panama, Invs. S.A. v. Christensen, 375 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1979) (J. Pearson, dissenting).
21. FLA. STAT. § 48.161 (1979).
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engaging in such activity in Florida has a "resident agent or officer" in
the state, process "shall" be served on him or her. The Florida courts
appear to have held that a foreign corporation amenable to suit in Florida under § 48.181 may be served, if feasible, according to § 48.081(1)
and (2),22 which list the corporate officers and agents upon whom process may be served.23
What all this means is that, even within the substantially overlapping coverage of § 48.193, on the one hand, and §§ 48.171, 48.181, and
48.19, on the other, the statutes are not duplicative because they are
tied to different methods of service of process. I submit that this is a
senseless state of affairs, and the product of historical accident rather
than design. There is no good reason'why methods of service of process
available in one category of cases should differ from those available in
another category. The sensible thing to do would be to list all of the
methods of service upon nonresidents deemed constitutionally acceptable, and provide that any of them may be utilized in conjunction with
any long arm statute. Among the methods so listed should be personal
service inside or outside the State of Florida, and service by registered
or certified mail addressed to persons outside the state.24 Substituted
service upon the secretary of state is a vestige of long-discredited doctrine that should be scrapped. It arose as a feature of the early "im22. FLA. STAT. § 48.081(1) & (2) (1979). See also FLA. STAT. § 48.081(3),
providing the further alternative of service upon the registered agent required by section 48.091 in the case of Florida corporations and foreign corporations qualifying to
do business in Florida.
23. At least a few courts have held that personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
corporation is not effectuated merely by satisfaction of § 48.081(1); they have stated
that § 48.181 must be satisfied as well. Caribe & Panama, Invs. S.A. v. Christensen,
375 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Goffer v. Weston, 217 So. 2d 896 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); see also Heritage Corp. of S. Fla. v. Apartment Invs., Inc.,
285 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The strong implication is that the methods of service provided by § 48.08 1(1) and (2) may be utilized in cases in which jurisdiction is conferred by § 48.181.
24. Gadd v. Pearson, 351 F. Supp. 895 (M.D. Fla. 1972), offers another example
of an undesirable result compelled by the present statutory scheme. The federal district
court, obliged to follow Florida law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e),
quashed service on a Florida resident who received substituted service in North Carolina under §§ 48.161 and 48.181. The court stated that those statutes did not apply
because the defendant was neither a nonresident nor concealing himself.
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plied consent" statutes25 designed to circumvent the proscription declared in Pennoyer v. NefflO against service of process beyond the
boundaries of the state. The United States Supreme Court stated over
thirty years ago that what matters, as a matter of constitutional due
process, is that the notice given to a defendant be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action . .

"

Obviously the meaningful part of §

48.161 is the provision for the mailing of process to the defendant, and
not the delivery of papers to a public official; even when the defendant's
whereabouts are unknown, constructive service by publication is more
likely to give him notice than substituted service upon the secretary of
state.
Once having eliminated the needless differences in the long arm
statutes with respect to service of process, the Florida legislature should
decide whether any substantive considerations justify the retention of
§§ 48.171, 48.181, or 48.19. Two other long arm statutes should be
reconsidered as well. One is § 48.071,28 providing for jurisdiction over a
nonresident individual or partnership which "engages in business" in
Florida, with respect to civil actions "arising out of such business." The
statute provides for service on "the person who is in charge" of such
business, with a copy to be sent by registered or certified mail to the
nonresident defendant. If the methods of service of process are harmonized, the overlap with § 48.193(1)(a) appears to be total. If the number of reported decisions are any indication, moreover, this statute has
received remarkably little use.
The other statute whose utility should be reconsidered is §
48.081 (5),29 which confers jurisdiction over a corporation which "has a
25.

See, e.g., the Massachusetts statute upheld in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352

(1927).
26.
27.

95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

28.

FLA. STAT.

29.

48.081 Service on corporations

§ 48.071 (1979).

(5) Where a corporation has a business office within the state and is actually
engaged in the transaction of business therefrom, service upon any officer or business agent, resident in the state, may personally be made, pursuant to this sec-

tion, and it is not necessary in such case, that the action, suit or proceeding
against the corporation shall have arisen out of any transaction or operation con-
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business office within the state and is actually engaged in the transaction of business therefrom"; service may be made upon "any officer or
business agent, resident in the state." Paragraph 48.193(1)(a) is potentially more far-reaching than this statute in that it refers to a party
who "has an office or agency in this state." But there is one crucial
difference between § 48.193 and § 48.081(5) that gives the latter statute greater scope: § 48.193(1), again, extends jurisdiction only to
causes of action arising from the Florida activities listed in the statute;
§ 48.081(5), uniquely among the Florida long arm statutes, states that
a civil action against a corporation covered by that section need not
have arisen out of the corporation's business transacted within the
State of Florida.
Is such a legislative pronouncement constitutional? The Florida
courts seem to have acted somewhat schizophrenically with respect to
that question. When long arm statutes have required that the cause of
action have arisen from the defendant's relevant Florida activities, the
courts have naturally insisted upon compliance with such statutes,30 but
often they have gone on to suggest that such a statutory requirement
was constitutionally compelled." When long arm statutes have not required such a connection, however, no Florida court has yet suggested
that a serious constitutional problem was presented. Thus, the few reported Florida decisions applying § 48.081(5) have done so without difficulty (and without any discussion of due process or "minimum contacts"), despite the fact that the cause of action was clearly
nected with or incidental to the business being transacted within the state.
FLA. STAT.

§ 48.081 (1979).

30. E.g., Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Jamison, 353 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978); Youngblood v. Citrus Assoc. of the N.Y. Cotton Exch., Inc., 276 So. 2d 505
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
31. "In addition, in order to meet constitutional standards, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident must be limited to causes of action arising out of
and directly related to the acts of the nonresident by which he 'purposefully avail[s]
...[himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the state.'" Corley v.
Miliken, 389 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. 1980) (applying § 48.19). Similar statements were
made in Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Simari, 191 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1966); Giannini Cont.
Corp. v. Eubanks, 190 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1966); Manus v. Manus, 193 So. 2d 236 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966); but see H. Bell & Assocs. Inc. v. Keasbey & Mattison Co.,
140 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Hoffman v. Air India, 393 F.2d 507 (5th
Cir. 1968); Woodham v. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co., 390 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1968).
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1

unconnected to the defendant's Florida contacts. 2
The Supreme Court of Florida confronted the issue in a related
context in Confederation of Canada Life Insurance Co. v. Vega y
Arminim3s back in 1962. The plaintiff sued a Canadian insurer for the
cash surrender value of an insurance policy purchased by the plaintiff
in Cuba in 1928; the transaction had nothing to do with Florida. The
defendant had qualified to do business in Florida, and thus personal
jurisdiction was upheld under § 624.0221, providing that an insurer
who applies for authority to transact business in Florida "shall file...
its appointment of the [insurance] commissioner

. . .

as its attorney to

receive service of all legal process issued against it in any civil action
....

." In response to the insurer's argument that due process was vio-

lated by applying the statute to a case in which the cause of action was
unconnected to the defendant's Florida activities, the court made a firm
distinction between corporations which had qualified to do business in
Florida and those which had not:
The statute and cases pertaining to service of process upon an actual representative or an impliedly appointed agent of a foreign
corporation not authorized to do business within the state wherein
the suit is brought are not applicable to the instant issue. The issue
before us is restricted to those cases wherein the foreign corporation, as a condition precedent to its operations within the state, has
expressly designated a public official as its agent for the purpose of
receiving service of process.
[T]he decided weight of authority is to the effect such a foreign
corporation qualifying to do business in the state becomes amenable to process even as to causes of action not arising out of its
transactions therein and thereby suffers no denial of due process of
law.'
At least one lower Florida appellate court has reached the same
conclusion with respect to the statutory provision allowing service to be
32.

Killingsworth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 327 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.

App. 1976); Crown Colony Club, Ltd. v. Honecker, 307 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1974); see also Donnelly v. Kellogg Co., 293 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
33. 144 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1962).

34. 144 So. 2d at 808 (emphasis in original). Accord, Kephart v. Pickens, 271
So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (applying §§ 624.422-23); Crown Life Ins.
Co. v. Luzanaga Y Garay, 141 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
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made upon the registered agent of a foreign corporation qualified to
transact business in Florida.3 5 The Florida Corporation Code3s requires
foreign corporations doing non-exempted intrastate business in Florida
to "qualify" as such, in order to be able to do so without penalty;37 one
requirement for qualification is the appointment of a registered agent
for service of process.38 Sub-section 48.081(3) provides that process
may indeed be served upon such an agent. Need the plaintiff's cause of
action in such a case have arisen out of the foreign corporation's activities in Florida in order to satisfy the demands of due process? A Florida district court of appeal answered this question in the negative. The
court stated that the question of minimum contacts had not been raised
in the action, but added:
We believe, however, that such minimum contacts would seem patently
established where, as here, the foreign corporation has actually qualified
under Florida law to transact business in this state and has appointed a
resident agent for service of process as required by.

.

. 48.091, F.S.A.3 9

The Florida courts appear to have taken too simplistic a view, in
different ways at different times, of the "requirement" that the cause of
action have arisen from the defendant's contacts with the forum state.
The only requirement - but a constant one - is "minimum contacts." A

connection between the plaintiff's cause of action and the defendant's
activities in the state is, in effect, one more contact between the defendant and the forum state; it is fairer and more reasonable, in such circumstances, to require the defendant to defend in the courts of the forum state. In the absence of such a connection, "minimum contacts"
may still exist, but only if the defendant's contacts with the state are
greater, in quantity and/or quality, than would be necessary if the connection existed. The United States Supreme Court appears to have endorsed this point of view, although admittedly in dictum, in the Inter35. Junction Bit & Tool Co. v. Institutional Mortgage Co., 240 So. 2d 879 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970). See also Killingsworth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 327 So.
2d 50 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
36. FLA. STAT. §§ 607 et seq. (1979).
37. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.034 et seq. (1979).
38. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.324 & 48.091(1) (1979).
39. 240 So. 2d at 882.
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national Shoe case, in which Chief Justice Stone wrote:
"Presence" in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the
activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on .

. .

. Conversely it

has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate
agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a
state in the corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on
causes of action unconnected with the activities there.
[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as
to justify suit against it on causes
of action arising from dealings entirely
40
distinct from those activites.
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,4 on which the Florida
Supreme Court relied in the Confederationcase, is not to the contrary.
There the United States Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the Ohio
courts to assert jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation with respect
to a cause of action that had arisen outside of Ohio. The Supreme
Court stated that Ohio could constitutionally have asserted jurisdiction
in such a case, but it must be noted that the Court characterized the
'
activities of the defendant in Ohio as "continuous and systematic."42
To say, then, that a connection between plaintiff's cause of action
and defendant's activities in the forum state is, with respect to a given
category of cases, either always required or never required, is too simplistic. Moreover, as at least one federal court has recognized, 43 it is
40. 326 U.S. at 317-18 (citations omitted). Accord, Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells
Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 413 (9th Cir. 1977).
41. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
42. Id. at 448.
43. Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.

denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1972) (citations omitted):
We think the application to do business and the appointment of an agent for
service to fulfill a state law requirement is of no special weight in the present
context. Applying for the privilege of doing business is one thing, but the actual
exercise of that privilege is quite another . - . . The prinicples of due process

require a firmer foundation than mere compliance with state domestication
statutes.
A sentence from the Supreme Court opinion in Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co. is
also worth quoting: "The corporate activities of a foreign corporation which, under
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unrealistic to view a case any differently simply because state law compels the written appointment of a state official as one's agent for service
of process in order to transact business in that state. To my knowledge,
the Florida appellate courts have given no evidence of a proper understanding of this aspect of the "minimum contacts" analysis, with the
consequence that the few cases decided under § 48.081(5) have
reached very questionable results. 44 Properly applied, however, that section reaches further than § 48.193(1)(a), and thus serves a useful
purpose.

II. THE CASE LAW
A.

Products Liability Cases Under § 48.193

The United States Supreme Court stated, in InternationalShoe,
that "due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' -45 The somewhat amorphous concept of "minimum contacts" remains the test for personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, its case-by-case application properly and ultimately
guided by considerations of basic fairness. The United States Supreme
Court has had several occasions to apply this test in the years since
InternationalShoe, and it has done so with uncharacteristic consistency; 46 the one theme that pervades all of its opinions in this area,

state statute, make it necessary for it to secure a license and to designate a statutory
agent upon whom process may be served provide a helpful but not a conclusive test."
342 U.S. at 445.
44. See Killingsworth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 327 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1976); Crown Colony Club, Ltd. v. Honecker, 307 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1974); see also Donnelly Co., 293 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
45. 326 U.S. at 316.
46. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); see Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal.
436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International
Life Ins., Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). An unexplained departure from the general pattern is the decision in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 49 U.S. Law Week 4445 (April 28,
1981), involving an action brought in a federal court in Illinois seeking to enjoin the
flow of inadequately treated sewage from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, into Lake Michigan
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culminating in the World-Wide Volkswagen47 decision of 1980, is the
concept of "purposeful activity."
Chief Justice Warren expressed it this
48
way in Hanson v. Denckla:

The application of the [minimum contacts] rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within 49the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws.

Florida courts have clearly shown that they understand this requirement. Thus, for example, in Jack Pickard Dodge, Inc. v. Yarbrough,50 it was held that a Florida court lacked jurisdiction over a
North Carolina automobile dealer whose alleged negligence in repairing a car in North Carolina gave rise to an accident in Florida; the
language of § 48.193(1)(1)(2) seemed to apply, the court found, but
the North Carolina third-party defendant had engaged in no purposeful
activity vis-a-vis the State of Florida. Similarly, according to Osborn v.
and ultimately into Illinois waters. Although the suggestion of "purposeful activity" in
Illinois seems a bit strained in this context, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-

cuit concluded simply that it was not "unfair or unreasonable" to extend jurisdiction
over the City of Milwaukee in Illinois. 599 F.2d 151, 156 (7th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court agreed, with Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, addressing the issue in a
footnote: "We agree that, given the existence of a federal common law claim at the
commencement of the suit,. . . personal jurisdiction was properly exercised.

.

. ."

49

U.S. Law Week at 4447 n.5. See also Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S.
493, 500 (1971).
47.

-

U.S.

-,

100 S. Ct. 559 (1980).

48. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
49. Id. at 253.
50. 352 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977). See also Harlo Prods. Corp. v.
J. I. Case Co., 360 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Hyco Mfg. Co. v. Rotex
Int'l Corp., 355 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Dunn v. Upjohn Co., 350 So.
2d 127 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); but see Youngblood v. Citrus Assocs. of the
N.Y. Cotton Exch., Inc., 276 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The court in
Pickard also rejected the view, expressed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Universal Marine Co., Ltd., 543 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir.
1976), that the mere fact that an injury (caused by a tortious act) occurs in Florida is
sufficient to invoke § 48.193(1)(b). But see Lee B. Stern & Co., Ltd. v. Green, 398
So.2d 918 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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University Society, Inc.,51 Florida had no jurisdiction over a New York
defendant in an action seeking payment for services rendered by the
Florida plaintiff in New York, despite the literal application of §
48.193(1)(g), where there was no indication that the nonresident defendant had engaged in purposeful activity in Florida.52
One of the most interesting contexts in which the "purposeful activity" requirement has been applied is the products liability case.
When is it fair for a court to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident
manufacturer of seller who has directly or indirectly sent one or more
of its products into the forum state? Consider two archetypal and leading cases of the 1960s that considered this question. The famous Illinois case of Gray v. American Radiator & StandardSanitary Corp.53
concerned an action by an Illinois resident arising out of the explosion
of a water heater in Illinois; she sued the Pennsylvania corporation
which had manufactured the water heater and the Ohio corporation
(Titan) which had manufactured a safety valve, incorporated into the
water heater, which was allegedly defective. Although the opinion of
the Supreme Court of Illinois reveals no clear evidence of Titan's intent
to send its products into Illinois or knowledge that its products would
find their way into Illinois, the court made the following statements in
upholding personal jurisdiction over Titan in Illinois:
Where the alleged liability arises, as in this case, from the manufacture
of products presumably sold in comtemplation of use here, it should not
matter that the purchase was made from an independent middleman or
that someone other than the defendant shipped the product into this
State....

51. 378 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
52. A few Florida courts have held that § 48.193(1)(g) applies simply by virtue
of the fact that payment by the defendant is due in Florida, and that this is true when
the plaintiff resides in Florida even though the contract is silent on the point. Professional Patient Transp. Inc. v. Fink, 365 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Madox Int'l Corp. v. Delcher Intercontinental Moving Servs., Inc., 342 So. 2d 1082
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); First Nat'l Bank of Kissimmee v. Dunham, 342 So. 2d
1021 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Those holdings are properly modified by the concern for minimum contacts reflected in Osborn and Lakewood Pipe of Tex., Inc. v.
Rubaii, 379 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); but see Guritz v. American
Motivate, Inc., 386 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
53. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its products
for ultimate use in another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable
there for any damage caused by defects in those products."

Compare Gray with the opinion of the Supreme Court of California in
Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County.55 In
Buckeye a California resident sued the Ohio manufacturer (Buckeye)
of a pressure tank which exploded in California. Buckeye's contacts
with the State of California were not extensive, and no one seemed able
to explain how the particular pressure tank which had injured the
plaintiff had come to rest in California. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court of California held that Buckeye was amenable to suit in California, and made the following key pronouncements while doing so:
If the manufacturer sells its products in circumstances such that it
knows or should reasonably anticipatethat they will ultimately be resold
in a particular state, it should be held to have purposefully availed itself
of the market for its products in that state.
Buckeye did not allege before the trial court that the tank which
allegedly injured plaintiff arrived in California in a manner so fortuitous
and unforeseeable as to demonstrate that its placement here was not
purposeful.56
The difference in the theories suggested by the language of the Illinois
and California courts is evident. Gray, although *somewhat unclearly,
suggests that the purposeful activity requirement can be satisfied by the
intentional sale of one's products for ultimate use in other states, with
at least a subjective "contemplation" of such use in the forum state.
Buckeye goes further, suggesting rather clearly that the mere objective
foreseeability of the product's entry into the forum state will suffice.
57
In World-Wide Volkswagen the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
took a position reminiscent of the Buckeye approach to the minimum
contacts test, but without explicitly saying so. The plaintiffs in the case,
who had been injured in an automobile accident in Oklahoma, sued the
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at
, 176 N.E.2d at 766 (emphasis supplied).
71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
Id. at -, -, 458 P.2d at 64, 67 (emphasis supplied).
585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978).
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manufacturer of their automobile as well as the regional distributor
and dealer who had sold them the automobile in New York, alleging
defective design and placement of the gas tank and fuel system. The
regional distributor and the New York dealer contested the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over them in Oklahoma, but without initial success. Oddly, the opinion of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is devoted
entirely to the question of whether the Oklahoma long arm statute applied to these facts; at no point did that court expressly address itself to
the question of minimum contacts. Nonetheless, the court did make the
following statement en route to its conclusion that the defendants could
be sued in Oklahoma: "In the case before us, the product being sold
and distributed by the petitioners is by its very design and purpose so
mobile that petitioners can foresee its possible use in Oklahoma." 58
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 59 In the process of
doing so, it seems to have eliminated the possibility of equating the
mere objective "foreseeability" of a product's entry into a state with
the requisite "purposeful activity" on, the part of the nonresident. Justice White, writing for a six-man majority of the Court, observed that
the defendants carried on "no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma." 60
Conceding that it was foreseeable that the purchasers of automobiles
sold by the defendants might take them to Oklahoma, he stated: "Yet
'foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for per' If it were, he consonal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause."61
tinued, "[e]very seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his
agent for service of process. His amenability to suit would travel with
the chattel." 62 Justice White added:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But
the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather,
it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 354.
U.S. ___, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980).
Id. at __, 100 S. Ct. at 566.
Id.
Id.
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The forum state does not exceed its powers under the Due Process clause
if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum State. Compare Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp..... Is
The citation of Gray is somewhat cryptic. Whether the Supreme
Court approves of Gray's language and result is impossible to say; the
opinion in Gray does not disclose whether the plaintiff purchased the
water heater in Illinois, nor did the Supreme Court of Illinois insist
that the defendant must have had an expectation that such a sale
would occur. What is important is that a majority of the United States
Supreme Court has suggested, albeit in dictum, that the intentional
sale of one's products in the forum state, directly or indirectly, may
serve as a basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the seller.
The Supreme Court reinforced that suggestion when it dismissed,
for lack of jurisdiction, an appeal from the 1979 ruling of the Supreme
Court of Illinois in Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc." The plaintiff in that
case sued the Belgian manufacturer of plaintiff's tires, the failure of
one of which had allegedly caused injury to the plaintiff. The tire was
manufactured in Belgium, then sold there to General Motors, which
installed it on an automobile which was shipped to Illinois and sold
there to the plaintiff's father. Discovery revealed that numerous such
tires manufactured by the defendant had been similarly shipped to Illinois during a relevant time period; the defendant apparently had no
other contacts with Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the
courts of Illinois had jurisdiction over the Belgian manufacturer. The
63. Id. at 567. Mr Justice White's highly quotable reference to a "critical" foreseeability standard is misleading (and therefore regrettable) in that it appears to provide a test for jurisdiction but in actuality does not do so. As one commentator has
noted, "jurisdictional foreseeability is a conclusion that implies advance litigant perception of relevant grounds for jurisdiction. The foreseeability concept itself cannot provide those grounds." Ratnep, ProceduralDue Process and Jurisdiction to Adjudicate,
75 N.W. L. REv. 363, 379 (1980). See generally Ripple & Murphy, Worldwide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson: Reflections on the Road Ahead, 56 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 65 (1980).
64. 75 Ill. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979), appeal dismissed, - U.S.
, 100
S. Ct. 992 (1980).
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only real explanation given was as follows:
Defendant Englebert's tires, introduced into the stream of commerce in
obvious contemplation of their ultimate sale or use in other nations or

States, came into Illinois on a regular basis and in substantial numbers,
and we hold that its activities rendered it amenable to process ...
Given the nature and quality of its activities, we hold further that Englebert has purposefully invoked the benefits and protections of the law
of Illinois ... .

The fact that the United States Supreme Court dismissed the defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, although a somewhat ambiguous act, 66 means in theory that the United States Supreme Court considered any argument for a contrary result to be erroneous.6 7 What is
troubling about that conclusion is the fact that the Supreme Court of
Illinois never focused, even in a conclusory way, upon the knowledge,
intent, or contemplation of the defendant with respect to the indirect
sale of its products in the State of Illinois. It may be overwhelmingly
likely that the defendant did know, contemplate, and perhaps even intend that its tires would be sold to consumers in Illinois, but the law
would be clearer if the court had said so. Adding to the unsettling quality of the opinion is its lengthy quotation from Buckeye Boiler, with all
of its references to foreseeability, which the Supreme Court of Illinois
found "persuasive."' 8 Approximately a month after the apparently
helpful World-Wide Volkswagen opinion, the United States Supreme
Court muddied the waters just a bit by giving its seal of approval to
this unclear ruling of the Supreme Court of Illinois.69 It seems most
65. Id.at ___ 389 N.E.2d at 160 (emphasis supplied).
66. See generally Lewis, Is the Supreme Court CreatingUnknown and Unknowable Law? The Insubstantial Federal Question Dismissal, 5 NOVA L.J. 11 (1980).
67. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332, 344 (1975).
68. 75 Ill. 2d at
, 389 N.E.2d at 160.
69. More consistent with its World-Wide Volkswagen opinion was the action of
the Supreme Court vacating and remanding the opinion of the Colorado Court of Appeal in Byrd v. Butterfield, No. 78-973 (Colo. Ct. App. March 29, 1979), vacated sub
nom. Eschmann Bros., & Walsh, Ltd. v. V. Mueller & Co., - U.S. , 100 S. Ct.
1003 (1980), for further consideration in light of World-Wide Volkswagen. The Colorado court had upheld jurisdiction in a products liability case over a British third-party
defendant who had manufactured a component of a product which found its way into
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unlikely that the United States Supreme Court meant to retreat so
quickly from its forceful statement in World-Wide Volkswagen that
"foreseeability alone" will not suffice.70 Given the Volkswagen opinion,
one is inclined to conclude that the Uniroyal dismissal means that the
requisite purposefulness may be inferred from continuous and systematic commercial activity vis-a-vis the forum state on the part of a nonresident manufacturer of a component of a product shipped into the
state by a third party. I hope that the Uniroyal dismissal means no
more than that, because the distinction between subjective contemplation and objective foreseeability makes perfect sense; sending one's
product into a state for sale is surely purposeful activity vis-i-vis that
state, whereas the foreseeable but unintentional arrival of that product
in the state is not. Curiously enough, the Florida courts do not seem to
have focused upon and fully understood that distinction.
To my knowledge, only two Florida appellate courts have ever addressed themselves to the possibility that "foreseeability" might serve
as a viable basis for personal jurisdiction in a products liability case.
The holdings of these cases are not incorrect, but, in light of WorldWide Volkswagen, their language probably is. The first of these cases,
Aero Mechanical Electronic Craftsman v. Parent,1 was decided by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in 1979. The plaintiff was injured in
Florida by a product which he purchased here from Sears, Roebuck &
Company, part of which had been manufactured by the third-party deColorado; the third-party complaint appears to have contained insufficient allegations
of purposeful activity by the third-party defendant vis-A-vis Colorado, and the court
made some ambiguous references to foreseeability.
More recently, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal, for lack of jurisdiction,
from the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Mallory Eng'r, Inc. v. Ted R. Brown
& Assocs., Inc., No. 15530 (Utah March 6, 1980), dismissed sub nom. Valad Elec.
Heating Corp. v. Ted R. Brown & Assocs., Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3420, 3427 (Dec. 9,
1980). The case involved a breach of contract by a New York corporation to supply
goods within the State of Utah. In a clear and persuasive opinion, the Utah court held
that the New York defendant, by contracting to ship goods into Utah and doing so, had
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state.
70.

-

U.S. at

.,

100 S. Ct. at 566. "Summary actions

. . .

should not be

understood as breaking new ground but as applying principles established by prior decisions to the particular facts involved." Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).
71. 366 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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fendant Aero in California. Aero's product had gone through the hands
of two other California companies before being sold to Sears, Roebuck
& Company in Chicago. The court approached the question of jurisdiction in the following manner:
In construing § 48.193(l)(O(2), our courts have required a more sub-

stantial contact with Florida than the mere possibility that the product
might reach this state.
We . . interpret the phrase in the ordinary course of commerce [in §
48.193(l)(f)(2)] to mean that the non-resident must at least have some

reason to anticipate that his product will reach another state in the ordinary course of interstate commerce. The manufacturer could then be
said to have acted in a purposeful manner or with such knowledge as to
make its deeds the equivalent of having purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of conducting activities within our state.73

Since the complaint contained no allegatibn that Aero knew or had reason to anticipate that its product would be shipped in interstate commerce when Aero passed it along to another California manufacturer,
the court held that Florida had no jurisdiction over Aero. The holding
is unobjectionable, but "having some reason to anticipate" that one's
product will enter Florida does not constitute purposeful activity in the
state.
At least it can be said in defense of the Fourth District Court of
Appeal that it wrote the opinion in Aero prior to the ruling of the
United States Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen. No similar
excuse is available to the panel of the Third District Court of Appeal
that recently decided Life Laboratories,Inc. v. Valdes.7 The plaintiff
in that case sued the manufacturer of a product, disclosing in her complaint that the defendant manufactured the product for a non-party
wholesaler who distributed it. Since these allegations do not adequately
support a finding of purposeful activity vis-i-vis Florida, the court's remand for dismissal of the complaint is not surprising. What is surprising is the fact that the court cited World-Wide Volkswagen, yet went
on to quote not only the language of Aero set forth above, but some of
72. Id. at 1270 (emphasis in original).
73.

387 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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the "foreseeability" language of Buckeye Boiler as well.7 4 Thus, the
Third District Court of Appeal seemed oblivious to the fact that the
United States Supreme Court had, at the very least, cast serious doubt
upon the "foreseeability" analysis over eight months prior to the district court's action. Florida attorneys relying on the language of Life
Laboratoriesdo so at their peril.
This was the extent of the relevant case law in Florida7 prior to
the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida on January 8, 1981, in
the case of Ford Motor Co. v. Atwood Vacuum Machine Co.76 The
fact pattern in the case closely approximates that of Uniroyal. The
plaintiff sued Ford, alleging that she was injured by the faulty operation of the rear door hinge of a new Ford station wagon. Ford impleaded Atwood, a nonresident corporation which had manufactured
the door hinge assembly. Ford alleged that Atwood supplied door hinge
assemblies to Ford "knowing that they were to be incorporated into
automobiles manufactured by Ford and knew that some of these
automobiles would be shipped to Florida and sold. '77 Significantly,
Atwood did not dispute the factual allegations of the third-party complaint, which therefore had to be regarded as true for the purpose of
the motion to dismiss. The supreme court held that the circuit court
had jurisdiction over Atwood under § 48.193(1)(f)(2).
Justice Boyd, writing for the majority, properly distinguished this
74. Id. at 1011.
75.

It should also be noted that the Supreme Court of Florida approved of the

assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a products liability case on the
basis of very general allegations in Electro Eng'r Prods. Co., Inc. v. Lewis, 352 So. 2d

862 (Fla. 1977). Wrote Justice Hatchett:
Here, the facts stated in the complaint show that petitioners manufactured a
defective paint gun, and were engaged in the business activity of marketing and
distributing this product for use by citizens of this state. These allegations place
them within the reach of the Long Arm statute and satisfy the 'minimum contacts' required by the federal constitution.

Id. at 864 (emphasis supplied). The italicized language connotes purposeful activity in
Florida. Since the allegations were undisputed, the court held that they had to be re-

garded as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss.
76.

1981 Fla. L. Weekly 31 (Jan. 9, 1981), appealdismissed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3890

(June 1, 1981). Again, the theoretical meaning of a dismissal of an appeal by the
United States Supreme Court is that the Court agreed with the result in the individual
case. See text at footnotes 66-67, supra.

77. Id.
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case from World-Wide Volkswagen, and framed the question for decision this way: "whether a manufacturer who by continuous and systematic activity indirectly through others serves or seeks to serve a state's
market is subject to the jurisdiction of that state's courts." 78 The italicized words are words which arguably connote purposeful conduct.
Justice Boyd then quoted at length the passage from Justice White's
opinion in Volkswagen leading up to its citation of Gray,7 9 finding significance in the implication (which Justice Boyd was willing to draw)
that the United States Supreme Court approved of the Gray opinion.
After quoting at length from Gray itself, he added:
A number of courts have cited the Gray case as authority for the proposition that a manufacturer engaged in interstate commerce, which expects its products to be used in other states, can reasonably expect to be
held subject to the jurisdiction of those other states' courts. 80
Although Justice Boyd made no further mention of the fact, it is
significant that Atwood had not disputed the allegation that it knew
that Ford vehicles containing Atwood's door hinge assemblies would be
sold by Ford in Florida. This knowledge on the part of the nonresident
that it was benefiting from contact with the State of Florida, on a systematic and continuous basis, obviates the need to analyze the jurisdictional question in terms of mere foreseeability, and, in light of Uniroyal, satisfies the "purposeful activity" requirement. While Justice
Boyd largely spoke the language of volitional behavior in his majority
opinion, it is unfortunate that he did not make this argument more
clearly. There is, in fact, some very puzzling language by him toward
the end of the opinion that casts doubt on the cogency of his rationale.
Included is a terribly ambiguous quotation from a 1966 Arizona opinion81 that appears to suggest that even foreseeability may not be required for jurisdiction in a products liability case. This regrettable sentence, apparently intended to have some relevance and significance,
follows:
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 33 (emphasis supplied).
444 U.S. at 297-98, (quoted at 1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 33-4).
Id. at 34 (emphasis supplied).
Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966),

(quoted at 1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 34).
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Other cases have held that the occurrence of a single injury in the state
is a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the nonresident manufacturer's product got there through normal commercial channels, thus
justifying the conclusion that sufficient contacts existed.82
Given such statements, one can almost understand the viewpoint

of Chief Justice Sundberg, joined by Justice England in dissent.
Atwood "carries on no discernable activity in this state," wrote the
Chief Justice. "Its only connections with this state are that it is foreseeable that some of Atwood's components might end up in cars sold by
Ford in Florida, and the indirect economic benefit derived from such
sales."8" The remainder of the dissenting opinion reveals an astute
awareness of the teachings of World-Wide Volkswagen, but one wonders whether anyone stressed the fact that, again, Atwood's commercial
relationship with Florida was not merely foreseeable but known. Had
Ford's pleadings been less helpful, the question would have been
whether an inference of "purposeful activity" might properly be drawn
from the allegation of ongoing commercial activity; in that regard Uniroyal, whose significance may well have been unclear to the Supreme
Court of Florida, would have been relevant." In any event, the result

82. Id. at 34.
83. Id. at 35.
84. Should the Florida courts decide that purposefulness cannot simply be inferred from a continuing course of indirect commercial dealings with the State of Florida, it would probably be necessary for the plaintiff in such a case to make a showing of
the state of mind of the defendant or its agents. Discovery might well be necessary in
order to make such a showing. Florida plaintiffs have utilized discovery with respect to
jurisdictional issues. See, e.g., American Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Duzinski, 359 So. 2d 483
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Youngblood v. Citrus Assocs. of the N.Y. Cotton Exch.,
Inc. 276 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Eder Instrument Co. v. Allen, 253
So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971); but see Ward v. Gibson, 340 So. 2d 481 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). One district court has held, however, that a trial court could
not require a nonresident defendant to appear in Florida for the purpose of giving testimony concerning jurisdiction. Thomas v. Lane, 348 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1977). The Court in Thomas went on to say that the defendant could not be required
to give a deposition in Florida, but might be required to give one in his state of residence. These conclusions appear to be correct, regardless of the procedural posture of
the case or purpose of the deposition. See Kaufman v. Kaufman, 63 So. 2d 196 (Fla.
1952); Madax Int'l Corp. v. Delcher Intercontinental Moving Servs., Inc., 342 So. 2d
1082 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Godshall v. Hessen, 227 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist.
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appears to be correct, and even the dissenters were willing to state
that a nonresident "manufacturer-distributor of the finished product" could be sued in Florida "because of significant business contacts
that a manufacturer-distributor necessarily incurs through his commercial efforts." 85
B. Products Cases Under § 48.181
Perhaps more significant than the apparently occasional tendency
of Florida courts to reach too far under the long arm statutes is the
overly restrictive approach taken by them over the years with respect to
this very same category of cases, i.e., cases in which a.nonresident defendant has sent products into the state. These restrictive cases, however, have arisen under the "business or business venture" long arm
statute, § 48.181. Prior to 1973, it should be remembered, § 48.181
Ct. App. 1969). The question of whether sanctions may be imposed upon a nonresident
defendant who refuses to respond to a discovery request pertaining to jurisdiction has
apparently not been considered by the Florida courts, but has been considered by some
federal courts. The Third, Fourth and Eighth Circuits have answered the question in
the affirmative; the Fifth Circuit has answered in the negative. Aetna Business Credit,
Inc. v. Universal Decor & Interior Design, Inc., 635 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1981); Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinea v. Ins. Co. of North America, 49 U.S.L.W. 2801 (June
2, 1981); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 832 (1979); Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10 (4th Cir. 1971).
But see Blanco v. Carigulf Lines, 632 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Wells Fargo
& Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 n.24 (9th Cir. 1977).
The basic procedure to be followed by the parties when a challenge to jurisdiction
has been raised is described in Electro Eng'r Prods., v. Lewis, 352 So. 2d 862 (Fla.
1977); Elmex Corp. v. Atlantic Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n of Ft. Lauderdale, 325 So.
2d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Dublin Co. v. Peninsular Supply Co., 309 So. 2d
207 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975); and American Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Dunzinski, 308
So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Basically, plaintiff must allege in his complaint facts supporting jurisdiction; defendant must then make a prima facie showing,
through affidavits, of the absence of personal jurisdiction, whereupon plaintiff must
substantiate his allegations via affidavits or testimony at a hearing. The case law has
been modified by one of the 1980 amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
adding subpart (i) to Rule 1.070, allowing a plaintiff to plead the basis for service of
process under a long arm statute "in the language of the statute without pleading the
facts supporting service." See generally H. TRAwICK,FLORiDA PRACnCE AND PROCEDURE 121-22 (1980).
85. Ford Motor Co. v. Atwood Vacuum Machine Co., No. 56, 238 (Fla. 1981),
1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 35.
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was the primary long arm statute available with respect to torts, other
than vehicular collisions, committed by nonresidents.
The Supreme Court of Florida held in DeVaney v. Rumsch8" that
the practice of a profession constituted "engaging in business" under §
48.181, and stated: "The determinative question is whether goods,
property or services are dealt with within the state for the pecuniary
benefit of the person providing or otherwise dealing in those goods,
property or services." ' 87 The same court has also made clear that, for §
48.181(1) to apply, the nonresident must have been engaging in a general course of business activity in the state, as opposed to an isolated
act stemming from a pecuniary motive;88 under § 48.181(3), however,
which states in essence that anyone who sells property "through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors" to anyone in Florida shall be
conclusively presumed to be engaging in a business venture here, even a
single in-state sale will suffice.89 Sub-section 48.181(1) has been applied numerous times, in vastly differing fact patterns, and often with
great liberality.90 Oddly enough, however, there have been several cases
in which the direct shipment of products into Florida would seem to
86. 228 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1969).
87. Id. at 906.
88. Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Assocs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 561, 564 (Fla.
1975).
89. Id.
90. Among the cases applying § 48.181(1) liberally are Compania Anonima Simantob v. Bank of America Int'l of Fla., 373 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Horace v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Ft. Lauderdale, 251 So. 2d 33 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971); McCarthy v. Little River Bank & Trust Co., 224 So. 2d 338
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Odell v. Signer, 169 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1964); and International Graphics, Inc. v. MTA - Travel Ways, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 598
(S.D. Fla. 1976). The statement in Lake v. Lucayan Beach Hotel Co., 172 So. 2d 260,
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965), to the effect that "the mere solicitation of business is not
sufficient" was criticized in Reader's Digest Ass'n v. State ex rel Conner, 251 So. 2d
552 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1971), which held to the contrary; even the Lake opinion
held in favor of jurisdiction, on the basis of little more than "mere solicitation." The
liberal holding of Flying Saucers, Inc. v. Moody, 421 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1970), was
disapproved in Youngblood v. Citrus of the N.Y. Cotton Exch., Inc., 276 So. 2d 505
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973). Of particular interest to Florida attorneys is the case of
Atwood v. Calumet Indus., Inc., 308 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975), in
which a Florida law firm was able to sue a nonresident client for fees in Florida, because the client had transacted business in Florida through the plaintiff law firm.
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have supported jurisdiction under § 48.181, yet the court apparently
ignored that contact in reaching its conclusion. 91
The restrictiveness of the "product" cases under § 48.181 seems
owing at least in part to the development of the "control" test under
that statute with respect to sales in Florida through "brokers, jobbers,
wholesalers or distributors." The "control" test has been applied by
Florida courts at least since 1962,92 but the Supreme Court of Florida
endorsed it in 1975 in the case of Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Associates, Inc.9 3 The test requires that the nonresident defendant have
"some degree of control" over either (1) the property in the hands of
the brokers, or (2) the brokers themselves." Dinsmore was not a products liability case, but the supreme court applied the "control" test in
such a context later the same year in AB CTC v. Morejon.95 The plaintiff in that case sued the Swedish manufacturer of an allegedly defective washing machine which had caused personal injury to the plaintiff
in Florida. The defendant claimed that all of its products were sold and
shipped in Sweden to its distributor, an independent contractor, which
in turn sent the washing machine to Florida. Since the plaintiff failed
to prove that the defendant exercised any control over the distributor,
or over the washing machine in the hands of the distributor, the plaintiff lost. Given the opinions in World-Wide Volkswagen, Uniroyal, and
Ford,9" it appears that the minimum contacts test would have been satisfied in Morejon as long as the Swedish manufacturer had "deliver[ed] its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation
91. Richard Bertram & Co. v. American Marine, Ltd., 258 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Viking Superior Corp. v. W.T. Grant Co., 212 So. 2d 331 (Fla.

1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968); DiGiovanni v. Gittelson, 181 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1965); Forston v. Atlantic Eng'r & Mfg. Corp., 143 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1962); Newark Ladder & Bracket Co. v. Eadie, 125 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.

App. 1961); but see Eder Instrument Co. v. Allen, 253 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1971); Sayet v. Interstate Blood Bank, 245 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.

1971).
92.

Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand, 144 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.

1962); Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Brown, 146 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1962).
93.

314 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1975).

94. Id.
95.
96.

324 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1975).
See text accompanying notes 58-85 supra.
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that they [would] be purchased by consumers in" Florida;97 but the
Florida courts showed no interest in such an inquiry. If the "control"
test is not constitutionally compelled, why the long arm statute should
be so interpreted is unclear, and the Supreme Court of Florida offered
no real explanation for the doctrine in either Dinsmore or Morejon.98
If the "control" test is needlessly restrictive in cases in which products manufactured by a nonresident reach the State of Florida through
intermediaries, it is even less justifiable when the nonresident has
shipped those products directly into the state, whether to an intermediary or to the plaintiff himself. Yet the "control" test was applied to just
such a fact pattern in one of the earliest decisions invoking the doctrine, Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand,9 9 quoted with approval by
the Supreme Court of Florida in Dinsmore.""° A recent case arising
under § 48.181, American Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Duzinski,101 illustrates
the problem well. The plaintiff in that case was injured in Florida while
wearing a baseball helmet manufactured by the defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the defendant sold its products in Florida, through middlemen here, on a general
basis, and that the particular helmet in question had been sold, either
directly or through a distributor, to the Florida supplier of athletic
equipment to the plaintiff's school, which gave it to plaintiff. The defendant claimed, among other things, that it shipped its goods directly
to buyers, in response to purchase orders. Although it appears that the
97. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
567 (1980).

-

U.S.

_,

100 S. Ct. 559,

98. Cases with similar fact patterns in which the "control" test precluded the
exercise of jurisdiction by a Florida court include Cooke-Waite Laboratories, Inc. v.
Napier, 166 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964), and Talcott v. Midnight Pub-

lishing Corp., 427 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1970).
99.

144 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).

100. 314 So. 2d at 565. To the same effect are Mac Millan-Bloedel, Ltd. v. Canada, 391 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct App. 1980); Publications, Inc. v. Brown, 146
So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962); and Jenkins v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.,
204 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Fla. 1962). Courts found jurisdiction by virtue of strained
applications of the "control" test in Dublin Co. v. Peninsular Supply Co., 309 So. 2d

207 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975), and DiGiovanni v. Gittelson, 181 So. 2d 195 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965), both involving goods apparently sent directly into Florida by
the defendant.
101.

359 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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plaintiff alleged in the alternative that the sale had been made through
a distributor, the court found no evidence of such sales, and thus held
that § 48.181(3) was inapplicable. The court then turned to the applicability of § 48.181(1), the general "business or business venture" section, and said this:
The sales to nonresident major sporting goods companies which were
shipped in accordance with the purchaser's directions to sales outlets in
Florida could not constitute the doing of business in Florida because...
those companies were not "brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors"
in this state; and even if they were, neither they nor the102product after it
reached them were under the control of the defendant.
Was the court making the startling statement that, in order to be doing
business under § 48.181, a nonresident seller of goods must be selling
through "brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors"? The court went
on to observe that the defendant did sell some helmets directly to Florida retailers, but concluded:
[D]irect sales by a foreign corporation, not otherwise doing business in
Florida, from a place of business not in this state, to retailers in Florida,
when no control is retained by the foreign corporate seller, does not constitute operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or
business venture in Florida within the meaning and contemplation of §
48.181(1).103
As Judge Ervin said in his reluctant concurrence in American

Baseball Cap,1 ' and as World-Wide Volkswagen suggests, no constitutional concerns would have been raised by the assertion of jurisdiction
over the defendant in this case. Judge Ervin felt, however, that the language of Dinsmore, with respect to the "control" test under §
48.181(1) and (3), compelled the result reached by the appellate court.
In this he may be correct, although, as he noted, Dinsmore is arguably
distinguishable in that it did not involve a general course of business
activity in Florida (so that § 48.181(1) did not apply, without the assistance of § 48.181(3)) and the single "sale" did not occur in Florida (so
102. Id. at 488.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 489-90.
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that § 48.181(3) did not apply). Furthermore, former Chief Justice
Adkins stated in Dinsmore "that the requisite control, as explained
herein, is also applicable to § 48.181(1), where the nonresident is doing
business through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers, or distributors."105
The court in American Baseball Cap seems to have concluded that the
defendant was not selling through such persons, yet it applied the "control" test anyway. It seems possible, then, for the court to have distinguished the American Baseball Cap case from the apparently controlling precedents, and it is my belief that justice would have been served
by doing so. At least two possible bases for distinction exist: (1) sales
through "wholesalers," etc., versus sales through retailers or directly to
the consumer; and (2) shipment into Florida through intermediaries
versus direct shipment into Florida by the defendant. To draw the second distinction, however, would be to overrule, in effect, the Fawcett
line of cases. 106
It must be noted that what has been said thus far about the American Baseball Cap decision concerns what is technically dictum in the
case. The court declined to fully resolve the "control" issue in the case,
concluding instead that § 48.181 could not apply because there was no
showing that the plaintiff's cause of action arose out of the defendant's
activities in Florida. On this point Judge Ervin disagreed, 10 7 and I can
only add that I find the majority's ruling on this point absolutely
astonishing.10 8
105. 314 So. 2d at 566 (emphasis supplied).
106. See notes 99 & 100 supra.
107. 359 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
108. See also General Tire & Rubber v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 388 So. 2d
264 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Defendant sold its product in Alabama, where it
was incorporated into a product sold in Georgia and then in Florida, where it allegedly
gave rise to personal injuries. There was no evidence of any notice to or knowledge by
the defendant that its product would find its way into Florida, but the court declined to
decide the question of whether the defendant was "doing business" in Florida, concluding instead that the plaintiff's cause of action had not been shown to have arisen out of
the defendant's activities in Florida. This resolution of the case is a bit odd, since the
cause of action certainly did arise out of a connection between the defendant and the
State of Florida, and the real question was whether that connection amounted to "doing business" in Florida within the meaning of § 48.181 or § 48.193. Federal Ins. Co.
v. Michigan Wheel Co., 267 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Fla. 1967), is also questionable in this
regard.
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Although Florida courts have sometimes said that jurisdiction
under the long arm statutes was meant to extend as far as the United
States Constitution permits, 10 9 it is clear that this has not been the case
with respect to actions involving the interstate shipment of goods. Is it
possible for Florida courts to completely shed the restrictive "control"
test that has evolved under § 48.181? A question that immediately
comes to mind is whether the "control" test is also to be applied under
the nearly identical "business or business venture" language of the
newer long arm statute, § 48.193(1)(a). Although a few cases have
indicated that § 48.193(1)(a) is to be interpreted just as § 48.181 has
been, 110 and one case under § 48.193(1)(a) has found the "control" test
satisfied,1" no Florida appellate opinion has yet addressed itself to this
question. The Florida courts should take advantage of the absence of
precedent on this issue and hold that the "control" test was not meant
to be encompassed under § 48.193(l)(a). In doing so, the courts might
seize upon a reason (albeit an unconvincing one) given long ago for the
use of the "control" doctrine;112 namely the idea that a long arm statute (such as § 48.181, through § 48.161) utilizing substituted service of
process should be strictly construed; § 48.193(2) requires personal service of process. 113 They might also note that it would be incongruous
for the courts to stretch to the limits of due process in tort and contract
cases under § 48.193(1)(b), 14 (f),1 and (g), 116 while simultaneously
109. See, e.g., Cleveland Compania Maritima v. Logothetis, 378 So. 2d 1336
(Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Fisher v. Premiere Realty Co., Inc., 298 So. 2d 447
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Babson Bros. Co. v. Allison, 298 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Flying Saucers, Inc. v. Moody, 421 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1970); but
see Youngblood v. Citrus Assocs. of the N.Y. Cotton Exch., Inc., 276 So. 2d 505 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Spencer Boat Co. v. Lieutermoza, 498 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.
1974); Mallard v. Aluminum Co. of Canada, Ltd., 634 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1981).
110. Bank of Wessington v. Winters Gov't Sec. Corp., 361 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Escambia Treating Co. v. Otto Candies, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1235
(N.D. Fla. 1975).
111. Pace Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Life Carpet & Tile Co., Inc., 365 So. 2d 445
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
112. Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand, 144 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1962).
113. See text accompanying note 19 supra. Even if my legislative recommendations are accepted, see text accompanying notes 24-27, any method of service allowed
will be a fair one, requiring no "strict construction" of statutes.
114. See Godfrey v. Neumann, 373 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1979).
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doing substantially less under § (1)(a) of the same statute. Admittedly,
the "control" test, even if retained under § (1)(a), will be less significant simply by virtue of the existence, under § 48.193, of general long
arm provisions concerning tort and contract cases. The Aero and Life
Laboratoriescases, discussed above,11 7 demonstrate the courts' lack of
interest in "control" in products liability cases under § 48.193(1)(f)(2),
as does the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida in Ford Motor
Company v. Atwood Vacuum Machine Co.118 Understanding that the
"control" test is needlessly restrictive may nevertheless prove to be important with respect to the rare case to which § (1)(b), (f), and (g) do
not apply, but in which personal jurisdiction predicated upon the sale
of goods in Florida may yet be possible under § (1)(a). In addition,
products liability cases can continue to be brought under § 48.181, if
my legislative recommendations do not find favor, by plaintiffs who
prefer the substituted service provisions of § 48.161 (or the provisions
of § 48.081) to the personal service apparently required by § 48.193.
C.

Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction

Quasi in rem jurisdiction, of course, describes the situation in
which a court lacks jurisdiction to render a binding in personam judgment against a nonresident defendant, but does have power over that
nonresident's interests in property located within the state; the result is
that the court may render a judgment against the nonresident which
only affects his interests in that property. Quasi in rem jurisdiction has
clearly existed in Florida. 119 No statute speaks explicitly of the availability of quasi in rem jurisdiction, but it seems to be tied to chapter 49
of the Florida Statutes, which provides for constructive service of pro115.

E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Atwood Vacuum Machine Co., 1981 Fla. L.

Weekly 31 (Jan. 9, 1981).

116. See cases cited at note 52 supra.
117. See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra. See also Shelton v. Wisconsin
Motor Corp., 382 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
118. 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 31 (Jan. 9, 1981); see also Electro Eng'r Prods. Co.,

Inc. v. Lewis, 352 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1977).
119. See, e.g., Kingswood Builders, Inc. v. Wall Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 317
So. 2d 139 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Harris & Co. Advertising, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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cess, i.e., service by publication. 120 Since personal and substituted service of process lead to in personam jurisdiction, and there is no general
provision for service by mail, service by publication appears to be the
only method of service available to effectuate quasi in rem jurisdiction
in Florida.12 The publication statute'does require, however, that notice
of the action also be mailed (but not necessarily by certified or registered mail) to any defendant whose address is even partly known. 22
The statute applies, by its clear terms, only to certain enumerated categories of civil actions,1 23 most of which seem to embrace rather obvi-

ously the property-or-status-oriented actions that have traditionally
been associated with in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction.
But the present status of quasi in rem jurisdiction is the subject of
considerable doubt, following the rule of the United States Supreme
Court in the 1977 case of Shaffer v. Heitner.124 The decision held that

mere ownership of corporate stock, deemed by the state of incorporation to be located therein, did not suffice to give the courts of that state
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against the nonresident owners that
did not arise out of that stock ownership. Writing for six members of
the Court,1 25 Mr. Justice Marshall stated: "We think that the time is
ripe to consider whether the standard of fairness and substantial justice
set forth in InternationalShoe should be held to govern actions in rem
as well as in personam."2

After carefully considering that question,

he wrote: "We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court juto the standards set forth in Inrisdiction must be evaluated according
12 7
ternationalShoe and its progeny.1

The most natural inference to draw from this opinion is that quasi
in rem jurisdiction continues to exist, but subject now to the minimum
120. FLA. STAT. § 49.011 et seq. (1979).
121. See, e.g., Ferrer v. Sanchez, 247 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
122. FLA. STAT. § 49.12 (1979).
123. FLA. STAT. § 49.011 (1979).
124. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
125. Mr Justice Brennan, while dissenting as to the application of the minimum
contacts test to the facts of the case, concurred with that part of the majority opinion
which stated that the test should be applied. Id. at 219.
126. Id. at 206.
127. Id. at 212.
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contacts test set forth in InternationalShoe.128 Because, however, the
existence of minimum contacts suffices to give rise to in personam jurisdiction, and to an in personam judgment if the plaintiff prevails, the
concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction, 129 which is more limited, appears
to be completely expendable in light of Shaffer. A given state might
choose to retain the more limited form of jurisdiction, even though the
constitutional requirements for in personam jurisdiction be met, and at
least some of the courts which have continued to recognize quasi in
rem jurisdiction have apparantly done so because no state long arm
statute applied, thus rendering in personam jurisdiction unavailable as
a matter of state law.130 The most rational response to Shaffer by a
state legislature, however, would be to amend the state's long arm statutes to extend in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident whenever
property of the nonresident, located in the forum state, has been
brought within the custody of the court; the minimum contacts test, of
course, would have to be satisfied in each such case. Is it possible, however, that some lesser showing of "minimum contacts" than is needed
for in personam jurisdiction might suffice for quasi in rem jurisdiction?
At least one lower federal court seems to have thought so,'$' but there
128. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
129. At least one federal district court was prepared to conclude that the Court
in Shaffer had "scuttled" quasi in rem jurisdiction. Marketing Showcase, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 445 F. Supp. 755, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Another court stated that Shaffer "has abrogated quasi in rem jurisdiction as a
separate and insular conceptual category." Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451
F. Supp. 1044, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
130. That condition of New York law seems to explain the decision in Intermeat,
Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. D'Angelo, 453 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); and National Am. Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d
314 (2d Cir. 1979). See also the state cases cited in Leathers, The First Two Years
After Shaffer v. Heitner, 40 LA. L. REv. 907 (1980).
131. Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (footnotes omitted): "[W]e would find on the record now before us that [the defendant] has
had insufficient contacts with the forum to render it personally liable for a judgment of
this Court. Thus, jurisdiction over [the defendant] rests solely upon the attachment."
See also Louring v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co., 455 F. Supp. 630, 633 (D. Conn.
1977): "Finally, even if there are not the minimum contacts needed to satisfy International Shoe (though there may well be), there are surely sufficient contacts to make the
assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction over a foreign corporation fair even under Shaf-
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is not the slightest hint in Shaffer of such a double standard, and, after
all, the reference is already to minimum contacts, i.e., the minimally
requisite contacts compatible with basic fairness.1 32
The primary reason for uncertainty about the present status of
quasi in rem jurisdiction stems from the concurring opinions in Shaffer
by Mr. Justices Powell and Stevens. Mr. Justice Powell said the following, and Mr Justice Stevens said he agreed:' 33
I would explicitly reserve judgment.

. .

on whether the ownership

fer." See also Riesenfeld, Shaffer v. Heitner: Holding, Implications, Forebodings, 30
HASTINGS L. J. 1183, 1204 (1979).
132. Mr. Justice Marshall did suggest, in Shaffer, the possibility that "a state in
which property is located should have jurisdiction to attach that property ... as security for a judgment being sought in a forum where the litigation can be maintained
consistently with InternationalShoe." 433 U.S. at 210. At least one federal district
court has followed that suggestion, allowing the attachment in California of an unrelated debt, owed to the nonresident defendant by a California corporation, as security
for a claim being pursued against the defendant in New York. CarolinaPower & Light
Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977). The court stressed that it was
asserting "jurisdiction merely to order the attachment and not to adjudicate the underlying merits of the controversies." Id. at 1048. See generally Leathers, The First Two
Years After Shaffer v. Heitner, 40 LA. L. REv. 907, 911-12 (1980); Note, Attachment
Jurisdiction After Shaffer v. Heitner, 32 STAN. L. REv. 167 (1979). Whether any
showing of "minimum contacts" is necessary for such an attachment to be constitutional is presently unclear. The Uranex court stated that
where the facts show that the presence of defendant's property within the state is
not merely fortuitous, and that the attaching jurisdiction is not an inconvenient
area for defendant to litigate the limited issues arising from the attachment, assumption of limited jurisdiction to issue the attachment pending litigation in another forum would be constitutionally permissible.
451 F. Supp. at 1048. The Florida legislature may wish to amend the Florida attachment and garnishment statutes, chapters 76 and 77 of the Florida Statutes, to expressly
permit Florida courts to utilize those prejudgment remedies in connection with litigation pending in another state. See FLA. STAT. §§ 76.03, 77.01, 77.031 (1979). Mr.
Justice Marshall also hinted at another possible exception to the Shaffer requirements:
"This case does not raise, and we therefore do not consider, the question whether the
presence of a defendant's property in a State is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when
no other forum is available to the plaintiff." 433 U.S. at 211 n. 37. This hint was relied
upon in Louring v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co., 455 F. Supp. 630 (D. Conn. 1977);
see also Amoco Overseas Oil Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation,
605 F.2d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1979).
133. 433 U.S. at 217.
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of some forms of property whose situs is indisputably and permanently
located within a State may, without more, provide the contacts necessary
to subject a defendant to jurisdiction within the State to the extent of the
value of the property. In the case of real property, in particular, preservation of the common-law concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction arguably
would avoid the uncertainty of the general InternationalShoe standard
without significant cost to "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'"

Because Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the Shaffer decision, it
is possible that three Justices would adhere to the traditional concept of
quasi in rem jurisdiction in at least some cases. The fact that no other
Justice joined the concurrences, however, probably indicates that the

other six are strongly in agreement with the sweeping and unequivocal
theoretical pronouncements of the Marshall opinion.'
Only one Florida decision, 3 " to my knowledge, has utilized the
concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction subsequent to the Shaffer decision

in 1977. In addition, at least three other appellate opinions13 since
134. Id.
135. Quasi in rem jurisdiction seems also to have survived in admiralty cases
arising under federal admiralty jurisdiction. Amoco Overseas Oil Corp. v. Compagnie
Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1979); Grand Bahama Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447
(W.D. Wash. 1978); Engineering Equip. Co. v. S,S, Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706,
(S.D.N.Y 1978).
136. Gelkop v. Gelkop, 384 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), concerned,
among other things, a claim for child support against a nonresident father who was
served by publication. In upholding the judgment against the father but reversing the
order holding him in contempt for failing to pay, the court said this:
It is the prevailing law of this state that a trial court has in rem jurisdiction in a
marriage dissolution action to enter a final judgment or order awarding permanent or temporary alimony, child support, attorneys fees and costs against a respondent who had been properly served, as here, by constructive process ...
The trial court in such action may enforce such provisions of the final judgment
in rem as against any property held by the respondent within the court's jurisdiction; it may not, however, enforce such provisions in personam by contempt proceedings, as here, or by the entry of a money judgment against the respondent.
Id. at 201. The court referred to "in rem jurisdiction," but was clearly describing quasi
in rem jurisdiction. No mention was made of Shaffer or minimum contacts; the decision is therefore erroneous in this respect.
137. Gaskill v. May Bros., Inc., 372 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
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then have made reference to the concept as if it were still viable, and,
indeed, the Florida statutory scheme appears to continue to allow for it,
subject only to the satisfaction of the minimum contacts test. This is
because, according to the Florida courts, service by publication under
chapter 49 cannot provide the basis for a valid in personam judgment; 138 any judgment so obtained, therefore, must be described as in
rem or quasi in rem.
The problem here is twofold. First, quasi in rem jurisdiction in the
absence of minimum contacts is unfair, for all of the reasons set forth
by Mr. Justice Marshall in Shaffer, and is conceptually unnecessary if
minimum contacts are present. Regardless of the present constitutional
status of the concept, then, quasi in rem jurisdiction should no longer
be recognized under Florida law. Second, the use of service by publication upon a nonresident whose address or location is known is indefensible, regardless of the theoretical basis for jurisdiction. 13 9 The United
States Supreme Court indicated long ago that constructive service is
acceptable even as a predicate for in personam jurisdiction in the case
of defendants whose whereabouts are unknown,1 40 and it is to that cateBoeykens v. Slocum, 356 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Palmer v. Palmer,
353 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Of these three, only Gaskill referred
explicitly to quasi in rem jurisdiction; the ohers referred to "in rem jurisdiction," but
clearly meant quasi in rem.
138. Palmer v. Palmer, 353 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
139. "The general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by
publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known
or very easily ascertainable and whose legally protected interests are directly affected
by the proceedings in question." Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-13
(1962), referring to Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318
(1950). Accord, Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956). Both
Schroeder and Walker were actions involving real property, and might have been described as in rem or quasi in rem proceedings. In any event, it is clear that the defendant's "legally protected interests" are at stake in such proceedings. See Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
140. This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a
customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably
possible or practicable to give more adequate warning. Thus it has been
recognized that, in the case of persons missing or unknown, employment of
an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that the
situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights.
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gory of cases that constructive service should be confined. 141 Even if the
best possible notice is not constitutionally required, as in a "true" in
rem proceeding (e.g., dissolution of marriage), it should be required by
statute. Again, service by registered or certified mail should be available and satisfactory, as should personal service, with respect to every
form of long arm jurisdiction, but the simple mailing provided for by
§ 49.12 is not satisfactory.
Because I am recommending the repeal of § 49.011, which lists
the categories of cases in which service by publication is permitted, it
may be desirable to add some of these categories to the general long
arm statute, § 48.193(1). Many disputes traditionally adjudicated on
the basis of quasi in rem jurisdiction should fall within the scope of
§ 48.193(1)(c), providing for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
with respect to claims arising from his ownership, use, or possession of
real property in Florida. If, for example, it is not clear that § (1)(c)
would apply to disputes over ownership of real property in Florida, the
statute should be amended.1 42 Similarly, § 48.193 presently makes no
reference to personal property in Florida, or to dissolution of marriage.
A provision should also be enacted conferring jurisdiction upon the
Florida courts to enforce the valid judgments of the federal courts and
courts of other states; Mr. Justice Marshall suggested in Shaffer that
such jurisdiction is permissible under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 43 but such actions in Florida presently appear to be encompassed within § 49.011(1), (7), (8), or (11), and thus may be tied to

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950), citing Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261 (1912) which upheld service by publication where the
defendant could not be located.
141. Risman v. Whittaker, 326 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976), permitted service by publication upon nonresident defendants whose addresses were
known, despite the fact that personal service was concededly possible under §§ 48.193
and .194. Although service by publication gave rise only to "in rem jurisdiction," the
ruling is a regrettable one. Other cases have held that service by publication is permissible only when personal service cannot be effected. Taylor v. Lopez, 358 So. 2d 69
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Bradbery v. Frank L. Savage, Inc., 190 So. 2d 183 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
142. "[W]hen claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State
where the property is located not to have jurisdiction." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 207 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
143. Id. at 210, n.36.
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service by publication.
III. CONCLUSION

The present configuration of long arm statutes in Florida is needlessly duplicative and complex, the unfortunate product, like so much
in this state, of unplanned growth. There is no justification for the present connection between particular long arm statutes and particular
methods of service of process. Substituted service of process upon the
secretary of state, moreover, is an archaic procedure that should be
abolished. Constructive service, by publication, should be confined to
those cases in which the defendant, resident or nonresident, cannot be
located. The Florida legislature should consider whether any of the
long arm statutes other than § 48.193 confers on the Florida courts
jurisdiction not conferred by § 48.193 to an extent such that the statute
should be retained; if so, the statute should be amended to provide that
service of process may be accomplished in any manner provided for by
§ 48.194. That section should be amended to encompass all permissible
methods of service, any of which may be utilized in connection with
any long arm statute.
The Florida courts should regard quasi in rem jurisdiction as a
thing of the past. At the same time, they should extend in personam
jurisdiction under the long arm statutes to the furthest extent permitted
by the federal constitution, confining if not abrogating the "control"
test under § 48.181 (if that section is not repealed) and drawing a clear
distinction, in products liability cases, between "purposeful activity"
and mere "foreseeability." The courts should also recognize, finally,
that the existence of "minimum contacts" may depend, in a given case,
upon the connection between plaintiff's cause of action and defendant's
contact with the state, and that no theory of "consent" stemming from
the enforced appointment of an agent can lead to a contrary
conclusion.
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EEOC's New Sexual Harassment Guidelines: Civility

in the Workplace
by Robert W. Martin, Jr.*

INTRODUCTION

On November 10, 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) published an amendment to the Guidelines on

Discrimination Because of Sex1 which stated: "[t]his amendment will
re-affirm that sexual harassment is an unlawful employment practice."

It is rare indeed for a federal agency to understate the impact of its
guidelines 6r regulations, but this is such a time. The amendment goes

far beyond reaffirming that sexual harassment constitutes an unlawful
employment practice; in essence it redefines what conduct constitutes
sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2
BEFORE THE GUIDELINES

Many federal court decisions have held that sexual harassment is

an unlawful employment practice.3 Generally, those decisions required
a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment by
proving:
1) submission to sexual advances of a supervisor was a term or condition
of employment;
* A.B. Hamilton College; J.D. Rutgers-Camden Law School; Chief, Legal
Branch, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region III; formerly Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University of Law. This article was written by Mr.
Martin in his private capacity. No official support or endorsement by the Environmental Protection Agency or any other agency of the federal government is intended or
should be inferred.
1. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (1979).
3. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977).
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2) this submission substantially affected plaintiff's employment; and
3) employees of the opposite sex were not affected in the same way by

these actions."
While the new guidelines do not specifically address the third requirement, there must be evidence of gender-based discrimination in
Title VII suits. If a supervisor makes the same sexual demands of both
male and female employees, i.e., a bisexual supervisor, the supervisor
may not be engaging in an employment practice prohibited by Title
VII.5 But as at least one court observed, the third requirement is generally read such that it may only be an issue in the case of a bisexual
supervisor:
It is not necessary to a finding of a Title VII violation that the discriminatory practice depend on a characteristic "peculiar to one of the gen-

ders," or that the discrimination be directed at all members of a
sex. . . . It is only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor
in the discrimination, and that if the plaintiff "had
been a man she
'6
would not have been treated in the same manner.
In contrast to Title VII's nominal impact on the gender discriminatory element in traditional sex harassment claims, the new guidelines
have a significant impact on the other two elements of the plaintiff's
prima facie case. Prior to the guidelines, Title VII judicial decisions
carry the notion that harassment must be done by a supervisor or another in a position to make sexual advances a "term or condition of
employment." For example, in Fisher v. Flynn,1 the court stated:
"Plaintiff has not alleged a sufficient nexus between her refusal to accede to the romantic overtures and her termination. She has not alleged
that the department chairman had the authority to terminate her employment or effectively recommend the same and we cannot so
S
assume."
Moreover, the language, "term or condition of employment,"
4.
5.
6.
1977).
7.
8.

Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (D. Colo. 1978).
See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.4 (3d Cir.
598 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1979).
Id. at 665.
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presents another problem. Conduct which most civilized people would
find offensive and actionable may not give rise to a statutory violation
unless it is shown to be a "term or condition of employment." For example, in Bundy v. Jackson,9 the plaintiff fared well in terms of promotions, moving through the civil service ranks from a GS-4 in 1970 to a
GS-9 in 1976. In its findings of fact, the Bundy court noted that two of
plaintiff's supervisors had made persistent sexual advances. 10 Although
the court concluded that "[p]laintiff's allegations with regard to improper sexual advances made to her by other Department employees
(recall that both Burton and Gainey were supervisors) are fully
proved, . . . [d]efendant did not discriminate in any term or condition
of her employment. . . ... In other words, the plaintiff lost her case

not because she was unable to prove sexual harassment (since the court
found that the incidents occurred), but rather because she failed to
show any economic detriment. As discussed below, Bundy, and its reversal on appeal, is an excellent example of the judicial climate before
and after the guidelines.
In another pre-guidelines case, the court in Tomkins v. Public
Service Electric & Gas Co., 2 stated:
we conclude that Title VII is violated when a superior, with the actual or
constructive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual advances or demands toward a subordinate employee and conditions that employee's
9. 19 F.E.P. Cases 828 (D.C.D.C. 1979), rev'd, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C.C.A.
1981).
10. Id. at 830-31.
On numerous occasions, Burton called her into his office on Monday mornings to
talk about her activities over the weekend, asking her if she liked horses. When
plaintiff responded that she rode horses, Burton claimed that he had heard that
women who rode horses had a tendency to need sexual relief and rode them for
that purpose . . . Burton repeated on numerous other occasions that he had
other sexual literature which was not of the type one could buy in a bookstore
and that plaintiff should come to his apartment to see it....
After Gainey became plaintiff's first line supervisor, he made several advances to her. On one occasion he stated to her, "Sandy, I've been after you for
the last two years and you refuse all my attempts ....
You have turned me
down and I have been wanting to get-you to a motel ... "
11. Id. at 832. This holding was reversed in a decision that refers to the EEOC
guidelines with approval. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C.D.C. 1981).
12. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
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job status-evaluation, continued employment, promotion, or other aspects of career development--on a favorable response to those advances
or demands .... 18

This view has prevailed in numerous other courts arriving at similar
conclusions. 4 The guidelines may change the results.
EEOC GUIDELINES
In contrast to the rule articulated in Tomkins and Bundy, EEOC
guidelines expand the protection offered to employees by including harassment caused not only by "agents and supervisory employees," 5 but
17
also by "fellow employees" 1 6 and in some cases by non-employees.
The "term or condition of employment" requirement is now one of
three disjunctive requirements that define sexual harassment actionable
under Title VII:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working

13. See Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975):
"[T]here is nothing in the Act [Title VII] which could reasonably be construed to have
it apply to verbal and physical sexual advances by another employee, even though he be
in a supervisory capacity where such complained of acts or conduct had no relationship
to the nature of the employment." See also Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F.
Supp. 1382, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978). "[F]requent sexual advances by a supervisor do not
form the basis of the Title VII violation that we find to exist. Significantly, termination
of the plaintiff's employment when the advances were rejected is what makes the conduct legally objectionable."
14. 568 F.2d at 1048-49.
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c).
16. Id. at § 1604.11(d).
17. Id. at § 1604.11(e).
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environment.1 8

While the power of the EEOC guidelines is still uncertain, 19 the
stated goal-eliminating an "intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment"--appears a radical departure from case law. The guidelines
also eliminate the absolute necessity of showing the harassment was
done by a supervisory employee and that it was a "term or condition of
employment." Although the guidelines may break with precedent, they
are consistent with the oft-stated view that Title VII is meant to be
interpreted broadly. Speaking of the breadth of section 703 of Title VII
(one basis of the EEOC guidelines), the court in Rogers v. EEOC20
said:
[It] evinces a Congressional intention to define discrimination in the
broadest possible terms. Congress chose neither to enumerate specific
discretionary practices, nor to elucidate in extenso the parameter of such
nefarious activities. Rather, it pursued the path of wisdom by being unconstrictive, knowing that constant change is the order of the day and
that seemingly reasonable2 practices of the present can easily become the
injustices of the morrow. 1
Elimination of an Intimidating, Hostile, or Offensive Working
Environment
EEOC has gone out of its way to reassure us that the guidelines do
not abruptly depart from case law. They stated that "[tihe courts have
found sexual harassment both in cases where there is concrete economic detriment to the plaintiff.

. .

and where unlawful conduct re-

sults in creating an unproductive or an offensive working atmo18. Id. at § 1604.11(a) (emphasis added).
19. As with most guidelines and regulations promulgated in the Title VII area,
the court's view of their persuasiveness seems to depend upon whether the guidelines or
regulations agree with the result the court wants to reach. See, e.g., Ablemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 451 (1975): EEOC guidelines said to be entitled to "great
deference." Compare Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973): "deference must have limits where, as here, application of the guidelines would be inconsistent with an obvious congressional intent not to reach the employment practice in
question."
20. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
21. Id. at 238.
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sphere.""2 EEOC cited Kyriarzi v. Western Electric Co.2" to support
the latter portion of this statement. Yet Kyriarzi seems an inappropriate case for EEOC to cite in support of its guidelines. Although the
court may have found "an unproductive or offensive working atmosphere," it also found that plaintiff's job performance ratings were suspect, and that plaintiff "did not receive the salary to which she was
entitled." 4
A later proceeding in Kyriarziz5 more clearly addressed the issue
of work environment. There the court stated:
While it is hardly this Court's role to penalize mere rudeness, when a
party's deliberate conduct is so extreme that it intentionally interferes
with another's ability to practice a profession or earn a livelihood, the
wrongdoer must be punished or deterred. It is clear from the conduct of
the individual defendant[s]
26

. . .

that they made Kyriarzi's work environ-

ment intolerable.

However, this statement must be read in light of the court's finding
that Kyriarzi had been denied promotions and raises.27
EEOC could also have pointed to dicta in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 28 a landmark case on sexual harassment. The
court there declined to find that sexual harassment, as prohibited by
Title VII, can exist where the harassment is not "a term or condition of
employment."
Appellant suggests an alternative theory of liability that, in addition to
prohibiting specific discriminatory acts, Title VII mandates that employees be afforded "a work environment free from the psychological harm
flowing from an atmosphere of discrimination." Analogizing to EEOC
findings of Title VII violations where employees have been subjected to
their supervisors' racial epithets and ethnic jokes.

. .

appellant contends

that the sexual advances and subsequent retaliatory harassment to which
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978).
Id. at 943.
476 F. Supp. 335 (D.N.J. 1979).
Id. at 340.
Id. at 336.
568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
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she was subjected created an environment of debilitating sexual intimidation constituting a barrier to her employment opportunities. Because
we hold that the facts as alleged constitute a sex based condition of employment in violation of Title VII, we need not pass upon this second
theory."9
Although judicial precedent for the guidelines is limited to dicta in
two cases, the guidelines are well justified. In an era when the work
environment is being scrutinized for physically disabling factors, it
should also be scrutinized for psychologically disabling ones. Discrimination is harmful even in the absence of monetary harm. The Rogers
court spoke of the effect of ethnic discrimination on the work
environment:
[I]t is my belief that employees' psychological as well as economic
fringes are statutorily entitled to protection from employer abuse, and

that the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in Section 703 [of Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment charged
with ethnic or racial discrimination.30
In Bundy v. Jackson, the court of appeals held that women can
"sue to prevent sexual harassment without having to prove that...
their resistance [to the harassment] caused them to lose tangible job
benefits."3 1 Although the court based its decision on Rogers,3 2 it cited
with approval the EEOC guidelines in fashioning relief for the plaintiff.33 Thus the guidelines may be less a radical departure from case
law than an integrated and logical extension of the judicial precedent.

29. Id. at 1046 n.1. See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R. Fed 224 (1980). Concerning analogous cases involving other Title VII cases see, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc.,
424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) [religion and ancestry]; Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961

(1972) [race].
30. 454 F.2d at 238.
31. 641 F.2d at 945.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 947.
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Sexual Harassment and the Employer
An employer may find himself a defendant in a Title VII suit for
the acts of his supervisors, acts of his employees, and in some instances
the acts of non-employees. "A purely personal, social relationship without discriminatory employment effect" is not prohibited;3 4 the guidelines still require a connection between the harassment and the employer before he may be held liable for damages.
Under the guidelines, the employer is strictly liable for sexual harassment done by an agent or supervisor:
Applying general Title VII principles, an employer, employment agency,
joint apprenticeship committee or labor organization (hereinafter collectively referred to as "employer") is responsible for its acts and those of
its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment
regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or
even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer
knew or should have known of their occurrence. 85
The imposition of strict liability for harassment by agents or supervisors is consistent with case law. The court in Miller v. Bank of
America36 held the employer was not immunized by lack of knowledge
37
of the harassment or by company policy against such harassment.
The employer can take steps to limit his liability for sexual harassment done by non-supervisory employees. Prior to promulgation of the
guidelines, employers' liability for sexual harassment was generally
limited to liability for behavior of supervisory personnel. The guidelines
now state:
With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and
appropriate corrective action."
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (1980).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c).
Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 213.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d).
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For acts between co-employees, the potential for liability on the part of
the employer is less than for acts of supervisors. This may be justified,
since an employee probably feels he is exposing himself to less risk in
complaining about a fellow employee than in complaining about harassment by a supervisor. Thus the employer is potentially better informed, and better able to remedy the situation. It is also important to
note the correlation between the expanded liability of the employer and
the expanded definition of sexual harassment. Employers would be well
advised to handle sexual harassment between co-employees in a prudent manner.39
Additionally, an employer may be liable for harassment of his employees by non-employees. Although obscure on this point, the guidelines suggest that employer liability might extend, for example, to independent contractors. The guidelines state:
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with
respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate cor-

rective action. In reviewing these cases the Commission will consider the
extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility which
the employer
may have with respect to the conduct of such nonemployees.40
To this meager guidance, the "supplementary information" issued with
the guidelines merely adds that "[s]uch liability will be determined on
a case-by-case basis, taking all facts into consideration. ' 41 Absent a
situation where the non-employee is perceived as an employee, subject
to normal employee rules, courts may be unlikely to find the employer
liable for acts done by such persons.
In the light of the above discussion, the employer should take steps
to limit his liability. Although both the courts42 and the guidelines impose strict liability on the employer for sexual harassment by a supervisor, the employer should act promptly to minimize liability in situations
39.
40.
41.
42.

See text accompanying notes 43-49 infra.
Id. at § 1604.11(e).
45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
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involving non-supervisory personnel. The following steps are suggested
for employers:4 3
1. Establish and publicize a strong policy against sexual harassment;
2. Establish an internal grievance procedure to handle claims of sexual
harassment;
3. Follow up on any information received, or any other reason to believe,
that sexual harassment is taking place;
4. Investigate any claims of sexual harassment fully; and
5. If harassment is found, rectify the situation by reprimanding, suspending or dismissing employees who engaged in the sexual harassment.
While not guaranteeing immunity for an employer, these procedures
are consistent with the guidelines; 4 ' and seem to be a prerequisite for
avoiding liability for the acts of co-employees and designated non-employees. Such good-faith programs by the employer may even affect the
extent of liability for the acts of supervisory employees.
In the "supplementary information" accompanying the guidelines,
EEOC noted that many comments were received in response to the Interim Guidelines. These responses voiced concern that the guidelines
covering employer procedures for prevention and reporting programs
were "not specific enough.' 4 5 The guideline states in pertinent part:
An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing
strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment
under
46
Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
Replying to the comments received, EEOC clarified its position: it
did not intend to provide rules, but intended to encourage each employer to develop an "individualized" program.' 7 The five points above
are indeed merely suggestions; the employer must assess his own inter-

43.
C.F.R. §
44.
45.
46.
47.

See Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978); 29
1604.11(0.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0.
45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f).
45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
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nal bureaucracy in devising procedures to insure that he learns of any
sexual harassment at the earliest possible moment and properly resolves
any problems quickly. For example, some companies may find it desirable to have rules about socializing between supervisory and non-supervisory personnel. While the EEOC does not attempt to prevent purely
social relationships, a particular employer may choose to do so.
Alternatively, it may be prudent for the employer to adapt existing
company rules governing other personnel policies, which have proven
effective, to handle allegations of sexual harassment. This course of action may better protect the rights of the accused supervisor/employee/
non-employee. Since not all claims of sexual harassment are well
founded, the reputation of the accused must be reasonably protected.
An existing, effective complaint-and-hearing system may already protect the rights of all the parties in that workplace.
The guidelines fail to instruct the employer on disciplining the offending employee beyond suggesting the development of "appropriate
sanctions. 14 8 As a practical matter, the guidelines may make firing the
guilty employee the only "safe" remedy, even though circumstances
could otherwise dictate demotion or suspension. Take, for example, the
situation where a supervisor is engaged in sexual harassment. If he is
demoted to a non-supervisory function, the harassment may continue;
and the employer may still be liable under the guidelines. The employer's failure to fire the offender initially may be construed as a failure to express strong disapproval of sexual harassment. Again EEOC
suggested a case-by-case analysis. The appellate court in Bundy suggested an injunction requiring the employer to use warnings and other
"appropriate discipline."4 9 It thus appears that the normal array of disciplinary actions, even mere warnings, remains available to the employer, as long as "appropriate."
There is, however, a great deal to be said for severe punishment of
a person guilty of sexual harassment; such conduct has been condoned
for too long. As in racial discrimination, strong action may be necessary to achieve results. The 1970's were to sexual harassment what the
1950's were to racial discrimination. In the long road ahead, some
firings may be necessary to insure progress.

48. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(0.
49. 641 F.2d at 947.
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The EEOC final guidelines contain a section not found in the interim guidelines; it deals with sexual favoritism. In part it states:
Where employment opportunities or benefits are granted because of an
individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances or requests for
sexual favors, the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex discrimination against other persons who were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity or benefit. 50
If there is a section in the guidelines that stands noble in theory but
becomes only empty words in application, this is it. EEOC suggested
the potential of the section in its "supplemental information;" [e]ven
though the Commission does not consider this to be an issue of sexual
harassment in the strict sense, the Commission does recognize it as a
related issue which would be governed by general Title VII principles." 51 But consider the problems of proof. How does one prove that
an employee's advancement was the result of sexual favors if both the
supervisor and the promoted employee say otherwise? Unlike most harassment claims where the parties to the sexual conduct are adversaries,
here they are co-defendants, not in an adversary position to each other.
The courts may find that cases decided on such potentially unreliable
evidence may make the cure worse than the disease.52
Sexual harassment is prevalent in the workplace. All one has to do
is read the newspaper or talk to those involved in personnel disputes to
discover the magnitude of the problem. If the guidelines function effectively, what results can we expect in the workplace atmosphere? It will
be many years before we can judge their full effect. But if they merely
increase public awareness of the problem, they will have a positive
effect.
There are those who will argue that what the guidelines define as
sexual harassment is not "harassment" but rather part of human nature-part of the interpersonal relationships that are bound to occur in
a workplace environment. In Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. 53 for example, the court said that even assuming the allegations of verbal and
50. Id. at § 1604.11(g).
51. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
52. Id. at 25,024.
53. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975).
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physical sexual advances .by another employee were true, absent a
showing that the employer somehow benefitted from such harassment,
employer liability would not be found."
It would be ludicrous to hold that the sort of activity involved here was
contemplated by the Act [Title VII] because to do so would mean that if
the conduct complained of was directed equally to males there would be
no basis for suit. Also, an outgrowth of holding such activity to be actionable under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit every time
any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances towards another. The only sure way an employer 5could
avoid such charges would be
5
to have employees who were asexual.
Such views will not be changed easily. Some employers will view
the guidelines as yet another federal intrusion into their lives. The
weight courts give the guidelines is the most important factor in predicting their long-term effects. Empirical evaluations of changes in the
workplace atmosphere will eventually yield answers to our questions.
BEYOND THE GUIDELINES

As expected, definitions of "sexual harassment" vary widely in
56
state laws. Wisconsin, for example, has a very narrow definition,
which in the words of one commentator "only reaches the most flagrant
types of sexual harassment." 57 He also noted that California has gone a
bit further and that Washington "has thrown by far the broadest
58

net.",
The EEOC guidelines will probably serve as a starting point for
state legislatures and administrative agencies attempting to curb sexual
harassment. For example, during the 1980 Florida legislative session,
Rep. Helen Gordon Davis (D-Tampa) introduced a bill which, after

54. Id. at 162-63.
55. Id. at 163-64.
56. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5)(g)4 (West 1980) which reads: "For any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or person to make hiring, employment, admission, licensure, compensation, promotion or job assignments contingent upon a person's consent to sexual contact or sexual intercourse as defined in s. 940.225(5)."
57. NAT'L L.J., Apr. 21, 1980, at 6, col. 1.
58. Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss3/1

96

et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue
Nova Law Journal

1418

5:19811

committee substitutions, tracked the approach and language of the interim EEOC guidelines.5 9 The bill passed in the Florida House of Representatives, but died when the Florida Senate Commerce Committee
refused to hear it. The 1981 legislative session also concluded without
progress in this matter.
While a statutory amendment to include sexual harassment within
the meaning of "discrimination on the basis of sex" now found in Florida Statutes Ch. 23, part IX, is a preferable solution, it is not the only
solution. A Florida court could find the broad approach taken by
EEOC controlling in a case before it. Even with no amendments to
Title VII, and before the EEOC guidelines, actions against sexual harassment brought in federal court were successful. The problem with
waiting for state courts to deal with sexual harassment, rather than
pressing for a legislative solution, is that they might be reluctant to
follow the EEOC guidelines that vary from prior federal decisions.6 0
Should Florida adopt the language and approach taken by EEOC?
The answer would seem to be yes, unless Florida can improve on
EEOC's language or approach. Perhaps more thought should be given
to the section concerning "sexual favoritism.""1 This section is weakly
worded, but may be acceptable if given the proper gloss by the courts.
As there are no other glaring deficiencies in the guidelines, they make
an acceptable model; there is no point in reinventing the wheel. If federal courts speak to the guidelines before state legislators consider the
language, those rulings could also be taken into account.
CONCLUSION

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency do not have a monopoly on improving
the "atmosphere" in the workplace. With its guidelines on sexual harassment, EEOC takes a large step toward making us aware that sexual
harassment is a serious and persistent problem. Although courts had
been reluctant to find actionable harassment absent some monetary or
similar detriment to the plaintiff, EEOC recognizes that harassment
59.

FLA. H.B. 331 (1980);
FLA. STAT. §§ 23.162(9)

FLA. C.S./H.B. 331, S.B. 332 (1980) (was to be codiand (10).
60. See, e.g., Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1979).
61. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g).

fied in
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victims suffer other less tangible damages. The Bundy court has seen fit
to view sexual harassment as comparable to racial harassment, damaging even in the absence of monetary loss. That court pointed to the
guidelines with approval. One can hope this is the trend for the future..

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss3/1

98

et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue

I

I

Limiting Contributions to Referendum Political
Committees: Taking Out the First Amendment Slide
Rule and Going Back to the Supreme Court's
Drawing Board
Cheryl Ryon Eison*

In response to the revelation of various election abuses during the
Watergate investigations,' many state and local legislative bodies, as
well as Congress, began increasing restrictions on election campaign
financing. Among the most controversial regulations are those limiting
the dollar amounts of contributions by individual citizens to a single
political committee in a referendum campaign. Two recent decisions
testing the validity of such laws under the first amendment, one by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Let's Help Florida v. McCrary,2 and
another by the Supreme Court of California in Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley,' make it apparent that the United States
Supreme Court must review, clarify, and extend the law it developed in
the 1970s in response to first amendment challenges to campaign contribution and expenditure limitations, especially in Buckley v. Valeo4
and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.5
* B.A.E., J.D. University of Florida, 1970, 1974. Associate Professor of Law,
Nova University Center for the Study of Law.
1. For an historical overview of the development of federal election campaign
finance investigation and regulation, including examples of abuses revealed during the
Watergate investigations, see Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 835-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
2. 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-970 (U.S. Dec. 8,
1980).
3. 27 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980), appealdocketed, No.
80-737 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1980).
4. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding against first amendment attack the Federal
Election Campaign Act's limitation on contributionsto candidates for federal office,
but invalidating restrictions on expenditures by or on behalf of candidates).
5. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (overturning a Massachusetts statute insofar as it prohibited corporations from making any contributionor expenditure to influence the vote
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THE RECENT CASES

Let's Help Florida v. McCrary
This case was one of several 6 arising out of a 1978 initiative campaign for a state constitutional amendment to allow casino gambling in
a defined area of South Florida. Let's Help Florida, a political committee, challenged a Florida statute which imposed a $3,000 limitation on
persons making contributions to a political committee supporting or opposing a statewide referendum issue. The district court declared the
statute unconstitutional. 8 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, the case was consolidated with Dade Voters for a Free Choice v.
Firestone,9 wherein a Florida lawO0 placing a $1,000 ceiling on contributions to political committees organized in connection with countywide referendum elections was found invalid.
After disposing of several issues of federal jurisdiction and review,"" the court addressed appellants' substantive arguments: that the
statutes should be upheld as (1) aiding in the prevention of political
corruption and (2) promoting disclosure about who are the supporters
of referendum campaigns. Responding to the anti-corruption argument,
the court determined that
[t]he state's interest in preventing the actual or apparent corruption of
on referendum measures).
6. See, e.g., Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Fla., 363 So. 2d
337 (Fla. 1978), Let's Help Fla. v. Smathers, 360 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978); Let's Help Fla. v. Smathers, 360 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
7. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(d) (1977). This provision was part of a comprehensive
election code enacted by the Florida Legislature in 1977 to become effective January 1,
1978. The code did not restrict the number of contributions one could make to different
political committees or the total amount of one's independent direct expenditures. FLA.
§
8.
9.
political
prohibit
10.
11.
STAT.

106.011(5) (1977).
453 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Fla. 1978).
No. 79-770 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 1979). Dade Voters for a Free Choice was a
committee formed to oppose the passage of a county ordinance which would
smoking in public places.
FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(e) (1977).
The court rejected the contentions of the appellants in Dade Voters that the

district court (1) lacked jurisdiction because no case or controversy existed; (2) should
have abstained from hearing the case under the Younger abstention doctrine; and (3)

should not have granted injunctive relief. 621 F.2d at 198-99.
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candidates, which the Supreme Court found so compelling in Buckley
fv. Valeol2], does not justify restrictions upon political contributions in
referendum elections. .

.

. Large contributions for publicity by one

group or another do not influence the political decisionmakers-in this
case, the voters themselves-except in a manner protected by the first
amendment.13
The court also noted that the Supreme Court in First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellottil4 had distinguished between candidacy and referendum elections in terms of risk of corruption, concluding that the risk
"simply is not present" 15 in the referendum context. Similarly, the
court rejected appellant's argument that the contribution limitations
promoted disclosure, although it recognized that disclosing campaign
contributions serves an important state interest.' 6 The court wrote:
Florida can and does effectively promote the disclosure of large contributions through measures that are less harmful to first amendment rights
[than imposing contribution limitations]. For example, .

.

. the Florida

Election Code [requires] political committees to register with the state
and to file information about each contribution and contributor throughout the campaign. This information is available to the public ....17
In short, because the contribution limitations added nothing new to the
existing disclosure laws to make them more effective, they could not be
defended as disclosure measures. Since the statutes did not serve the
purpose of preventing political corruption or of promoting disclosure,
the district court's decisions, invalidating the acts as abridging important first amendment rights, were affirmed by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeal.
12. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). For a more detailed analysis of this case, see text accom-

panying notes 33-42 infra.
13. 621 F.2d at 199-200 (emphasis supplied).
14. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). For a more detailed analysis of this case, see text accompanying notes 43-52 infra.
15. Id. at 790.
16. 621 F.2d at 200.
17. Id. at 200-01.
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Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley
In this case the Supreme Court of California overturned a California Court of Appeal decision 18 invalidating a Berkeley city ordinance19
imposing a $250.00 maximum on contributions in support of or in opposition to a ballot measure.20
Like the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Let's Help Florida,the
Supreme Court of California examined the ordinance in light of its
proposed effectiveness in preventing corruption and promoting disclosure. Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the California court perceived the
Berkeley ordinance as both necessary and effective in achieving those
objectives. Viewing the corruption to be guarded against not as the corruption of persons but as the corruption of the initiative and referendum mechanisms, the Court reasoned:
[T]he domination of these processes by large contributors leaves other
citizens with a stilled voice in the very domain of our electoral system set
aside for accomplishing the popular will .... When large contributors
use the power of their purse to overcome the power of reason, they
thwart the intended purpose of the initiative or referendum: instead of
fostering participation by a greater segment of the electorate, the vision
of direct democracy is transformed into a tool of narrow interests.2 1
The court also observed that "the electoral process is. . . corrupted by
such contributions because voters lose confidence in our governmental
system if they come to believe that only the power of money makes the
difference."22 And it accepted the contribution limitations as a means
of promoting disclosure: although section 112 of the Berkeley ordinance
required the city to publish in newspapers a list of all contributors
making donations of more than fifty dollars to candidates or commit18.

99 Cal. App. 3d 736, 160 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).

19. Berkeley, Cal., Election Reform Act of 1974, § 602, as cited in 27 Cal. 3d at
_,614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
20. The term "ballot measure" is synonymous with the term "referendum issue"
and is so-used throughout this article.
21. 27 Cal. 3d at _,614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (footnote omitted)
(citing CROUCH et al., CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 108 (3d ed. 1964) and
Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo; The Constitutionalityof the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 323, 330 (1977).
22. 27 Cal. 3d at ., 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
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tees at least twice during the last seven days of a campaign,23 the court
was concerned that "the campaign propaganda and the identification
[of donors] are not simultaneous: inducements are disseminated and
voter impressions are formed substantially before the sources of com12
mittee financing are revealed. '
Having embraced the corruption and disclosure arguments to establish a compelling state interest in imposing contribution limitations,
the Supreme Court of California rejected the notion that countervailing
first amendment freedoms of expression and association were being impermissibly abridged. 25 The court distinguished First NationalBank of
Boston v. Bellott 26 which was relied upon by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal in Let's Help Florida as establishing a distinction between permissible limitations on contributions to candidates and impermissible
ceilings on contributions to referendum campaigns on the basis of potential for corruption. The California court simply noted that "[t]he
statute at issue in Bellotti totally prohibited. . . expenditures and contributions; the Berkeley ordinance .. .permits contributions .. .in
amounts up to $250."28 Thus, the court not only rejected the candidacy/referendum reading of Bellotti in Let's Help Florida but further
determined that expression and association were not being completely,
and therefore impermissibly, repressed, but merely permissibly regulated in the public interest.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of California found the compelling
state interests of preventing corruption and promoting disclosure were
served by the Berkeley ordinance in a reasonable manner.29 The district
23.

Id. at

..
, 614

P.2d at 753, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 95.

24. Id. at _,614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91. Though the Florida disclosure statute found by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to be more effective than
contributions limititations in Let's Help Fla. (FLA. STAT. §§ 106.03,.07 (1977)) did not
require publication of the names of contributors, political committees were required to
file contribution and expenditure reports quarterly from the time the campaign treasurer was appointed and, following the last day for qualifying for office, either weekly
or bi-weekly depending on the scope of the election in question (statewide vs. nonstatewide). Id. § 106.07(1).
25. 27 Cal. 3d at ., 614 P.2d at 748-49, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91.
26. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
27.

621 F.2d at 200.

28.

27 Cal. 3d at

29.

The court rejected the argument that the $250 ceiling was too low: "The
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court decision invalidating the measure was reversed, four to three."0
THE BACKGROUND: BUCKLEY AND BELLOTTI

The Supreme Court predicate for the Let's Help Florida and
Berkeley decisions provides no ready answer as to which court, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of California, has
decided correctly the validity of limitations on contributions to referendum political committees. A brief review of Buckley v. Valeos1 and
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,3 2 relied upon by both courts
in reaching their opposite conclusions, will show the complexity of the
issue and the potential for confusion and conflict created by the Supreme Court in those decisions.

Buckley v. Valeo
The Supreme Court opinion in this 1976 case has since been the
point of departure for analysis of the validity of a variety of federal,
state, and local campaign finance regulations. At issue in Buckley were
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,13 limiting (1)
contributionsby individuals or groups to candidates for federal elective
office" and contributions to any such candidates by political committees 5 and (2) expenditures by individuals or groups advocating the
election or defeat of such candidates8 as well as expenditures by the
major proportion of CARC's [Citizens Against Rent Control] funds came in amounts
under the ceiling; moreover, the few contributions that were larger were considerably
above the ceiling and hence would not have been aided by a modest upward adjustment." Id. at -, 614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
30. Justice Richardson wrote a cogent and convincing dissenting opinion, Id. at
_,614 P.2d at 750-55, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 92-97, with which Justices Clark and Manuel
concurred.
31. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
32. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
33. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3, as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (imposing a $1,000 limit).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (imposing a $5,000 limit). A
$25,000 limitation on total contributions by any contributor (individual, group, or political committee) (18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) was also contested.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (imposing a $1,000 limit).
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candidates themselves 7 and their own campaign organizations.3 8 The
reporting and disclosure requirements of the Ac 9 were also
contested.40
The Court held that the contribution limitations at issue were not
unconstitutional but were supported by substantial governmental interests in limiting corruption and the appearance of corruption in federal
elections.4 1 As to the expenditure limitations, the Court found these
unconstitutional as impermissible burdens on the right of free expression under the first amendment which could not be sustained on the
basis of governmental interests in preventing the actuality or appearance of corruption or in equalizing the resources of candidates. 2
Thus, a cursory reading of Buckley would dictate acceptance of
the Supreme Court of California's view in Berkeley that the city ordinance was not invalid because it was a contribution limitation, not an
expenditure limitation, and contribution limitations prevent corruption.
But an examination of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti leads
37. 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (dollar limit depending on
office involved).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (dollar limit depending on office
involved).
39. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq. (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (requiring political committees to report to the Federal Election Commission the names of persons contributing
more than $10, with the names of those contributing more than $100 in a calendar
year being subject to public inspection) and 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) (1970 & Supp. IV.
1974) (requiring every person or group other than a political committee or candidate
who makes political contributions or expenditures exceeding $100 in a calendar year,
other than by contribution to a political committee or candidate, to file a statement
with the Federal Election Commission).
40. Two other principal holdings in Buckley are not relevant here: (1) that the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code for public financing of presidential election
campaigns were not unconstitutional as being contrary to the art. I, sec. 8 general
welfare clause or the first or fifth amendments or as invidiously discriminating against
minority parties or their candidates or candidates not running in party primaries, 424
U.S. at 85-109; (2) that the principle of separation of powers contained in the art. I,
sec. I appointments clause was violated by the method of appointment of the members
of the Federal Election Commission considering its rule making, adjudicatory and enforcement powers (though de facto validity would be given to the Commission's past
acts), 424 U.S. at 109-143.
41. Id. at 58.
42. Id. at 58-59. The Court also decided that the reporting and disclosure requirements were valid. Id. at 84.
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to the conclusion that a less superficial analysis of Buckley will be required to resolve the question of the validity of limitations on contributions to political committees in referendum campaigns.
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
Although Let's Help Florida and Berkeley were, like Buckley,
contribution cases, Bellotti was a 1978 expenditure case. Unlike Buckley, Bellotti was a referendum case, not a candidacy case. The Massachusetts statute at issue prohibited corporations from making contributions or expenditures "for the purpose of.

.

. influencing or affecting

the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation."' 43 The law further provided that "[n]o question submitted to the
voters solely concerning the taxation of the income

. . .

of individuals

shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of
the corporation."" The appellants, two national banks and three business corporations, wanted to spend money to publicize their opposition
to a proposed state constitutional amendment to allow the legislature to
impose a personal income tax.
Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had
concerned itself principally with the question of whether and to what
extent corporations have first amendment rights,45 the Supreme Court
took a less subjective approach:
We believe that the court posed the wrong question. The Constitution
often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking their vin43. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977). In addition to
prohibiting corporate contributions or expenditures for the purpose of influencing the
vote on referenda, section 8 proscribed contributions and expenditures in candidacy
elections.
The importance of the governmental interest in preventing [corruption of elected
representatives through the creation of political debts in candidacy elections] has
never been doubted. The case before us presents no comparable problem, and our
consideration of a corporation's right to speak on issues of general public interest
implies no comparable right in the quite different context of participation in a
political campaign for election to public office.
435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
44.

MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977).

45.

371 Mass. 773, 359 N.E.2d 1262 (1977).
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dication. The First Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal
interests. The proper question therefore is not whether corporations
"have" First Amendment rights .

.

Instead, the question must be

whether [the statute] abridges expression that the First Amendment was
6
meant to protect.'
The Court was quick to determine that "[t]he speech proposed by appellants is at the heart of the First Amendment's protection"' and
"[i]f the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest
that the State could silence their proposed speech."' 48
The state advanced as one of its principal justifications for the prohibition of corporate speech in the referendum context "the State's interest in sustaining the active role of the individual citizen in the electoral process and thereby preventing diminution of the citizen's
confidence in government."' 49 Pointing out that the state could prevail
with this argument only upon showing it to represent a compelling subordinating interest in regulating protected speech in pursuit of which a
method "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement" of the right
to engage in that speech had been used,50 the Court noted that the
State's assertion that there is danger in allowing corporate participation
in the discussion of a referendum issue rested upon the unsupported
assumption that "such participation would exert an undue influence on
the outcome of a referendum vote and-in the end-destroy the confidence of the people in the democratic process and the integrity of
governnment." '51 The Court concluded:
46. 435 U.S. at 776.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 777.
49. Id. at 787. The state also asserted a compelling interest in protecting the
rights of corporate shareholders whose views were different from those expressed by the
management on behalf of the corporation. The Court concluded that "[a]ssuming, arguendo, that protection of shareholders is a 'compelling' interest under the circumstances of this case, we find 'no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State's effort' to prohibit appellants from speaking"
considering the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of the statute. Id. at 795
(quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960)).
50. 435 U.S. at 786 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 25).
51. 435 U.S. at 789.
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If appellee's arguments were supported by record or legislative findings
that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic
processes .

. .,

these arguments would merit our consideration. .

.

.But

there has been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has
been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts, or that there has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in government.
Nor are appellee's arguments inherently persuasive or supported by
the precedents of this Court. Referenda are held on issues, not candidates for public office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving
candidate elections. . . simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue. To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of
the vote. .

.

.But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is

hardly a reason to suppress it: The Constitution "protects expression
which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing. . .

."

We

noted only recently that "the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. . . ." Buckley,
supra, at 48-49. Moreover, the people . ..are entrusted with the re-

sponsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting
arguments. They may consider

.

.

the source and creditibility of the

advocate.5 2
Thus, the Court relied not so much on the fact that an expenditur was
at issue but rather emphasized that it-was a referendum and not a
candidacy election, that was at stake. This was certainly the Fifth Circuit's reading of Bellotti in Let's Help Florida.
SYNTHESIS:

BUCKLEY,

BELLOTTI,

LET'S

HELP

FLORIDA,

BERKELEY
The principal cases indicate that the questions which must be answered in determining the validity of limitations on contributions to political committees supporting or opposing ballot measures are these:
(1) For the purpose of first amendment protection, is a contribution to a referendum political committee political expression or merely
a manifestation of political association?
(2) What state interests, if any, are sufficiently compelling to with52.

Id. at 789-92 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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stand the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny of laws infringing on first
amendment rights by imposing ceilings on contributions to referendum
political committees?
(3) Assuming a compelling state interest in monitoring referendum campaigns, are limitations on contributions to political committees
the most effective and least restrictive means of serving such an
interest?

1. Is a Contribution to a Referendum Political Committee "Political Expression" or "PoliticalAssociation?"
Both political expression5" and political association54 are forms of
"speech" protected by the first amendment. But what the Supreme
Court in Buckley saw as the symbolic nature of a campaign contribution, 55 as opposed to a direct expenditure of money to express one's
views (for example, purchasing newspaper space for a political advertisement), seems somehow to diminish the "political expression" aspect
of such contributions. That is not to say that "the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce
53. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established
by our Constitution. The first amendment affords the broadest protection
to such political expression in order "to assure [the] unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 ... (1957)....
"[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs
.... " Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
54. The First Amendment protects political association as well as political
expression. The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), stemmed from the Court's recognition that "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association." Subsequent decisions have made clear that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee "'freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas,"'.... Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56, 57 (1973), quoted in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S.
477, 487 (1975).
Id. at 15.
55. Id. at 21.
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a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the
First Amendment," 56 but
[a] limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate
or campaign organization

. . .

involves little direct restraint on his politi-

cal communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe [upon] the
contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.5 7
Thus, according to Buckley, contribution "speech" partakes more of
freedom of association than of freedom of expression in first amendment analysis: "the primary First Amendment problem raised by...
contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association." 58 And though measures curtailing the freedom to associate demand the closest scrutiny, 59 "[e]ven
a 'significant intereference' with protected rights of political association" may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest . .

.60

It is difficult to resist the conclusion that although both political
expression and political association are fundamental rights, contributions to referendum political committees will fare better for the purpose
of first amendment protection if such contributions are seen primarily
as a non-symbolic form of political expression. Indeed, in Buckley limitations on symbolic, associational campaign contributions were sustained but limitations on campaign expenditures, described as "limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression," 1 were
declared invalid.
Should contributions to referendum political committees be characterized primarily as political expression for first amendment purposes? In a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal case, California
56. Id. at 16.
57. Id. at 21.
58. Id. at 24-25.
59. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
60. 424 U.S. at 25 (citing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975),
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963), and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960)).
61. 424 U.S. at 44-45.
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Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission,62 (hereinafter
CMA) Judge Wallace, dissenting, found contributions to multi-candidate political committees more analagous to campaign expenditures
(expression) than to campaign contributions (association) 3 for reasons
which are analytically applicable in the referendum political committee
context. At issue in CMA was the constitutionality of limits on contributions to political action committees" under the Federal Election
Campaign Act as amended in 1976."After the Supreme Court upheld
the Act's $1,000 limitation on individual's contributions to candidates
for federal office in Buckley, Congress, "as a matter of legislative
grace,.

. .

opened a wider avenue by which individuals could channel

funds to candidates: any person, including both natural persons and various kinds of organizations, could contribute up to $5,000 to multicandidate political committees which in turn could contribute up to
$5,000 to each candidate." 66 In CMA, CALPAC was a multi-candidate political committee affiliated with the California Medical
Association.
Comparing the expression and association interests affected by the
contribution limitations sustained in Buckley with those affected by the
Act's limitation on contributions to political committees, Judge Wal67
lace found the latter to be "more substantial":
In Buckley the contribution limitations governed contributions from a
supporter to a candidate. The communication inhering in such contribu62. No. 79-4426 (9th Cir. May 23, 1980), appeal docketed, No. 79-1952, (U.S.
June 12, 1980).
63. No. 79-4426, slip op. at 3405.
64. The phrase "political action committee" may be of indeterminate origin, but it appears to have gained currency by 1944 when it was used as a
term of art by the Congressional Special Committees to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, H.R. REP. No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); S.
REP. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). It now has a meaning fixed by
federal law. 2 U.S.C. § 44Ia(a)(4) (1976).
Kiley, Pacing The Burger Court: The CorporateRight to Speak and the Public Right
to Hear After FirstNational Bank v. Bellotti, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 427, 428 n.6 (1980).

65. Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (_).The $5,000 limitation on contributions
to political committees was codified as 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (1976).
66. No. 79-4426, slip op. at 3375 (footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 3404.

Published by NSUWorks, 1981

111

Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 1
434

Nova Law Journal

5:1981

tions is simply that the contributor "supports" the candidate and his
views. The Court found that this "symbolic expression of support"...
is adequately communicated by the act of contribution: the contribution's size is of "marginal" importance ...
In contrast ..... .[t]he object of an unincorporated association's
donations to a political committee is not merely to indicate "support" for
the committee's views, but to use the instrument of a political action
committee to voice its own ideas. Whereas in Buckley [where the contributions were to the candidates themselves] "the transformation of contributions into political debate [involved] speech by someone other than the
contributor,"

. . .

here this transformation is accomplished by the com-

mittee donors themselves, through a committee which, in large or small
measure, they control.68
Judge Wallace went on to point out that a limitation on donations
to political committees ultimately affects not only the total funds available for contributions to candidates, but also the amount available for
direct expenditure by the committee:6 9
It is by repeatedly forgetting this incontestable fact that the majority erroneously likens the . . . donation restriction to the contribution

limitations upheld in Buckley. [The Act] imposes [quoting Buckley] "direct and substantial restraints on the quantity" of .

.

. "political

speech.". . . The individual speech interests are therefore comparable7 0to
those affected by the expenditure limitations invalidated in Buckley.
It may be argued here that the "limitation on funds available for
expenditure" rationale should be de-emphasized because, since Buckley, campaign contributors remain free to make their own direct expenditures in any amount they choose. However, freedom of association
is implicated here:
Only in conjunction with outside donors will some unincorporated associations be able to aggregate sufficient funds and expertise to compete
effectively in the political marketplace with other more affluent "persons" capable of huge personal expenditures. .

.

. [This] restriction

. ..

68. Id. (citation omitted).

69. Id.
70. Id. at 3404-05 (footnote and citation omitted).
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goes to the heart of the associational right."'
Whatever criticisms or distinctions can be raised in opposition to
Judge Wallace's dissenting opinion in CMA considering the potential
for corruption in the candidacy context,7 2 the opinion is well-tailored to
make the point that contributions by individuals to referendum political
committees should be treated as direct expenditures, as pure speech
political expression, for first amendment purposes. Paraphrasing Judge
Wright,"3 the object of an individual citizen's donation to a political
committee is not merely to indicate support for or opposition to the
committee's views on a ballot measure, but to use the political committee to voice his or her own ideas. Although an individual contributor
does not have complete control over the precise "speech" which will
emanate from the political committee regarding the ballot measure in
question, the issue to be spoken to is clearly established in advance of
the donation, as well as the position being supported by the committee,
positive or negative. Although such contributors are clearly free to directly expend as much money as they are willing and able in favor of
or in opposition to a referendum issue, again paraphrasing Judge Wallace,74 only in conjunction with other donors will some citizens be able
to aggregate sufficient funds to compete effectively in the political mar71.

Id. at 3405.
72. The 1976 amendments gave political action committees great and
unusual powers in comparison to either candidates or individuals: Political
action committees are unlimited in the total amounts of money they receive, expend, and contribute to candidates. To vest such extraordinary
power in political action committees, without some reasonable limits such
as section 441a(a)(1)(C) on how they can collect money, would be to create novel and potentially enormous opportunities for corruption. As one
study has concluded, even as limited by section 441a(a)(1)(C), political
action committees have become vast, unaccountable, and low visibility centers of electoral influence that effectively detach candidates from their
nominal geographic constituencies. See Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, An Analysis of the Impact of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 1972-78, Prepared for the
House Comm. on House Admin., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (Comm. Print
1979) ....

No. 79-4426, slip op. at 3377.
73. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
74. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
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ketplace with other more affluent individuals capable of huge personal
expenditures. Considering the nature of the election at stake (ballot
measure versus candidacy), the referendum political committee will not
itself be making contributions, only expenditures to publicize its support or opposition to a concept, not a potentially corruptible candidate.
Thus, the referendum political committee serves as a mechanism for
effectively pooling expenditure capital for the purpose of first amendment protected political expression.
Recognizing a first amendment right to make unlimited contributions to referendum political committees also serves an important public interest: the public's right to hear. In Bellotti, the Supreme Court
emphasized that it was the nature of the speech proposed that commanded first amendment protection:75 "The Court has declared . . .
that 'speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is
the essence of self-government.'

. .

. And self-government suffers when

those in power suppress competing views on public issues 'from diverse
and antagonistic sources.'... 176 The Court also noted that "freedom
of expression has particular significance with respect to government because '[i]t is here that the state has a special incentive to repress opposition and often wields a more effective power of suppression.' ",7
Surely political communication regarding an issue of such governmental importance as to be the subject of a referendum goes to the "essence of self-government" such that financial limitations on such expression would be in obvious violation of the fundamental purpose for
78
which the first amendment was historically intended.
2. What State Interests Are "Compelling"?
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized two state interests
as sufficiently compelling to allow regulation of political contributions
and expenditures: preservation of (1) the integrity of the representative
75.
76.
77.

See 435 U.S. at 776-77.
Id. at 777 n.12 (citations omitted).
Id. n.11.

78.

For a discussion of the historical relationship between the first amendment

and the public discussion of governmental affairs, see T.
ERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

EMERSON, TOWARD A GEN-

(1966) and A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
(1948) (both cited in Bellotti, 435 U.S. at

777 n.11).
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system of government and (2) the public's confidence in that system of
government. 79 These interests have been expressed in various ways
("prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption," ' 0 ["preservation of] the integrity of the electoral process,"' ' ["sustaining] the
active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for
the wise conduct of government" 2), but the underlying principles remain the same. Of course, a mere assertion of these interests is insufficient if not inherently persuasive or supported by record or legislative
findings, or by Supreme Court precedents. 83
79.
80.
81.
82.

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
Id. at 25.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788.
Id. at 788-89 (citing United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567,

575 (1957)).
83. See Bellotti as quoted in text accompanying note 52 supra.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court relied on legislative findings to constitutionally
support the Federal Election Campaign Act's $1,000 limitation on contributions to
candidates:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure political quid pro quo
from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices
can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after
the 1972 election [in the Watergate. investigations] demonstrate that the problem
is not an illusory one.
424 U.S. at 26-27 (footnote omitted). See also note 1, supra.
In striking down the Act's $1,000 limitation on independent expenditures in support of a candidate, the Court made no reference to any record or legislative findings or
Supreme Court precedents supporting the limitation and apparently found arguments
advanced by the Act's proponents inherently unpersuasive:
The parties defending §608(e)(1) [limiting expenditures] contend that it is necessary to prevent would-be contributors from avoiding the contribution limitations by the simple expedient of paying directly for media advertisements or for
other portions of the candidate's campaign activities. They argue that expenditures controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and his campaign might
well have virtually the same value to the candidate as a contribution and would
pose similar dangers of abuse. Yet such controlled or coordinated expenditures
are treated as contributiods rather than expenditures under the Act. Section
608(b)'s contribution ceilings rather than §608(e)(1)'s independent expenditure
limitation prevent. . . [such] disguised contributions. . . . Unlike contributions,
such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate. . . not only
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Is there any basis for finding a compelling state interest in limiting
contributions in the referendum political committee context which
would justify infringement on contributors' first amendment rights of
political expression and association? In both Let's Help Florida" and
Berkeley, 85 the proponents of the regulations limiting such contributions stressed their importance in preventing corruption and promoting
disclosure of the identity of campaign contributors, two variations on
the integrity of the system/public confidence theme. Although the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Let's Help Florida followed Bellotti
in concluding that, with regard to referendum elections, statutory restrictions upon political contributions cannot be justified as a means for
preventing political corruption because there are no candidates to be
corrupted, 86 the Supreme Court of California in Berkeley merged the
integrity of the system/public confidence interests to define the corruption to be guarded against as the corruption of the purpose of the initiative/referendum mechanism itself and the electoral process in general.8 7 The California court relied heavily on "[c]ommentators on our
political scene" 88 to find a trend toward loss of confidence in the political system and apathy in elections which limitations on contributions to
referendum political committees might reverse by "assuring the voters
that their vote and their participation, whether in the form of money or
services, are significant" 89 and concluded that this interest, served by
the ordinance, should be recognized as compelling."
undermines the value of the expenditures to the candidate, but also alleviates the
danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.
424 U.S. at 46-47 (footnote omitted).
Likewise, in Bellotti, the Court found that the state's assertion that there is danger
in allowing corporate participation in the discussion of a referendum issue rested upon
the unsupported assumption that "such participation would exert an undue influence on
the outcome of a referendum vote and,-in the end-destroy the confidence of the
people in the democratic process and the integrity of government." 435 U.S. at 789.
84. See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
86. 621 F.2d at 199-200.
87. 27 Cal. 3d at -, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
88. Id. at , 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
89. Id. at _. 614 P.2d at 747-48, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
90. Id. at _ 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
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Will the United States Supreme Court agree? Bellotti ("[t]he risk
of corruption perceived in candidate elections.

. .

simply is not present

in a popular vote on a public issue"91) indicates a negative answer, notwithstanding the distinction drawn between the statute in Bellotti and
the ordinance in Berkeley by the California court: "[tihe statute at
issue in Bellotti totally prohibited. . expenditures and contributions;
the Berkeley ordinance

. . .

permits contributions

. . .

in amounts up

to $250.1192 This distinction does not take into account the fact that the
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act found unconstitutional in Buckley were financial limitations, not prohibitions. Thus,
particularly if the previously advanced principle is accepted-that contributions to referendum political committees, like Bellotti's referendum expenditures, are pure speech political expression which cannot be
dollar-limited according to Buckley-the Berkeley explanation of Bellotti creates a distinction without a difference under the first
amendment.
Even assuming that restoring public confidence in the political system and stemming voter apathy are compelling anti-corruption interests, "[iut is noteworthy that it [was] not the.fact of a danger but the
potential of a danger that alone generates the compelling interest
found by the majority [in Berkeley]."" Thus, Justice Richardson, dis-

senting, criticized the Berkeley majority for basing its finding of a compelling state interest on a "wholly untested political hypothesis [which
was] not based upon any record but rather upon the opinions and conclusions of 'commentators on our political scene,' 'a political scientist,'
[and] a 'student of the California initiative process.' 94 Justice Richardson continued:
The rationale for the ordinance's restrictions, viewed as sufficient by
the majority, is the danger of "corruption" of the initiative process
through this infusion of unlimited sums of money by "large contributors"
...favoring or opposing a ballot measure. This, the majority argues,
will destroy the electorate's "confidence in our political system.".

.

. In

the absence, however, of some affirmative showing "by record or legisla91.
92.
93.
94.

435 U.S. at 790 (citations omitted).
27 Cal. 3d at _,614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
Id. at , 614 P.2d at 751, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (emphasis in original).
Id.
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tive finding" this precise reasoning, central to the majority opinion, was
flatly rejected, as to corporate contributors, by the Bellotti court

. . .

in

these words: "[T] here has been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts or that there has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in government." Similarly, there has been "no
showing" whatever that large contributors, corporate or otherwise, have
thwarted or perverted the initiative in California, which at present appears to be alive and well and increasingly used.95
Accordingly, even if the California court's definition of "corruption" in
the referendum context gains acceptance, it is possible the Supreme
Court will not find that the Berkeley ordinance serves a proven compelling anti-corruption interest.
3. What Form of Regulation is Most Effective and Least
Restrictive?
Clearly, one of the most effective means of protecting the political
process from the corruption of money is to place ceilings on contributions and expenditures of all kinds. But because of the fundamental
first amendment implications of such ceilings, the test for the validity
of those measures is not whether they are the most effective means of
protecting against corruption but whether they are the least restrictive
method of effectively accomplishing that end, "closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgment""6 of first amendment rights.
Accepting the notion that referendum elections do not present the
same opportunities for quid pro quo corruption as candidacy elections,
and thus limitations on contributions to referendum political committees unnecessarily infringe on first amendment rights, does not preclude
some other form of regulation. For example, in Let's Help Floridathe
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal recognized Florida's disclosure laws as
effective against corruption of the initiative/referendum process, since
they allow the public an opportunity to evaluate the merits of a ballot
measure with knowledge of its supporters and opponents. 97 The protection of the electoral system afforded by disclosure measures is not abso95.

Id. at

-,

614 P.2d at 752, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 94.

96. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
97. See 621 F.2d at 200-01.
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lute, however. The information made public is just that-information.
It is the responsibility of the voter to use this data in conjunction with
other information about an issue to make a reasoned decision.
In contrast, the Supreme Court of California regarded the Berkeley disclosure provision as too little, too late, to allow the public reasonable opportunity to use facts made public by disclosure to make rational decisions.9 8 Interestingly, the Berkeley ordinance required
newspaper publication (twice during the last seven days of a referendum campaign) of contributor information,9" whereas the Florida law
required mainly reporting of financial information to the Secretary of
State (which information then became public record).' °0
Are disclosure laws like those on the books in Florida and Berkeley, California, sufficiently effective against corruption of the referendum process? The answer cannot be objective. In the final analysis it
must be tied to the basic political philosophy of those asked to respond.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's attitude toward the Florida disclosure requirement reflects a more conservative view of the relationship
between a citizen and his/her government than that held by the Supreme Court of California. Even though the*California court may be
correct in its observation that "inducements are disseminated and voter
impressions are formed substantially before the sources of committee
financing are revealed," 101 should one citizen's participation in the political process be sacrificed to another citizen's political naivete'?
Stated another way, to what lengths should government go to see to it
that citizens fully inform themselves before making political decisions?
In light of the first amendment implications of limiting contributions to
referendum political committees, a more constitutionally acceptable
method of improving public awareness would be to rewrite the disclosure laws, a task which the Supreme Court can happily note falls to the
legislatures, not the courts.
CONCLUSION

It would be easy to succumb to the symmetry of upholding limita98.
99.
100.
101.

See 27 Cal. 3d at , 614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
Id. at , 614 P.2d at 753, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 106.03, .07 (1977).
27 Cal. 3d at , 614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
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tions on political contributions while striking down limitations on political expenditures without regard to the nature of the election at stake
(referendum versus candidacy) or, in the case of contributions, the
identity of the recipient (political committee versus candidate or candidate's campaign organization). But the stringent demands of the first
amendment on those who would seek to balance its protections against
state interests do not permit such unsophisticated treatment.
If the Supreme Court overrules the California court on the theory
that there is no risk of corruption in the referendum context, the validity of disclosure laws in that setting must be questioned. (If they do not
act as anti-corruption measures, what compelling state interest do disclosure laws serve?) If the Court accepts the California court's definition of "corruption" in connection with ballot measures (corruption of
the process), the integrity of disclosure laws will be preserved; but if
the Court goes the second mile and recognizes contribution limitations
as a valid method of avoiding that corruption, a precedent requiring a
case-by-case analysis of contribution limitations will be established, necessitating inquiry in each instance as to whether there was a demonstrable threat to the referendum process which required legislative action limiting contributions to political committees.
Recognizing contributions to referendum political committees as
pure speech political expression establishes neither the "no risk of corruption" precedent nor the "case-by-case corruption of the process"
precedent but does create other problems including the question of the
validity of limitations on contributions to candidate political action
committes, which the Court may resolve in CaliforniaMedical Association v. FederalElection Commission,10 2 and the issue of the validity
of limitations on contributions to political committees supporting both
candidates and ballot measures. Nonetheless, this appears to be the
most desirable judicial approach because it would preserve fundamental first amendment rights while leaving legislative bodies free to
impose reasonable disclosure requirements and other protections
against abuse of the referendum process.
Perhaps this discussion demonstrates that the Supreme Court's
resolution of the conflict between the first amendment and election
102.

See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
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finance laws can still be only piecemeal at best, notwithstanding the
Court's best efforts in Buckley and Bellotti. Nonetheless, the yearning
for one final blueprint still lingers, especially in the souls of advisors to
Congressional, state, and local lawmakers.
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Modern medical technology accords physicians the capacity to
prolong life and to protract the duration of numerous incurable diseases. However, the ability to sustain life transcends the ability to heal.
Lives which once would have expired now endure with organ transplants, respirators, pacemakers, and hemodialysis machines. "Living
Wills"' have been created by lawyers to assist those who wish to avoid
mechanically extending their lives. Medical progress, it seems, sometimes creates unforeseen and undesirable consequences.'
People envision the horror of being maintained in an unconscious,
non-human limbo in a refrigerated room containing only machines.
This state is in stark contradiction to the usual idea of death as a brief,
but peaceful end. We envision physicians preparing to dissect an organ
for transplant from a body whose brain is dead but whose heart is still
beating. We also envision a patient having been attached to a respirator
for so long that he has developed "respirator brain" - a condition
where the brain becomes softened or liquified8 - destroying pathological indications of brain injury and preventing a determination of the
cause of death.4 Such horrors exist within hospital walls daily, creating
confusion and fear among physicians and hospitals in determining
whether to withhold or withdraw life-supporting treatment. Since In re
1. A "living will" is a document, similar to a will, executed by a person during
his lifetime setting forth his wishes concerning medical treatment in contemplation of
illness or death.
2. See Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A ProsecutorialView of the Quinlan Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 304 (1977). See also Walker, Diamond & Moseley,
The Neuropathologic Findings in Irreversible Coma, 34 J. NEUROPATHOLOGY AND
EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY

3.

295 (1976).

Walker, Diamond & Moseley, supra note 2; Wright & Ostrow, The Role of

the Medical Examiner in Determining Time of Death in Brain Dead Patients, 67 J.
FLA. MED.

A. 134 (1980).

4. See In re Cain, 44 Fla. Supp. 208 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. 1976) (the continuation
of medical procedures would preclude any possibility of obtaining an effective examination of the deceased woman's brain tissue because such tissue was constantly
deteriorating).
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Quinlan, the issues of "euthanasia '' 5 and "the right to die"' have generated controversy in both the medical and legal professions. 7 Reevaluation of the physician's responsibilities to the dying patient has revolved
around whether the physician should permit the terminally ill individual to refuse life-supporting treatment or whether he should subsequently withhold or withdraw such treatment. These dilemmas have
created a recent flood of interest in the "living will" and in natural
death legislation.8 As a result, many patients questioning the value of
prolonging life at the expense of diminishing its quality, are refusing
life-supporting treatment, crying "death with dignity."
This right to die by refusing extraordinary treatment has emerged
from the recent availability of an alternative to life or death - to be
kept "alive" in a limbo state by life-supporting measures. If given the
opportunity, a person must be permitted to choose from these alternatives. To many, to die peacefully is a much more attractive alternative
than to die with tubes down one's throat and in one's arms. 9 To prolong
life at the expense of the loss of bodily functions and intense pain and
suffering, absent a hope of cure, does not make the prolongation of life
desirable. One such person who shares this belief is the subject of the

5. Giancola, The Discontinuationof "Extraordinary"Medical Treatment from
a Terminal Patient:A Physician'sCivil Liability in New York, 26 MED. TRIAL TECH.

Q. 326, 327 n.6 (1980). Black's defines "euthanasia" as "[t]he act or practice of painlessly putting to death persons suffering from incurable and distressing disease as an
act of mercy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 497 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). See
also J. Sanders, Euthanasia:None Dare"Call It Murder, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC. 351 (1969); 0. RUSSELL, FREEDOM TO DIE (rev. ed. 1977).
6. See Hirsch & Donovan, The Right to Die: Medico-Legal Implications of In re
Quinlan, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 267 (1977).
7. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) Twenty-one-year-old Karen
Quinlan was diagnosed as being in a permanent vegetative state, having lapsed into a
coma after an intake of alcohol and drugs. Her father sought to be appointed as her
guardian to authorize the withdrawal of extraordinary treatment enabling her to die
naturally. This case was the first to determine what constitutes "extraordinary" treatment. Withdrawal of Karen's respirator was permitted by the court. See Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients,30 RUTGERS L. REv.
254 (1977); LADIES' HOME J., May, 1980, at 90; TRIAL, September, 1976, at 36; J.
LEGAL MED., May, 1976, at 28.
CIN.

8. See Note, The Right to Die: A Proposalfor NaturalDeath Legislation, 49 U.
L. REV. 228 (1980).
9. Miami Herald, Apr. 27, 1980, § BR, at 8, col. 1.
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I

following hypothetical case.
Our patient is an elderly man residing in Florida, having moved
from California two years ago. He exists in a permanent vegetative
state, 10 assisted by a mechanical respirator. Usually, this situation
would create all the problems involved in recent cases concerning
whether to withdraw life-supporting treatment and allow the patient to
die. In such cases, the courts have speculated as to whether the patient
would have wanted to die. Usually the patient has never contemplated
such a problem, as the average person avoids facing the prospect of
dying. However, in this case our patient, while a resident of California,
executed a directive, otherwise known as a "living will," ' stating that
he be allowed to die if he becomes terminally ill or is maintained by
extraordinary treatment.
More than four million copies of the living will have been distributed in the past twelve years, mostly in response to individual requests.1 2 Lawyers, physicians and hospitals have distributed them to
their clients and patients. These living wills are available in legal
parchment form or as permanent wallet-size cards. Although the living
3 the
will is a recognized document, included in Modern Legal Forms,"
legality of enforcing a living will has never been tested in court. Nevertheless, it remains as an expression of one's right to self-determination
over his body, relieving the family and physician of all responsibility for
the patient's death.
Our patient's living will stated that "if the situation should arise in
which there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery from extreme
physical or mental disability, I direct that I should be allowed to die
and not be kept alive by medications, artificial means or heroic mea10. This is a state where the individual has no significant cognitive functions, but
may be partially responsive. Cognitive functions include the ability to think, feel, see
and communicate. Pollick, "Cognitive" and "Sapient" - Which Death is the Real
Death? 136 AMER. J. SURGERY 3, 5-6 (1978).
11. The task of considering whether the patient would wish to exercise this right
is considerably easier where he has expressed his intent not to have his life prolonged
beyond a certain point, especially if he made his "living will" in contemplation of illness or death.
12. 6 Concern For Dying Newsletter 2 (Spring 1980). Forms for "The Living
Will" can be obtained by writing, Concern For Dying, 250 West 57th Street, New
York, New York 10019.
13. STONE, MODERN LEGAL FORMS § 10199 (Supp. 1980).
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sures." Further, the document stated that he was of sound mind, that
the document represented his wishes, and that those who carried out
his wishes would be free from any liability. His living will included
additional provisions concerning transplantation of his organs at death,
the names of those persons with whom he had discussed his wishes, and
a statement designating what measures he qualified as extraordinary or
artificial.
California had passed natural death legislation in 1976 which recognized the right to die in certain situations, 1 ' but after a decade of
futile attempts, Florida had not yet passed such natural death or right
to die legislation when our client moved here. Aware of this fact, he
reexecuted his living will and distributed copies to his attorney, physician, clergyman, and family. In addition, he carried a minature copy of
his living will in his wallet to assure that his wishes would be followed
if he were to be found in an unconscious state, unable to express his
wishes. A copy of his living will follows:
MY LIVING WILL

This is a declaration of my right to die and a directive that my
wishes be carried out.
7186 (West Supp. 1979):
The Legislature finds that adult persons have the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care, including
the decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condition.
The Legislature further finds that modern medical technology has made
possible the artifical prolongation of human life beyond natural limits.
The Legislature further finds that, in the interest of protecting individual
autonomy, such prolongation of life for persons with a terminal condition may
cause loss of patient dignity, and unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing
nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the patient.
The Legislature further finds that there exists considerable uncertainty in
the medical and legal professions as to the legaility of terminating the use or
application of life-sustaining procedures where the patient has voluntarily and in
sound mind evidenced a desire that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn.
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients have a right to expect, the Legislature hereby declares that the laws of the State of California
shall recognize the right of an adult person to make a written directive instructing his physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures in the
event of a terminal condition.

14.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
On this 30 day of March, 1979, in the city of Ft. Lauderdalein the
county of Broward of the state of Florida, I do hereby make known my
wishes that I be allowed to die if I should ever encounter a situation
where I, as a result of extreme physical or mental disability or incurable
illness from which death will follow, have to be or already am being kept
alive by such extraordinary or artificial medical treatment as I have described below, and there is little or no chance of my recovery to a cognitive and sapient life according to all current medical knowledge practiced in this community and two physicians, one being my attending
physician. If such extraordinary treatment will only serve to artifically
prolong my death and not to preserve my life, I request that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn and that I may be permitted to die
naturally.
I do hereby make this expression of my wishes voluntarily, being of
sound mind and of majority age. I do hereby declare that my physician,
upon carrying out my wishes in good faith, shall be immune from civil or
criminal liability and not in violation of §782.08 Florida Statutes. If my
physician refuses to act in accordance with my wishes, he should direct
my care to another physician who will do so.
Additional Provisions
(1) I have discussed my wishes to have life-supporting treatment
withheld or withdrawn with the following who understand these wishes:
Jane Doe
Richard Doe
May Doe

(relationship) wife
(relationship) son
(relationship) sister

(2) I consider the following measures of medical treatment extraordinary or artificial; as such, these measures should not be performed
upon me:
mechanical respirator
nemodialysis machine
cardiac pacemaker
(3) If any of my organs would be valuable as transplants to help others,
I freely give my consent that they be donated for such use, at the point of my
legal and medical death.
(4) This guarantees that if, any time prior to or at the time of my death,
I am competent and wish to change or revoke this living will, I will be allowed
to do so in writing or orally in the presence of two persons, one being my
physician.
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(5) My terminal condition is diffus cerebral and brain stem anoxia resulting from cardio-respiratoryarrest. This must be completed as the only
evidence of a terminal condition. Diagnosed this 20 day of January, 1979 by
John Smith
M.D.
200 Bay Drive
(address)
Oceanview Medical Center (medical center)
(6) This directive shall have no effect after 5 years from this date unless
reexecuted, and it will be my responsibility to see that this is done.
(7) To the Medical Center: A copy of this directive shall be made part
of my medical records at the medical center at which I am subsequently hospitalized and/or administered such extraordinary treatment.
To the Nursing Home: If I am under care of a nursing home (per Chap.
400 Florida Statutes) at such time as I am required to reexecute my living
will, I shall have the assistance of a patient ombudsman (per §400.307 Florida
Statutes) for the purpose of preventing undue influence or fraud.
(8) I guarantee that a qualified attorney has inspected this document
and is satisfied that all formal requirements of execution have been met.
Signed: /s/ John Doe
We, as witnesses, to vouch for the sound mind of the signer-that he is
emotionally and mentally competent and that these are his true wishes and
that he signed voluntarily in our presence today, without any undue influence
from any physician or family member. We are not in any way whatsoever
related to the signer or in any way whatsoever a beneficiary of any interest of
the estate of the signer, or in any way whatsoever financially responsible for or
involved with the signer's hospitilization.
Witness Shawn Richards
Witness David Adams
Copies of this document have been distributed to the following:
My attorney
address

Richard Brown, Esquire
100 Oceanfront Drive - Ft. Lauderdale,
FL

My physician
address

John Smith, M.D.
200 Bay Drive - Ft. Lauderdale, FL

My clergyman
address

William Jones
800 Seagrape Lane -

My family
address
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Our patient is now in a permanent vegetative state, having lapsed
into an irreversible coma following cardio-respiratory arrest. He is being maintained on a respirator. Earlier, his family had agreed to honor
his "living will" but now has second thoughts. In addition, his physician now fears criminal liability and refuses to withdraw the extraordinary treatment. Our patient's attorney, who has been an advocate of
"right to die" legislation in Florida, presents this case of first impression to the court to determine the legality of this living will.
This case has been predicted in Florida since the recent case of
Satz v. Perlmutter,5 wherein the court recognized a patient's right to
die. Mr Perlmutter, a competent adult, expressed his wish to discontinue the extraordinary medical treatment which was prolonging his
life at the time such treatment was being administered. In contrast Mr.
Doe is comatose, incompetent to presently communicate his wishes.
Mr. Doe provided for his present situation by previously expressing his
wishes in his living will.
Mr. Doe's attorney will attempt to persuade the Florida court to
recognize his client's living will and the wishes expressed therein. Since
the Supreme Court of Florida arguably recognized a competent patient's right to decide to die, with dignity, expressed in his "contemporaneous living will,""6 the court should recognize this same right to die
with dignity expressed in the patient's previously executed "living will."
Mr. Doe is incapable of expressing his wishes contemporaneously with
his illness since he is comatose. He expressed his right to die at the only
time when he personally could exercise this right; he was competent
before the onset of this illness. If incompetents and competents are to
be treated equally with regard to their constitutional right to privacy,
the court must recognize Mr. Doe's wishes in his living will.

15.

Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affid, 379

So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980). The trial court permitted and the Supreme Court upheld the
withdrawal of the respirator from Abe Perlmutter, a competent, terminally ill adult
who had no minor dependents but had the unanimous approval of his family. Id. See
Note, Death with Dignity and the Terminally Ill: The Need for Legislative Action, 4
NOVA L.J. 257 (1980).

16.

6 Concern For Dying Newsletter 2 (Spring 1980).
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DEFINING EXTRAORDINARY TREATMENT

In his living will, our patient refers to heroic or extraordinary measures. What constitutes extraordinary treatment will inevitably affect
the outcome of this case. The distinction between extraordinary and
ordinary treatment 7 is critical, since judicial decision dictate that a
patient is not always free to refuse ordinary treatment when such refusal would affect the patient's death. 8 The court should classify the
respirator as extraordinary treatment in conformance with our patient's
living will, as it cannot cure his condition but, at best, can only prolong
his inevitable death. Therefore, our patient should be free to refuse the
treatment.
As medical technology progresses, once extraordinary treatment
quickly becomes ordinary treatment. Opposing counsel may argue that
we cannot justify withdrawal of the respirator as an extraordinary measure, because it may be considered ordinary tommorow. This argument
is without substance, because the courts and physicians must handle
the case at the time when it arises. Arguing hypothetical future advances does not solve the instant problems.
This ordinary-extraordinary dichotomy was a determinative issue
in Quinlan,"9 where the New Jersey Supreme Court had to determine
whether a respirator was an extraordinary method of treatment. The
court stated:
[W]hile the record here is somewhat hazy in distinguishing between
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" measures, one would have to think that
the use of the same respirator or like support could be considered "ordi17. Ordinary treatment is usually described as treatment that offers a reasonable
benefit without excessive pain, expense or inconvenience. Extraordinary treatment is
treatment that offers no reasonable benefit and cannot be used without excessive pain,
expense or inconvenience. Hirsh & Donovan, supra note 6, at 290.

18. Most cases have involved religious grounds, because patients are almost certain to recover if they accept the treatment. See Application of President and Directors
of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 331 F.2d 1010

(D.C. Cir. 1964) (the court ordered a blood transfusion against the wishes of the patient-a Jehovah's Witness who had suffered massive blood loss from a ruptured ulcer).
See also In re Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d
372 (D.C. 1972).
19. 70 N.J. at -,
355 A.2d at 669. See also Hirsch & Donovan supra note 6,
at 290.
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nary" in the context of the possibly curable patient but "extraordinary"
in the context of the forced sustaining
by cardio-respiratory processes of
20
an irreversibly doomed patient.

In certain situations, such as paralytic poliomyelitis,2 1 even artifical respiration is not an 'extraordinary' means.
The Quinlan court (as well as physicians) lacked guidelines defining extraordinary measures. Unfortunately, it did not set forth any
guidelines for use in future situations involving the ordinary versus extraordinary debate.22 Until recently this distinction largely had been
considered of only medical significance. However, the potentiality for
criminal prosecutions mandate formulation of distinct legal guidelines.
Some Florida legislators have proposed such guidelines, but none have
acquired support. 3
The American Medical Association sanctions the "cessation of the
employment of extraordinary means to prolong the life of the body
when there is irrefutable evidence that biological death is imminent." 2'
The Vatican issued formal declarations in 1957, wherein Pope Pius XII
stressed that no obligation exists to use extraordinary means to prolong
life or to give a physician permission to use them. 5 In July, 1980, Pope
20. Id. at 48, 355 A.2d at 667-68.
21. Paralytic poliomyelitis: "an acute viral disease, occurring sporadically and in
epidemics, and characterized clinically by fever, sore throat, headaches, vomiting, often
with stiffness of the neck and back ... characterized by ... paralysis." DORLAND'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1230 (25th ed. 1974). There may be subsequent atrophy of

groups of muscles, ending in contraction and permanent deformity. Id.
22. 70 N.J. at 48, 355 A.2d at 667-68.
23. Fla. H.R.J. Res. 91 (1969); Fla. H.R. 3184 (1970); Fla. H.R. 68 (1971);
Fla. H.R. 2614 (1972); Fla. H.R. 2830 (1972); Fla. H.R. 407 (1973-74); Fla. H.R.J.
Res. 3007 (1974); Fla. H.R. 239 (1975); Fla. H.R. 2463 (1976); Fla. H.R.J. Res. 2575
(1976); Fla. H.R. 3703 (1976); Fla. S. 513 (1976); Fla. H.R. 374 (1977); Fla. H.R. 8
(1978); Fla. H.R. 740 (1979); and Fla. H.R. 463 (1980); Fla. S. 446 (1980).
24. A.M.A. News, Dec., 1973 at 15, col. 2.
25. It is incumbent upon the physician to take all reasonable, ordinary
means of restoring the vital functions and consciousness, and to employ
such extraordinary means as are available to him to this end. It is not
obligatory, however, to continue to use extraordinary means indefinitely in
hopeless cases, but normally one is held to use only ordinary
means-according to the circumstances of persons, places, times, and cultures-that is to say, means that do not involve any grave burden for one-

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss3/1

130

et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue
454

Nova Law Journal

5:1981

John Paul II approved a flexible new set of guidelines on euthanasia
after consultations with medical experts and moral theologians.26 Relying on the Catholic teaching that God alone has the right to give life or
end it, the Vatican through Pope Paul II nonetheless declared that life
need not be prolonged by extraordinary means. When inevitable death
is imminent, patients may refuse forms of treatment that would only
secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life.27 If there is
no duty to deliver extraordinary care to our patient, he must be permitted to have his "plug pulled."
Opposing counsel will interject that we have invented an attractive
way out of the dilemma which technology has created, since all technology may be viewed as extraordinary, thereby justifying pulling the
plug. In response, we will assure the court that it is not our intention to
classify all technology as extraordinary. What is ordinary or extraordinary treatment will vary from patient to patient as medical science progresses. 28 Nevertheless, the law must set guidelines and criteria establishing when medical procedures can be withdrawn. Questions of
legality will inevitably surface in the form of homicide, malpractice,
and life insurance litigation. Case law on the right to die illustrates
that criteria used in determining extraordinary treatment must draw
heavily on medical expertise and prevailing medical practices in the
community.29 This court must inject law into this theory; otherwise
physicians will be in a position to fashion their own law to prolong life
according to customary practices, and this will evoke inconsistency.
RIGHT OF PRIVACY BASIS

Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly recognize a right of privacy, the Supreme Court has recognized its existence
self or another. There comes a time when resuscitative efforts should stop
and death be unopposed.
Pope Pius XII, Prolongationof Life, 4 AM. Q. PAPAL DOCTRINE 393 (1958).
26. NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1980, at 58; TIME, July 7, 1980, at 49.
27. NEWSWEEK, supra note 26, at 58.
28. 70 N.J. at 43, 355 A.2d at 667-68.
29. In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 617 P.2d 731 (1980) (en banc); Severns v.
Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980). Lovato v. District Court In
and For Tenth Jud. Dist., 601 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
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since Union Pacific Railroad v. Botsford.30 The right of personal privacy has been discussed within the penumbra of specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights,31 and from language of the first, 2 fourth, fifth,33
ninth,3 and fourteenth amendments.3 5 The Court's decisions articulate
that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit" in the concept of "ordered liberty" are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. This constitutional guarantee reached out in
Roe v. Wades6 to protect a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. The same guarantee extends to preserve one's right to privacy,
or common law right of bodily self-determination, against unwanted
infringements of bodily integrity in appropriate circumstances.37
We would argue that our patient's constitutionally based right of
privacy guarantees him the right to reject further medical treatment.
The Court in Superintendent of Belchertown State Schools v.
Saikewicz38 opined that it was "not inconsistent to recognize a right to
decline medical treatment in a situation of incurable illness." The court
articulated that a
constitutional right to privacy . . . is an expression of the sanctity of
individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents
of life. That the value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision
to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human being

30. 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
33. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
34. 381 U.S. at 484, 486-99.
35. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (a landmark decision where the
court declared that a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy in the first trimester
was protected by the constitutionally-guaranteed right of privacy, limited only by a
compelling state interest in the preservation of life). Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972). Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
37. 70 N.J. at
, 355 A.2d at 663.
38. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977). The court upheld the refusal of
chemotherapy for acute leukemia for a severely retarded adult and enumerated four
state interests: "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interest of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession." Id. at __, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
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the right of choice.39

Recognizing this constitutional right, the court in Quinlan noted
"that if Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval.

. .

and

perceptive of her irreversible condition, she could effectively decide
upon discontinuance of the life-support apparatus, even if it meant the
prospect of natural death."'40 Karen was in a chronic vegetative state
and was assisted in breathing by a respirator. She was able to maintain
some internal functions such as body temperature and blood pressure,
but she had lost most cognitive brain function. Even though Karen was
not able to express a preference for death with dignity over life as a
vegetable, the court concluded that no compelling state interest should
41
compel Karen to endure the unendurable.
In 1914, Justice Cardozo mandated that "[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body. . . .-42 We propose no interpretation other
than that this right incorporate the right to die. Logically, the right to
initially refuse treatment is concomitant with the right to discontinue
or have such treatment withdrawn once it has been initiated. The individual patient knows his capacity for pain, his family's emotional and
financial stability, and his own emotional makeup. In Eichner v. Dillon4" the court asserted that an individual has the right to "control his
own person." Therefore, we will argue that our patient's right to privacy will be violated if his body continues to be invaded by these medical procedures.
Courts have limited this right to privacy, restricting conduct which
is outweighed by public policy considerations. If the conduct offends
the public policy and a substantial state interest exists, the individual's
39. Id. at 426.
40. 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
41. Id.
42. Scholoendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914) (primarily involved the "informed consent" doctrine).
43. Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980). A priest won
judicial approval to withdraw extraordinary, life-supporting treatment (respirator)
from Brother Joseph Fox, a 83-year-old religious brother who had lapsed into a permanent vegetative state after a cardiac arrest. The court determined from his prior conversations with Brother Fox that he would want to die in this situation. Id.
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right to privacy may have to defer to the state interest." In Saikewicz,
the court enumerated four state interests including:
1) the preservation of life;
2) the protection of innocent third parties;
3) the prevention of suicide;
4) the45 maintenance of true ethical integrity of the medical
profession.
The court in Perlmutter adopted the four public policy considerations as limitations on the individual's right to privacy.' 6 Since Perlmutter remains the authority in Florida, we shall demonstrate that we
have overcome these limitations.
In Saikewicz, the court distinguished between preserving a valuable life and preserving an artificial life (i.e., a brain-dead person in a
permanent vegetative state), placing the emphasis on preserving the
valuable life.'7 Our terminally ill patient has no life left to preserve.
Therefore, no compelling state interest can surmount our patient's right
8
of privacy under the Roe test.4
Another state interest is the protection of innocent third parties. In
Mr. Doe's case, no unborn children are involved as in Roe and no minor children as in the Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, where the patient's refusal of treatment would have
been an abandonment of his minor child." In Perlmutter, the court
distinguished its limited decision from Georgetown."0 Even if Mr. Doe
had minor children he would not live to support them due to his terminal illness. Therefore, the state has no compelling interest to override
our patient's constitutional right to privacy and refusal of medical
treatment.
44. 410 U.S. at 154-55.
45. 373 Mass. at , 370 N.E. 2d at 425.
46. 362 So. 2d at 162.
47. 373 Mass. at , 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
48. 410 U.S. at 154. "The right of personal privacy ... is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation. Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved ... regulation limiting these rights may be justified only
by a 'compelling state interest."' Id. at 155.
49. 331 F.2d at 1008.
50. 362 So. 2d at 162.
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The third interest is the state's duty to prevent suicide. We shall
adopt Saikewicz and argue that if our patient's respirator is disconnected, death will result from natural causes instead of from the respirator's removal. 5 ' We can negate suicide by demonstrating that our patient did not induce his affliction, and he did wish to live but for his
terminal condition. Therefore, there is no compelling state interest in
our patient's case.
The final state interest listed by the court in Saikewicz was the
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical practice. Perlmutter
again adopted the language of Saikewicz in its recognition that the
right to refuse necessary treatment in appropriate circumstances is consistent with existing medical mores.52 Such a doctrine threatens neither
the integrity of the medical profession nor the hospital's role in caring
for such patients. Therefore, our patient's right of privacy has outweighed these four judicially determined public policy interests.
Reemphasizing, we maintain that the state's interest in preserving
life is less when death is merely postponed rather than when life is
preserved. The Quinlan court declared that the state's interest in the
preservation of life diminishes and "the individual's right to privacy
grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the .prognosis
dims."53 In In re Quackenbush," the court upheld the patient's right to
refuse treatment, the amputation of both legs, since this treatment was
an extensive bodily invasion.
In addition, in Saikewicz, the court stated that the right of privacy
encompasses the right to die;55 a right with which the state should not
interfere in the absence of minor or unborn children and a clear and
present danger to the public welfare or morale.5 In Georgetown, the
court indicated it would enforce its interest in preserving life and overrule the right of privacy (i.e., right to die) when the bodily invasion
ceased, when a reasonable expectation of recovery existed, or when minors or other third parties were involved, whose lives would be jeopard51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
invasions.
56.

373 Mass. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 421.
362 So. 2d at 163.
70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978).
"To die" is used in the context of a right to refuse non-consensual bodily
,370 N.E.2d at 424.
373 Mass. at Id. at

-

, 370 N.E.2d at 424-26.
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ized by the patient's death. Comparing the incompetent patient in
Eichner to the first trimester in Roe, we reason that both were incapable of independent, meaningful existence. The state's compelling interest in life's preservation only attached when the potential existed for
return to a sapient, cognitive life (Eichner) or when the fetus was viable (Roe). Our patient is terminally ill without hope of returning to a
natural existence unaided by artificial life support technology. Therefore our patient should be allowed to die, without artificially prolonging
his life.
In affirming Perlmutter,the Florida Supreme Court reinforced the
district court's decision to limit the case to its facts. Perlmutterapplies
to only competent terminally ill adult patients with no minor dependents and who have the consent of all affected family members.58 We
disagree with the provision requiring familial consent, because the right
of privacy is a personal right. As such, we do not advocate the state
delegating to third parties its own power to override an individual's
right to privacy where this promotes state interests. The adult patient
alone should exercise his constitutional right. When the patient is incompetent and unable to exercise this right at the time of his illness,
the state should recognize the legality of the living will. Recognizing
the expressed wishes contained therein, the state would prevent the exercise of this personal constitutional right by third parties.
In conclusion, we point out the recent passage of House Joint Resolution 387 which created Section 23 of Article I of the Florida State
Constitution recognizing a right of privacy. 59 In Florida, the right to
die is based on the right of privacy; therefore, this recent constitutional
amendment supports the right to die naturally and the right to refuse
prolongation of life through artificial means.

57. 331 F.2d at 1000.
58. 379 So. 2d at 359 (affirming lower court's ruling upholding patient's right to
refuse medical treatment).
59. Fla. H.R.J. Res. 387, (1980) (approved by voters in the November, 1980,
general election.) "Right of Privacy: Every natural person has the right to be let alone
and free from governmental intrusion into this private life except as otherwise provided
herein. . . ." FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 23.
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FLORIDA'S BRAIN DEATH STATUTE"0

An issue that confronts many courts is when life-supporting measures can be terminated. The law has always adopted the medical definition of death.61 However, in light of recent medical developments, the
legal definition of death is changing and the old "heart-lung death"
definition is outmoded. 2
The medical profession's current definition dictates that if the
brain is dead the patient is dead, even though a patient's vital organs
60. FLA. STAT § 382.085 (Supp. 1980) provides:
Recognition of brain death.
(1) For legal and medical purposes, where respiratory and circulatory functions are maintained by artificial means of support so as to preclude a determination that these functions have ceased, the occurrence of death may be determined
where there is the irreversible cessation of the functioning of the entire brain,
including the brain stem, determined in accordance with this section.
(2) Determination of death pursuant to this section shall be made in accordance with currently accepted reasonable medical standards by two physicians
licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459. One physician shall be the treating
physician, and the other physician shall be a board-eligible or board-certified
neurologist, neurosurgeon, internist, pediatrician, surgeon or anesthesiologist.
(3) The next of kin of the patient shall be notified as soon as practicable of
the procedures to determine death under this act. The medical records shall reflect such notice; if such notice has not been given the medical records shall
reflect the attempts to identify and notify the next of kin.
(4) No recovery shall be allowed nor criminal proceedings be instituted in
any court in this state against a physician or licensed medical facility that makes
a determination of death in accordance with this section or which acts in reliance
thereon, if such determination is made in accordance with the accepted standard
of care for such physician or facility as set forth in s. 768.45. Except for a diagnosis of brain death, the standard set forth in this section is not the exclusive
standard for determining death or for the withdrawal of life support systems.
An analysis of several states' brain death statutes can be found in the note, Toward a
Legally and Medically Acceptable Definition of Death, immediately following this
paper.
61. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 360 (5th ed. 1979) defines "death" as "[t]he cessation of life, the ceasing to exist, defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the
circulation of blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent
thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc."
62. M. Green & D. Wilder, Brain Death and Personal Identity, 9 PHILOSOPHY
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 105 (1980).
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are maintained by machinery. 3 Brain death is the state when an individual has no reflexes other than spinal reflexes, a flat electroencephalogram (EEG) indicating a complete absence of purposeful electrical activity in the cortex, and no capacity to breathe on his own." This
discrepancy between the positions of law and medicine on the definition
of death places physicians in the precarious position of facing possible
criminal sanctions under the legal definition of death. The "heart-lung
death" concept can no longer remain valid in light of modern resuscitative technology, which can virtually revive even those with no chance of
survival. Recent developments in the area of transplants6 5 have created
a demand for organs which have been removed after the donor's death,
but before the death of the tissues. As a result, a concern to pinpoint
the precise time of death has emerged.
Physicians adhere to the brain death6 definition in order to proceed with transplants while the vital organs are maintainable by machinery, thereby facilitating and increasing the number of possible
transplants. Physicians, however, may be criminally guilty of homicide,
if the law retains the "heart-lung death" definition of death. If surgeons are required to wait until the heart stops the donor may be "legally dead," but the organs may be worthless for transplants.

63. In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 617 P.2d 731, 733 (1980) (en banc).
64. Id.
65. See F. Stuart, ProgressIn Legal Definition of Brain Death and Consent to
Remove Cadaver Organs, 81 SURGERY 68 (1977); Note, The CriteriaFor Determining
Death in Vital Organ Transplants- A Medico-Legal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REv. 220
(1973).
66. In Lovator v. District Court, - Colo.
, 601 P.2d 1072 (1979) the court
defined brain death under the Uniform Brain Death Act: "For legal and medical purposes, an individual who has sustained irreversible cessation of all functioning of the
brain, including the brain stem is dead." Id. at ___, 601 P.2d at 1080.
"Characteristics of brain death consist of: (1) unreceptivity and unresponsiveness
to externally applied stimuli and internal needs; (2) no spontaneous movements or
breathing; (3) no reflex activity; and (4) a flat electroencephalogram reading after a 24
hour period of observation. Comm. v. Golston, Mass. -,
366 N.E.2d 744 (1977).
An increasing number of states have adopted this so-called "Harvard" definition of

brain death, either by statute or court decision."

BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY

170 (5th

ed. 1979). See also M. Green & D. Wilder, supra note 62; 238 J. A.M.A. 1651-55
(1977); 238 J. A.M.A. 1744-48 (1977); P. Green, Brain Death, 78 WIs. MED. J. 13
(1979); Status of the Legal Definition of Death, 5 NEUROSURGERY 535 (1979); Brain
Death, supra.
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The growing need for transplant organs alone does not justify declaring "death" perfunctorily. Physicians need a brain death standard
for uniformity so they can make legal as well as wise medical decisions.
Courts, scrutinizing physicians' conduct, have found that extraordinary
treatment was continued on terminal patients, in substantial part, due
to the increasing proliferation of malpractice litigation and possible
criminal liability. 67 Physicians have been heard to say, "Let's not pull
the plug," fearing criminal liability. Thus, legal concerns rather than a
patient's best medical interest may dictate a physician's actions.
Preeminent medical panels have posted new death criteria for
resolving the dilemma spawned by recent technological advances. In
1968, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School adopted
the "permanent cessation of brain function" as the definition of
death.68
Criteria used in diagnosing a patient as "brain dead," include the
following:
(1) pupils fixed and dilated;
(2) no extraocular movements, evident by using caloric testing or
doll's eyes;69
(3) no spontaneous respiration without a ventilator;
(4) no motor or sensory response to neurologic testing;
(5) patient completely flexic; 70 and
(6) no normal cerebral activity evident on the EEG. 71
The question then arises whether the patient is "legally" dead
though the heart continues to beat. If in all brain dead patients who are
67. G. Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision-Making for the
Terminally Ill and Incompetent, 4 AMER. J. L. & MED. 367, 395 (1979).
68. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); A Definition of Irreversible
Coma, 205 J. A.M.A. 85 (1968).
69. Doll's eyes is an oculocephalic reflex. P. Green, supra note 66, at 17. 5
CLINICAL NUCLEAR MED. 152 (April 1980).

70. Flexic means the absence of reflexes. C. Nagle, Use of Immediate Stutic
Scans in Combination with Radionuclide Cerebral Angiography as a Confirmatory
Test in the Diagnosis of Brain Death. See An Appraisal of the Criteria of Cerebral
Death, 237 J. A.M.A. 982 (1977).
71. Electroencephalogram (EEG): "An EEG reading is obtained by attaching
electrodes to the patients' head and examining the brain wave on a monitor." Comment, The Criteria For Determining Death in Vital Organ Transplants - A MedicoLegal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REv. 220, 224 n.24 (1973).
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not being sustained by a respirator, their hearts will not beat and in all
brain death patients who are being assisted by a respirator, their hearts
do beat, logic dictates that the respirator keeps the heart beating, not
life. A machine can create an artificial heartbeat. Thus, these patients
are not medically "alive." Why should these patients be legally alive,
when not medically alive? These differences must be reconciled. The
traditional definition of death was formulated when a heartbeat could
not be artifically sustained.
The most recent test for determining brain death is a radionuclide
cerebral angiogram (RCA) .72 In this test, isotope angiography reveals
the condition of the vessels supplying blood to the brain. The absence
of intracranial blood flow on the dynamic RCA, caused by the lack of
uptake in cerebral sinuses, confirms a diagnosis of brain-death. RCA
enjoys a distinct advantage over other tests for determining brain
death. The results obtained by a RCA are not affected by drugs. Other
tests (utilizing an EEG) do not determine brain death as accurately in
a patient whose coma is due to drug intoxication.73 Studies show that it
is still possible to resuscitate an unconscious patient (due to an overdose of sedatives, tranquilizers, narcotics, or hypothermia) for up to six
hours after the appearance of a flat EEG.7 4 Therefore, the RCA is a
major step forward in determining brain death and in contributing to
one "medico-legal" definition of death.
While the guidelines for determining death may differ with the
particular test, all require repeated determinations or reexaminations
after specified time intervals. Despite the growing recognition among
physicans of the brain death test, confusion is prevelant. Physicians,
faced with the recent surge of medical malpractice litigation, need set
standards promoting uniformity to conform their medical decisions to
legal standards.
Since 1971, twenty-six states have enacted statutory definitions of
brain death. 5 In 1978, the National Conference of Commissioners on
72. RCA is an x-ray visualization of the vascular system of the brain. See Triage
in Patient Care, 8 HEART & LUNG 1103, 1105 (1979).

73. Appraisal, supra note 71.
74. Id.
75. 1979 ALA. AcTs 165; ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 82-537 (1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (Deering 1975); CONN.
PUBLIc AcT 79-556; GA. CODE § 88-1715.1 (1975); HAWAii REV. STAT. § 327C-1
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Uniform State Laws approved the "Uniform Brain Death Act" which
provides that "[flor legal and medical purposes an individual who has
sustained irreversible cessation
of all functioning 76 of the brain, includ77
ing the brain stem, is dead.
In Florida, in 1980, a brain death bill7 8 was introduced at the request of certain hospitals. This bill, which became law on October 1,
1980, states that death is to be determined where there is irreversible
cessation of the functioning of the entire brain, including the brain
stem. It further states that for legal and medical purposes a determination of death is to be made where respiratory and circulatory functions
are maintainable only by artificial means of support. It maintains that
no criminal proceedings will be instituted in any court in this state
against any physician or medical facility making a determination of
death in accordance with this statute. It warns that brain-death is not
the exclusive standard for determining death or the withdrawal of lifesupporting systems. We maintain that our patient is both legally and
medically dead, and therefore the physician should disconnect the
respirator.
THE PHYSICIAN'S ROLE

The physician, in our case, fears criminal sanctions if he carries
out the patient's wishes to have treatment withdrawn as the legality of
(Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 552 (SmithHurd Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE § 702.8 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202
(Supp. 1979); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 9-111 (West Supp. 1979); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 43, § 54F (1980); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 333.1021 (1980); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 50-22-101 (1979); NEV. REV. STATS. § 451.007 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
12-2-4 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Cum. Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit.
63 § 1-301 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 146.087 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. 53-459
(1977); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 4447t (Vernon Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 54325.7 (Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 16-19-1 (Supp. 1980); Wyo. STAT. § 35-19-101
(Supp. 1980); and Fla. S.B. 293.
76. "Functioning" meaning purposeful activity in all parts of the brain, as distinguished from random activity. M. Green, supra note 69.
77. Lovato, Colo. at -,
601 P.2d at 1080.
78. Fla. S.293 FLA. STAT. § 832.085 (Supp. 1980). See note 60 supra for the
text of FLA. STAT. § 382.085 (Supp. 1980).
79. Fla. S.B. 293 (1980).
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the "living will" has not yet been determined in this state. With the
rise in malpractice suits, physicians have had to be extremely cautious
as well as secretive in their actions. In 1961, a survey conducted at a
Chicago medical convention revealed that more than half of the physicians present believed euthanasia was being practiced by members of
the profession. 0 In testimony before a 1974 Senate subcommittee,8 1 it
was revealed that about three-fourths of American physicians practiced
passive euthanasia regularly, that is, they withdrew artificial life support, permitting the patients to die. 2
In Quinlan, it was acknowledged that it was not unusual in the
medical community for physicians to terminate or withhold extraordinary treatment in terminal cases without resort to the law. 83 Few physicians have been prosecuted for such actions and fewer have been convicted. Therefore, legislation could only have a positive effect, for the
state of affairs as it now exists is without controls, and is insufferable.
We do not question the state's undoubted power to punish the taking of human life, but that power should not prevent an individual from
refusing medical treatment pursuant to his right to privacy. In Perlmutter, it was argued that the patient's ensuing death should not be
classified as homicide, but rather death from existing natural causes.
Since the patient was sustained by a respirator, its withdrawal left the
patient's system in control and death would ensue naturally.8 In Quinlan, the court determined that the termination of treatment was lawful
because it was justifiable under the circumstances. 5 Therefore, the termination of our patient's treatment could not be considered
"unlawful."
The advantages of the living will are obvious. If a physician were
80. Voluntary Mercy Death, 8 J. FOR. MED. 57, 68 (1961).
81. Medical Ethics: The Right to Survival: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee
on Health of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974).
82. Id.
83. 70 N.J. at 42, 355 A.2d at 667. See Horan, The "Right to Die" Legislative
and JudicialDevelopments, 13 FORUM 488 (1978).

84. 362 So. 2d at 1.
85. 70 N.J. at 43, 355 A.2d at 668. 394 U.S. at 559. In Florida, it is a felony to
assist another in the commission of self-murder. "Every person deliberately assisting
another in the commission of self-murder shall be guilty of manslaughter, a felony of
the second degree. . . ." FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (1979).
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prosecuted for permitting a patient to die when that patient's life could
have been prolonged by extraordinary treatment, the physician would
have a strong defense in the living will. On the other hand, if the physician refused to honor the living will and maintained the patient on extraordinary treatment, the physician might be sued more successfully
for pain, suffering, and expense caused by the unauthorized treatment. 6 Our patient's living will will give renewed confidence to all physicians and family members performing in accordance with its
provisions.
LITIGATION V. LEGISLATION

Court decisions in the past six years have substantially supported
the patient's right to refuse treatment. This right must be accepted by
the legal and medical professions, in order that it might be invoked
without the delay and uncertainty involved in seeking judicial
approval.8 7
The Perlmutter case determined that the issue of the right to die
was more suitable for the state legislature.88 Proponents stress that the
legislature is more capable of investigating and synthesizing the facts
and opinions that may be relevant to the resolution of such a complex
legal, medical, and social issue. In addition, a legislative directive
would eliminate the problem of uniformity inherent in a case-by-case
approach to the problem. Critics of natural death legislation fear that
after the living will is legalized, enabling passive euthanasia to be practiced, the next step would be the legalization of active euthanisia.89
They maintain that while the withdrawal of life-supporting treatment
can be rationalized under existing legal doctrines, the authorization of
86. Courts have uniformly held that it is an assault and battery upon a person to
administer medical treatment that he does not want. Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d
596, 207 N.W.2d 297, 310 (1973). Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 271, 104 N.W.
12, 16 (1905). Scholoendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E.
92, 93 (1914).
87. The Quinlan court stressed that "termination of treatment" should not require prior judicial determination. 70 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
88. 379 So. 2d at 360.
89. N. Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1977). G. Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L.
REV. 999 (1967).
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active euthanasia would obviously require a revision of current criminal
law.90
There is also concern that these acts will create more problems
than they solve by inhibiting other lawful withdrawal of life-supporting
treatment, unless such a document has been executed by the patient.
Another concern is that physicians' diagnoses can be fallible and patients can experience spontaneous remissions. 91 Nonetheless, these concerns have been addressed in the statutes and safeguards have been
instituted to decrease their occurrence."
Since the Quinlan case, nearly all state legislatures have been
presented with natural death bills. The first living will statute was enacted in California in 1976, 93 followed by seven others in 1977" and
two in 1979. 95
Our case has come before the Florida judiciary since the legislature has not acted. For the past decade, it has rejected death with dignity legislation. 96 As a result the Florida courts must take the lead in
establishing the law in this area. Legislative inaction must not prevent
judical enforcement of constitutional rights.97
The three latest cases 9s in this area promote the need for judicial
recognition of the living will. In In re Spring," the court emphasized

90. N. Cantor, supra note 89; G. Fletcher, supra note 89.
91. Ironically, Karen Quinlan is still alive in a nursing home three years after
her respirator was disconnected.
92. KAN. STAT. §§ 61-28, 102-28, 103 (Supp. 1979).
93. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1980).
94. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-301-3804 (Supp. 1977). IDAHO CODE §§ 39-45014508 (Supp. 1980). NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-.690 (1977). N.M. STAT. ANN. §§

24-7-1 to -11 (1978). N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (Supp. 1979). OR. REV.
STAT.

§§ 97.050-.090 (1977). TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp.

1980).
95.

KAN. STAT. § 65-28, 101 & 65-28, 109 (Supp. 1979). Ch. 112, 1979

WASH.

LAWS (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 70).

96.
97.

See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
As the Perlmuttercourt stated: "Preference for legislative treatment cannot

shackle the courts when legally protected interests are at stake ....

Legislative inac-

tion cannot serve to close the doors of the courtrooms of this state to its citizens who
assert cognizable constitutional rights."
98.
A.D.2d
99.

In re Spring, Mass. .. _, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980). Eichner v. Dillon, 424 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980). In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973).
Mass. at
, 405 N.E.2d at 115.

._,
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that the "living will" responds to the wishes of patients who have
chronic disease which would be fatal if not for modern medical
technology.
The court in In re Yetter 00 enforced an oral expression of an incompetent patient made while she was competent, requesting that she
not be treated for terminal illness. The court determined that if she
were competent at this moment, she would want the life-supporting
treatment terminated.
In Eichner v. Dillon,"1 Brother Joseph Fox, an 83-year-old incompetent patient, had expressed his wish for a natural death prior to becoming incompetent. The Supreme Court cited this expression as evidence in a decision upholding the lower court's order to terminate
respiratory treatment. Unfortunately, Brother Joseph lapsed into a vegetative state after suffering a cardiac arrest and died of congestive
heart failure before the opinion was handed down. Brother Joseph had
expressed his wishes to Father Eichner and Father Keenan just prior to
hospitalization, stating that if he should enter into a state where his
brain was rendered permanently incapable of sapient and rational
thought, the use of extraordinary life support systems should be discontinued and nature allowed to take its course.
Recognizing these previously expressed oral directives can create
tremendous hearsay problems. By adopting such a practice the court
would be forced to play a guessing game as to the patient's wishes if
competent.
Although living will legislation is a good idea, it has produced difficulties which will undoubtedly be ironed out in time. The North Carolina statute states that once a patient has been declared dead, consent
of the family is required to stop treatment.0 2 The Arkansas statute
provides for a list of relatives who can execute a living will for an incompetent patient. 103 One can envision an unknown relative being empowered with the right to make this rather delicate decision. The California statute requires the physician to determine the validity of the
living will, a cumbersome and unfair burden to the physician.1 04 In
100. 62 Pa. D. & C.2d at 620.
101.

-

A.D.2d at

-,

424 N.Y.S.2d at 519 (1980).

102. See statutes cited in note 94 supra.
103.

Id.

104. See

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
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Kansas, the physician can presume that the consent is valid if he has no
knowledge to the contrary. 10 5 These matters could be solved through
the creation of one uniform living will to be copied in all states, providing for flexibility in the addition of clauses such as the individual's desire to donate organs for medical research.
Many feel that informed consent to refuse treatment cannot be
given years before the patient confronts any terminal illness, when the
patient is in perfect health. However, wills to dispense of estates are
made years before death. Perhaps to compensate for changes in circumstances or feelings of the patient, we should provide for a codicil,
much like that for a will. Some states recommend that the living will
be reexecuted every set number of years to demonstrate that the patient's intentions have not changed.1 06
On the other hand, proponents of these advance declarations feel
that with the mental and physical duress of a terminal illness, the consent may not be rational. While a contemporaneous declaration may be
the logical preference as in Perlmutter,the patient must be allowed to
exercise his constitutional right to refuse treatment in advance by written directive, as he may never have the opportunity after falling ill.

SOLUTION: THE LIVING WILL

This court did not have to speculate as to our patient's wishes,
since they were enumerated in his living will. As our patient commands
a constitutional right to refuse treatment, his living will, in efffect,
merely establishes in advance those wishes which he could have effected legally under Perlmutter,at the discovery of his terminal illness,
were he conscious and capable of expressing his wishes. The living will
is destined to be a meaningful and legally recognized manner of providing for future events that directly affect one's right to privacy. Despite
a decade of failure by the Florida Legislature to enact any natural

105.
106.

KAN. STAT. § 65-28, 101 & 65-28, 109 (Supp. 1979).

Those states are California, Idaho and Oregon. See notes 93 & 94 supra.
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death legislation, courts should find the living will legally valid as the
first step toward inducing such legislation.
Sheryl L. Havens
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Definition of Death

Death may be defined as the absence of life." However, this type of
circular definition is only as concrete as the corollary term itself. The
tragedy faced by the Quinlan family in 19762 focused the attention of
the entire country on the need for a realistic definition of death within
which both the medical and legal professions could operate.3 Legislatures and the judiciary have attempted to establish a framework within
which both professions can function effectively without infringing on
the rights of the dead or dying patient.
Advances in medical technology have necessitated a change in perspective of the concept of death. The purpose of this paper is to examine this shift and to enumerate the ways in which the legislatures
and the courts have attempted to define death. Finally, the paper will
distinguish between the person who meets the definitional standard of
death and the person whom the medical and legal professions will allow
to die. 5
Traditionally, death has been viewed as an event in time,5 the occurrence of which triggers such legal issues as inheritance, property
rights, and liability under insurance contracts. 7 Until recently, the de1. Victor, Brain Death: An Overview, 27 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 37, 38 (1980).
2. In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Ch. Div. 1975), rev'd, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
3. Victor, supra note 1, at 38.

4. Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A Prosecutorial View of the Quinlan
Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 304 (1977). Dawben, Prometheus Revisited: Popular
Myths, Medical Realities and Legislative Actions Concerning Death, 5 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 250 (1980). Comment, North Carolina'sNatural Death Act: Confronting Death With Dignity, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 771 (1978).
5. Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standardsfor Determining
Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PENN. L. REV. 87 (1972).
6. See Hoffman & Van Cura, Death - Five Brain Criteria, 1978 MED. TRIAL

Q. 377, 378 (1978).
7. In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 617 P.2d 731, 734 (1980) (en banc). Ufford,

TECH.
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termination of the time of death has been relatively straight forward
both medically and legally.8 "When the heart stopped beating and the
lungs stopped breathing, the individual was dead according to physicians and according to the law."
When the question did arise as to the viability of an individual,
courts made the determination based on the then universally accepted
criteria of heartbeat and respiration. 10 These criteria were not statutory, but had developed as part of the common law, with many courts
quoting directly from Black's Law Dictionary.1 '
"With the recent advancement of medical science, the traditional
common law 'heart and lung' definition is no longer adequate." 2 Modern equipment, such as respirators and dialysis machines, and surgical
procedures, such as organ transplants, can now prolong the life of a
patient who at an earlier period would have died. 13 The situation created by the inadequacy of the traditional definition can be best illustrated by reference to the issues raised in relation to heart transplants.
A donor's cardiac function can be maintained mechanically for an indefinite period of time. If the physician removes the heart from the
donor while it is still beating, albeit mechanically, the physician may be
liable for homicide.14 However, if the donor's heart is not maintained
mechanically and the heart stops beating, the physician would be absolved of any liability but the operation would be useless.' 5
The advent of life-sustaining support mechanisms has shifted our
perspective in relation to the concept of death. Death can no longer be
viewed by the legal profession as a single event in time, but must be

Brain Death/Terminationof Heroic Efforts to Save Life - Who Decides?, 19 WAsHBURN L.J. 225 (1980).
8. Victor, supra note 1, at 39.
9. 94 Wash. 2d at -, 617 P.2d at 734.

10. Victor, supra note 1, at 50.
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1951) defines death as "the cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent thereon,
such as respiration, pulsation, etc." But see, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 360 (5th ed.
1979) which references Brain Death at 170.
12. 94 Wash. 2d at -, 617 P.2d at 734.
13. Hoffman & Van Cura, supra note 6, at 377.
14. Id. at 381.
15. Ufford, supra note 7, at 227.
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seen in the same light as in the medical community, as a "continuing
process of gradual change."1 Recognizing the distinction between the
clinical death of the person as an individual and biological death of
cells and tissues which may continue to deteriorate over a period of
time, 7 medical science has tried to determine the point at which the
"process of death becomes irreversible." 1 8 Since the cessation of either
the cardiac or the respiratory system is now frequently a treatable condition, 19 the use of either one as the criteria to determine when the
process of death has become irreversible will just as frequently be inconclusive. In those cases in which the 'heart-lung' criteria are inapplicable, the medical profession replaces them with brain death criteria.
"Brain death is used to describe a state where there is irreversible destruction to the entire brain despite the continuance of cardiac
'20
activity.
Although technical medical distinctions are beyond the scope of
this paper, it is necessary to have an elementary understanding of the
organization of the nervous system. 2 ' Functionally speaking, the nervous system may be divided into three levels: (1) the spinal cord level,
(2) the lower brain level (including the brain stem), and (3) the higher
brain or cortical level. The lower brain level is the pathway between the
spinal cord and the cortex.22 It is the reflex center of the brain and
controls the cardiac, vasomotor and respiratory functions. 28 The lower
brain level is considered the subconscious control area, the destruction
of which causes the loss of vital body functions resulting inevitably in
death. 24 The higher brain or cortical level is a vast storage area. The
human cortex contains the qualities which are unique to mankind and
which make the human being a cognitive, sapient individual. 25 If all or
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 230.
Victor, supra note 1, at 39.
Ufford, supra note 7, at 230.
Victor, supra note 1, at 39.
Id. at 45. Florida has recently enacted a brain death statute. See FLA.

STAT.

§ 382.085 (Supp. 1980).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Hoffman & Van Cura, supra note 6, 385-86.
Id.
Id.
Victor, supra note 1, at 48.
Ufford, supra note 7, at 228.
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a significant portion of the cortex is destroyed, a vegetative state will
result in which the reflex center of the lower brain maintains vital body
functions but all cognitive function is lost.26
In 1968 the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School
27
pointed out the need for the recognition of brain death as a standard.

Although the six criteria that this committee established for irreversible coma 28 "have been found to be inadequate in practice and have
been superceded by various other.

. .

criteria," 29 they were relied on in

0

the Quinlan case and continue to be cited in the most recent cases.31
No single criteria is determinative and multiple, realistic parameters
can be developed to establish the absence of cortical and brain stem
activity, 32 since both functions must be absent for a diagnosis of brain
death.

Several states, including Florida in 1980, have adopted statutory
definitions of brain death33 which eliminate uncertainty and avoid ret26. Victor, supra note 1, at 48.
27. Hoffman & Van Cura, supra note 6, at 382.
28. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the HarvardMedical School To Examine the Definition of Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J. A.M.A. 337
(1968) lists the necessary criteria as:
(1) Unreceptivity and unresponsivity to externally applied stimuli;

(2) No movement of breathing;
(3) No reflexes;
(4) A flat electroencephalogram;
(5) Repetition of tests in 25 hours; and
(6) No evidence of hypothermia or central nervous system depressants.
Id. at 338-40.
29. Hoffman & Van Cura, supra note 6, at 392-93 states that flat EEG is not
determinative and has been replaced by angiography. Victor, supra note 1, at 46 states
that spinal cord reflexes may be present even when the patient is brain dead.
30.

70 N.J. at

-,

355 A.2d 652, 656.

31. See note 73 infra.
32. Victor, supra note 1, at 48.
33. 1979 ALA. ACTS 165; ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 82-537 (1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (Deering 1975); CONN.
PUBLIC ACT 79-556; FLA. STAT. § 382.085 (Supp. 1980); GA. COD1 § 88-1715.1
(1975); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1979);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 552 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE § 702.8 (West
1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1974); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 9-111
(West Supp. 1979); MD.ANN. CODE art. 43, § 54F (1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
333.1021 (1980); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 50-22-101 (1979); NEV.REV. STATS. §
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rospective determination of the rights and duties of the parties involved." These advantages outweigh the fear that the statutes would be
poorly drafted or biased in favor of transplantation. 5
Kansas was the first state to pass a brain death statute in 1974.36
It recognizes the absence of cardiac-respiratory functions and, alternatively, the absence of spontaneous brain function as the standards for
determining death. Whether either of the statutory standards has been
met, is "based on the ordinary standards of medical practice."37 Both
the alternative standards and the lack of specific medical criteria were
451.007 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322
(Cum. Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-301 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 146.087
(1977); TENN. CODE ANN. 53-459 (1977); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 4447 (Vernon
Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 54-325.7; W. VA. CODE § 16-19-1 (Supp. 1980); Wyo.
STAT. § 35-19-101 (Supp. 1980); Hereinafter,Statutes.
34. Ufford, supra note 7, at 234-35.
35. Id. at 231.
36. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (1977), which provides:
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of the
physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence
of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and because of the disease or
condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or because of the passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at resuscitation are considered hopeless; and, in the event, death will have occurred at the
time these functions ceased; or
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a
physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence
of spontaneous brain function; and if based on ordinary standards of medical
practice, during reasonable attempts to either maintain or restore spontaneous
circulatory or respiratory function in the absence of aforesaid brain function it
appears that further attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not
succeed, death will have occurred at the time when these conditions first coincide. Death is to be pronounced before artificial means of supporting respiratory
and circulatory function are terminated and before any vital organ is removed
for purpose of transplantation.
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all purposes in
this state, including trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to the contrary
notwithstanding.
The 1979 revision changed the last sentence in the second paragraph to read: "Death is
to be pronounced before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation."
Id. (Supp." 1980).
37. Id.
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approved by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Shaffer"8 which
held that the Kansas brain death statute was constitutional.
Capron & Kass"9 have criticized the Kansas statute for going beyond a simple definition of death"0 and establishing the "misconception
that there are two separate phenomena of death."' 1 Their statutory
proposal,' 2 which has been adopted by eight states, would "provide two
standards gauged by different functions, for measuring different manifestations of the same phenomenon.' 3 The "irreversible cessation of
spontaneous brain functions" standard would be applicable only when
"artificial means of support preclude" the use of the "irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions" standard."
"Irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions" is intended to
include both cortical and brain stem activity. A patient who has no
cortical activity but retains some brain stem activity would be excluded
from the statutory standard. 45 "The condition of 'neo-cortical death'
may well be a proper justification for interrupting all forms of treatment and allowing those patients to die, but this moral and legal problem cannot and should not be settled by 'defining' these people as
'dead.' "146
Montana and Tennessee 4 adopted the model statute approved by
38. State v. Shaffer, 223 Kan. 244, 574 P.2d 205 (1977).
39. Alexander Morgan Capron is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University
of Pennsylvania. Leon R. Kass is the Executive Secretary on the Committee on Life
Sciences and Social Policy, National Research Council - National Academy of Sciences. Capron & Kass, supra note 5, at 87.
40. Id. at 110, 115, 117.
41. Id. at 109.
42. Id. at 111 provides:
A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician,
based on ordinary standards of medical practice, he has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions. In the event
that artificial means of support preclude a determination that these functions
have ceased, a person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a
physician, he has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions. Death will have occurred at the time when the relevant functions ceased.
43. Id. at 112.
44. Id. at 111.
45. Id. at 115.
46. Id.
47. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 50-22-101 (1981): "Definition of death. A
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the American Bar Association in 1975.48 This model does away with
the cardiac-respiratory standard entirely and relies solely on the "irreversible cessation of total brain functions. '49 Nevada adopted the Uniform Brain Death Act.50 The language of this model has the advantage
of specifically excluding any brain stem function from the scope of the
statute. Along with the American Bar Association model, the Uniform
Brain Death Act excludes the cardiac-respiratory standard. The language is no longer part of the statute and has been relegated to the
commissioners' comments which state that "the act does not preclude a
determination of death under other legal or medical criteria, including
the additional criteria of cessation of respiration and circulation."51
Several states, which have not adopted a statutory definition of
brain death, have adopted the brain death standard judicially. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court 52 approved a jury instruction in a murder trial which stated that
as a matter of law, the occurrence of a brain death, if you find it, satisfies the essential element of the crime of murder requiring proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of the death of the victim. Brain death occurs when,
in the opinion of a licensed physician, based on ordinary and accepted
standards of medical practice, there has been a total and irreversible cesI

human body with irreversible cessation of total brain function, as determined according
to usual and customary standards of medical practice, is dead for all legal purposes."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-459 (1980): "Death defined. - For all legal purposes, a
human body, with irreversible cessation of total brain function, according to the usual
and customary standards of medical practice, shall be considered dead." See statutes
cited in note 33 supra.
48. "For all legal purposes, a human body with irreversible cessation of total
brain functions, according to the usual and customary standards of medical practice,
shall be considered dead." House of Delegates Redefines Death, Urges Redefinition of
Rape, and Undoes the Houston Amendment, 61 A.B.A.J. 464 (1975).
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. NEV. REv. STAT. § 451.007 (1980). UNIFORM BRAIN DEATH AcT, 12 U.L.A.
15 (Supp. 1981): § 1. (Brain Death)
For legal and medical purposes, an individual who has sustained irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain stem, is dead. A determination under this section
must be made in accordance with reasonable medical standards."
51. Id.
52. Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977), cert. de-

nied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss3/1

154

et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue
478

Nova Law Journal

5:1981

I

sation of spontaneous brain functions and further attempts at resuscitation or continued supportive maintenance would not be successful in restoring such functions.53
The murder victim demonstrated neither cortical nor brain stem activity and was pronounced dead in accordance with the Harvard criteria
for brain death. His removal from the respirator which artificially
maintained circulation and respiration was "in accordance with good
medical practice."'" The court held that the trial judge had merely
taken into account technical advances in medical science in forming his
instruction.
In Lovato v. District Court,5 5 the Supreme Court of Colorado
stated that the prime issue before it was the "proper definition of
death."5' A young child-abuse victim "sustained cerebral death as evidenced by total lack of brain activity in both the cortex and the brain
stem."' 57 The district court ordered the child's guardians ad litem to
authorize the child's physician to remove all extraordinary devices as
the child was already dead. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court
adopted the provisions of the Uniform Brain Death Act, 58 but did not
preclude "continuing recognition of the standard of death as determined by traditional criteria of cessation of respiration and circulation."5 9 The effect of the decision is to provide for "alternative determi6
nations of death."
In In re Bowman, the Washington Supreme Court held that it is
for the law to define the standard of death and for the medical profession to determine the applicable criteria for deciding when death is present. 1 In this case, the child-abuse victim was pronounced brain dead
and tbe hospital was enjoined from removing the artificial life support
systems to give the child's guardian ad litem time to appeal the trial

53.
54.

Id. at
Id. at

-,
-,

366 N.E.2d at 747-48.
366 N.E.2d at 747.

55. Lovato v. District Court, 601 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1980) (en banc).
56. Id. at 1075.
57. Id. at 1074.
58. Id. at 1081. See note 51.
59. 601 P.2d at 1081.
60. Ashman, What's New in the Law, 66 A.B.A. J. 211, 212 (Feb. 1980).
61.

94 Wash. 2d at
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court's adoption of the "irreversible loss of brain function standard." 2
All of the victim's bodily functions had ceased before the Washington
Supreme Court was able to hear the case. However, because of the
importance of the question presented, the Court issued a decision in the
technically moot case."3
The Court was careful to distinguish brain death from a "persistent vegetative state."'" In order for brain death to occur there must be
total cessation of both cortical and brain stem functions. The issue then
becomes whether brain death is a recognized standard of death in the
State of Washington. 5 The issues involved are entirely different when
there is some brain stem activity even in the total absence of cortical
activity. This condition is known as vegetative coma and a person in
this condition is not brain dead according to any accepted medical
criteria. 66
The Washington Supreme Court decision is limited to the adoption of a brain death standard. That Court rejected the Uniform Brain
Death Act adopted in Lovato v. District Court67 because it failed to
interrelate the traditional standards with the new brain functions standard.68 Instead, the Washington Court adopted the provisions of the
Uniform Determination of Death Act recommendation69 which returns
to the alternative standards of the Kansas Statute70 and includes the
clarification as to brain stem function found in the Uniform Brain
Death Act.71
While the legislative or judicial adoption of definition of death
which is predicated on a brain functions standard deals with some of
the problems created by the.recent advances in medical technology, it
does not even address the issue of neo-cortical death which is raised by
62. Id. at _,617 P.2d at 734.
63. Id.
64. Id. at
617 P.2d at 735.
65. Id. at
617 P.2d at 737.
66. Id.
67. 601 P.2d 1072.
68. Contra, id. at 1081 provides that the traditional criteria of respiration and
circulation continue to be recognized.
69. Wash. 2d at ..,617 P.2d at 735.
70. See text of KAN. STAT. ANN., supra note 36.
71. See text of UNIFORM BRAIN DEATH ACT, supra note 50.
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In re Quinlan7 and its progeny.78 In the view of Capron & Kass, the
issues of brain death and when a person is pronounced dead should be
clearly distinguished from the issues of neo-cortical death and when a
person should be allowed to die.74 Several states have passed Natural
Death Acts which endorse the concept of the "living will" in order to
deal with the problems associated with the withdrawal of artificial lifesupport systems.71 These cumbersome statutes fail to distinguish be-

tween life-prolonging and life-saving procedures and deal only with the
competent adult who could invoke his constitutional right of privacy to
refuse treatment even without the statute.78
The courts, while themselves denouncing the legislative failure in
dealing with neo-cortical death, have attacked the issue head on and
attempted to fill the legislative vacuum in this area.77 The seminal case
is In re Quinlan." On the night of April 15, 1975, Karen Ann Quinlan
ceased breathing for at least two fifteen minute periods79 and suffered
neo-cortical death. In other words, Karen Ann Quinlan was in a chronic vegetative state. While she showed no evidence of cortex function,
she did show evidence of brain stem activity. Under the brain death
criteria discussed previously, Karen Ann Quinlan was alive although
she would never be restored to "cognitive or sapient life." 80 The New
Jersey Supreme Court allowed Ms. Quinlan's father to invoke Ms.
Quinlan's right of privacy in a "substituted judgment." 81 In accordance
with the framework set out by the court for the exercise of that right, 82
72. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
73. Severn v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Satz
v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff/d, 379 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Spring, - Mass. -, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Eicher v.
Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
74. Capron & Kass, supra note 5.
75. See generally, Comment, supra note 4.
76. See generally, Dawben, supra note 4.
77. Contra,Ufford, supra note 7, who argues that the courts are the most appropriate place to deal with neo-cortical death.
78. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
79. Id. at _, 355 A.2d 653-54.
80. Id. at _, 355 A.2d at 655.
81. Id. at _, 355 A.2d at 664-66.
82. Id. at -, 355 A.2d at 672.
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Mr. Quinlan had all extraordinary, life-prolonging machinery (i.e., respirator) withdrawn from his daughter. 8
Although the Quinlan court touched on many of the issues that
would be more fully developed by the cases which followed, 8 ' it mainly
developed the right of privacy, the mechanism through which that right
could be exercised, and a framework for the relief granted. The Quinlan court relied on Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut
which found the unwritten constitutional right of privacy to exist in the
penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 85 The "emanations from those guarantees"86 give life and substance to a right which
is broad enough to "encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions" 87 and, by analogy, "broad enough to
encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances."88 The invocation of the constitutional right to privacy triggers a balancing of the right of the individual against the interest of the state in preservation of the sanctity of human life. The
state's interest "weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as
the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome
the [s]tate interest." 89 At that point the individual may exercise his
constitutional right of privacy.
The Quinlan court then decided that the rights of a comatose individual could be exercised through the doctrine of "substituted judgment" under the court's equity power.90 "The only practical way to
prevent the destruction of the right is to permit the guardian and family . . . to render their best judgment, .
as to whether she would
exercise it in these circumstances." 1
83. Id. at _,355 A.2d at 664-66.
84. E.g., a few of the issues not emphasized in this paper include standing, lifesaving vs. life-prolonging treatment, the Catholic viewpoint, and cognitive vs. biological
existence.
85. 70 N.J. at , 355 A.2d at 663, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
86. 381 U.S. at 484.
87. 70 N.J. aL, 355 A.2d at 663 citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
88. Id. at , 355 A.2d at 663.
89. Id. at , 355 A.2d at 664.
90. Id. at , 355 A.2d at 666.
91. Id. at ... , 355 A.2d at 664.
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The framework developed by the court eliminated the need for judicial decision in this type of case when the family, guardian, attending
physician and hospital "Ethics Committee" all agree that there is no
"reasonable possibility" of the individual emerging from a comatose
condition to a cognitive, sapient state. 2 At that point the life-support
systems may be withdrawn without any civil or criminal liability on the
part of any of the participants.9"
The next two cases which helped to develop this area of the law,
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz9 and Satz v. Perlmutter,9 5 do not deal with neo-cortical death but rather with the right of
the guardian of a mentally retarded adult and the right of a competent,
terminally ill adult to refuse life-prolonging treatment. Saikewicz held
that the "substantive rights of the competent and the incompetent person are the same in regard to the right to decline potentially life-prolonging treatment '"" because of the value of human dignity.Y
Saikewicz also adopted the mechanism of "substituted judgment" and
went to great pains to make it clear that the primary test is a subjective
one.98 "[T]he goal is to determine with as much99accuracy as possible
the wants and needs of the individual involved."
The primary importance of Saikewicz to the present discussion is
that it sets out the state's interests °" which are to be balanced against
the individual's right of privacy, and it rejects what it views as the
92. Id. at _, 355 A.2d at 671. "The evidence in this case convinces us that the
focal point of decision should be the prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of return
to cognitive and sapient life, as distinguished from the forced continuance of that biological vegetative existence to which Karen seems to be doomed." Id. at _, 355 A.2d at
669.
93.

Id. at , 355 A.2d at 671.

94.

373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).

95.

362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.

1980).
96. 373 Mass. at _, 370 N.E.2d at 423 (except that the incompetent individual
may require more procedural safeguards).
97. Id. at , 370 N.E.2d at 427.
98.

Id. at __, 370 N.E.2d at 430-31.

99. Id.
100. The four state interests identified in Saikewicz are: (1) the preservation of
life; (2) the protection of third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) the ethical
integrity of the medical profession. Id. at _, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
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Quinlan court's abdication of its responsibility to make the final decision in this type of case. Both of these points have been cited with
approval in subsequent cases.101 The balancing, of course, is a factual
determination.
As to the second point, the Saikewicz court took "a dim view of
any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making responsibility away
from the duly established courts of proper jurisdiction to any committee, panel or group, ad hoc or permanent. 102 Satz v. Perimutter is
significant in that it clearly draws the distinction, alluded to in the previous cases, between life-saving treatment and life-prolonging
treatment.103
In seeking to protect the rights of an individual who has suffered
neo-cortical death, the court may derive its subject matter jurisdiction
from a statute, under the state's parens patriaepowers over an incompetent or under the more fundamental principle of equity jurisdiction. 104 Further, the court has the obligation to exercise that power,
even in the absence of enabling legislation, when it is faced with a "vital problem involving private rights. 105
The relief sought may be based on the common law right of bodily
determination or on the constitutional right to privacy.106 Since "common-law rights can be abrogated by statute in the exercise of the
[s]tate's police powers subject only to due process requirements,"10 7 it
is more effective to grant the relief sought on the basis of a constitutional right which "cannot be so abrogated."108 The "state action" necessary to apply the right of privacy through the mechanism of the four101.

E.g., Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359; Eicher, 73 A.D.2d 431,426 N.Y.S.2d 517

(1980).
102.

373 Mass. at

.,

370 N.E.2d at 434; however, In re Spring,

-

Mass. ., 405

N.E.2d 115 (1980), limited this to cases which had been brought before a court of
competent jurisdiction at the outset.
103.

362 So. 2d at 163.

104. Eicher v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d at , 426 N.Y.S.2d at 534. The New York
Supreme Court in Eicher issued a decision in a technically moot case in order to develop "the structural legal framework for reaching similar termination-of-treatment decisions." Id. at , 426 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
105. Id. at , 426 N.Y.S.2d at 534.
106. Id. at , 426 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
107. Id. at , 426 N.Y.S.2d at 540-41.
108. Id. at , 426 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
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teenth amendment can be found in the nexus between the relief sought
and the state's interest in its homicide statutes, hospital regulations and
parens patriae responsibility to protect incompetents. 10 9
To conclude that an individual has "a right to refuse medical
treatment necessarily implies that there exists a corresponding capability to exercise that right."" 0 However, there are certain medical criteria necessary to activate the individual's right. "He must be terminally
ill; he must be in a [chronic or irreversible] vegetative coma . . .; he
must lack cognitive brain function; and the probability [that such]...
cognitive function [will return] must be extremely remote.""' Unless
these criteria are met, the state's interest in the preservation of human
12
life will outweigh the individual's right to privacy.
The court in Eicher v. Dillon"3 approved the mechanism of "substituted judgment" to determine the subjective desire of the comatose
individual." 4 It further approved the admission of previous specific
statements of intent by the now comatose individual." 5 Finally, the
Eicher court combined the Quinlan procedure with the Saikewicz requirement that the neutral presence of the law make the final
determination." 6
The most recent case, Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center,
Inc.," 7 is the classic neo-cortical death case. Mrs. Severns had suffered

extensive damage to her cortex but her brain stem continued to evidence activity. The Delaware Supreme Court technically followed the
legal framework developed by the Eicher court and found that Mr.
Severns was to be appointed guardian and after a proper evidentiary
hearing, was entitled to such relief as the evidence warranted." 8
In conclusion, it is clear that the rapid advancement of medical
109.
U.S. 345,
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at , 426 N.Y.S.2d at 540. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
351 (1974).
Id. at _, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
Id. at _, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
Id.
73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
Id. at , N.Y.S.2d at 547.

115. Id.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at ._, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 548-51.
421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980).
Id. at 1349-50.
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technology has obfuscated the concept of death. Statutory definitions
adopting the brain death standard are preferable to judicial adoption of
the standard, especially when the statutes are flexible and recognize the
need to allow for changing medical criteria. But these statutes are only
a first step; it is necessary to deal with the individual who has suffered
neo-cortical death but fails to meet the brain death standard. Although
the courts are beginning to develop a realistic framework, within which
both the legal and medical professions can operate with relative certainty, judicial determination of this issue is much too cumbersome. A
comprehensive legislative package which could be adopted uniformly
throughout the country, is a goal that will not be realized in the very
near future. However, as technology advances, it will be incumbent on
the legislature to act to protect the fundamental rights of the
individual.
Cynthia L. Janov
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Prosecutorial Waiver Of Juveniles Into Adult
Criminal Court: The Ends of Justice ...
End of Justice? State v. Cain.

Or The

The State of Florida appealed the decision of an Osceola County circuit court which dismissed the prosecution of a juvenile in adult criminal court. Mark Cain, a minor, had been charged with two counts of
armed burglary, and two counts of grand theft. In his motion to dismiss, Cain attacked the constitutionality of Florida Statute
§ 39.04(2)(e)4.1 This statute vests the state attorney with authority to
prosecute juveniles, who are 16 years of age or older, in the adult criminal courts when they have committed two past delinquent acts, one of
which was a felony.2 Cain contended that the statute unconstitutionally
delegates to the state attorney unfettered discretion to prosecute
juveniles as adults.3 Further, he argued that the statute violates due
process of law in that juveniles are transferred to the adult criminal
court system without a hearing. The circuit court agreed with Cain,
granted his motion to dismiss, and held the statute unconstitutional. 5
The state appealed.
This case represents an attempt by the Supreme Court of Florida
to decide whether the legislature can constitutionally vest the state attorney with the power to terminate the juvenile court of its exclusive
1. State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1362 (Fla. 1980).
2. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)4 (1979 & Supp. 1980):
The State attorney may... with respect to any child who at the time of commission of the alleged offense was 16 or 17 years of age, file an information when
in his judgment and discretion, ihe public interest requires that adult sanctions
be considered or imposed. Upon motion of the child the case shall be transfered
for adjudicatory proceedings as a child pursuant to s. 39.09(1) if it is shown by
the child that he had not previously been found to have committed two delinquent acts, one of which involved an offense classified under Florida law as a
felony.
3. 381 So. 2d at 1362.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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jurisdiction over minors, and prosecute them as adult criminals.
The Florida legislature acted in chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes
to create the Juvenile Justice Act.6 Pursuant to this chapter the juvenile division of the circuit court is given the exclusive jurisdiction to
handle proceedings involving minors. 7 However, there are three statutory exceptions to this exclusive jurisdiction which allow the juvenile to
be thrust into the adult criminal court system. First, the juvenile court,
in a waiver hearing, may waive its jurisdiction over any child fourteen
years of age or older8 where the criteria delineated in Florida Statute
§ 39.09(2)(c)1-8 are fulfilled. Second, adult criminal prosecution can
be pursued by the return of a grand jury indictment. The indictment
must charge the child with a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment.9 Finally, the state attorney may divest the juvenile court of its
jurisdiction by filing an information against the child. The state attorney through § 39.04(2)(e)4 is given discretion to file informations
against minors when he believes the public interest will be served best
by the imposition of adult sanctions. 10 This last exception was at issue
in Cain.
The Florida Supreme Court in Cain, upheld the constitutionality
of Florida Statute § 39.04(2)(e)4 1 which pertains to a waiver invoked
by the prosecution. The decision of the court can be questioned on
three particular grounds. First, in order to uphold the present waiver
statute, the court used past precedent involving the constitutionality of
waiver by grand jury indictment. To view these two types of waiver as
comparable mistakes the inherent differences between the office of the
state attorney and that of the grand jury. Second, in upholding the
present waiver statute, the court sanctioned the use of prosecutorial discretion. This action by the court is dubious in light of the United States
Supreme Court's opinion of United States v. Kent.1 2 Third, the court
asserted that a juvenile's rights are not lessened when he is transferred
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1) (1979).
FLA. STAT. § 39.02(1) (1979).
FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(a) (1979).
FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1979).
FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)4 (1979).

381 So. 2d at 1368.
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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to criminal court. 13 This statement underestimates the advantages offered by the juvenile system.
In Cain, the court rejected the juvenile's due process attacks by
relying on Johnson v. State 4 and Woodward v. Wainwright. 5 These
cases upheld the constitutionality of Florida Statute § 39.02(5)(c)16
which allows adult prosecution of juveniles upon the return of a grand
jury indictment charging the juveniles with an offense punishable by
death or life imprisonment. The Cain court stated that there was no
difference between a state attorney's ability to file an information
against a juvenile and the power of the state attorney, as upheld in
Johnson, to refer the case to a grand jury for possible indictment.' 7
Justice Sundberg, writing the Cain opinion, reasoned that since the
present case was indistinguishable from Johnson, a conclusion that the
present statute is constitutional must follow.
The court's finding that there is no difference between the prosecutor's power to file an information and his ability to refer the case to a
grand jury is dubious at best. First, in filing an information, it is the
state attorney who formulates the charge against the minor.18 When
the case is referred to the grand jury, it is the grand jury and not the
state attorney who charges the juvenile. 19 Second, the office of the state
attorney is an entity separate and distinct from that of the grand jury,
with decision-making processes which are totally dissimilar.

13.
14.

381 So. 2d at 1366.
314 So. 2d 573 (1975).

15. 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977).
16. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1979) reads in part:
A child of any age charged with a violation of Florida law punishable by death
or by life imprisonment shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court as set
forth in s. 39.067 unless and until an indictment on such charge is returned by
the grand jury. When an indictment is returned, the petition for delinquency, if
any, shall be dismissed and the child shall be tried and handled in every respect
as if he were an adult.
17.

381 So. 2d at 1364.

18. 17 FLA. JUR. Indictments and Informations § 3 (1964), which reads in part:
"An information is a written accusation of crime preferred by a grand jury."
19. Id. "An indictment is a written accusation or charge of a crime, against one
or more persons, presented upon oath or affirmation by a grand jury legally convoked."
Id.
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20
This latter notion was espoused in the case of Gerstein v. Pugh.
One issue in Gerstein was whether a person arrested on an information
was entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause, prior to detention. State Attorney Gerstein attempted to defend the power of the
prosecutor to charge non-capital offenders by information, without a
preliminary hearing, by arguing that the prosecutor's decision to file an
information is, itself, a judicial determination of probable cause.21 He
further asserted that this identical procedure was practiced by the
grand jury. 2 The United States Supreme Court rejected his argument
and revoked the power of the state attorney to charge non-capital offenders by information without a hearing. 28 However, it allowed this
procedure to continue with regard to the grand jury.
Gerstein illustrates the inherent differences between the state attorney and the grand jury. The grand jury was permitted to substitute
its judgment on probable cause for that of the court because of its relationship to the courts and its historical role of protecting individuals
from unjust prosecution .2 This same substitution of judgment was not
granted to the state attorney because the prosecutor's responsibility to
law enforcement is inconsistent with the constitutional role of a neutral
and detached magistrate. 5
The Gerstein court's finding was based on the premise that the
decision-making process of the grand jury is clothed with restraint,
while the state attorney operates unrestrained. A grand jury impanelment by the court 28 operates as a check on its decision-making process.
Furthermore, the diverse membership of the grand jury creates a cer-

20.

420 U.S. 103 (1974).

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 117 n.19.
Id. at 117.
15 FLA. JUR. Grand Jury § 2 (1964) states:

A grand jury is an agency of the state, and a part of its judicial system. .

.

. In

essence it is a creature of the court since it cannot constitute itself on its own
initiative but can act as a grand jury ... only when summoned, impaneled and
convened by the court.
§ 5 states: "Courts invested with criminal jurisdiction have long been regarded as having a resulting and implied power with reference to the organization of the grand jury."
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tain internal policing of its actions. However, the state attorney proceeds without any of these restraints and with practically unfettered
discretion.
Therefore, to state that there is no difference between the state
attorney's power to file an information and his ability to refer the caseto the grand jury mistakes the fact that two separate institutions are
formally accusing the juvenile, and that each entity arrives at its decision to charge in very different ways. It logically follows that Johnson
v. State,27 which upheld waiver through grand jury indictment, cannot
be relied upon to uphold the constitutionality of the present statute.
The Supreme Court in Cain also resisted the juvenile's due process
attacks by sanctioning the use of prosecutorial discretion, as created by
§ 39.04(2)(e)4. This action by the court seems to run against the
landmark juvenile case United States v. Kent.28
In United States v. Kent, Morris Kent, a juvenile, was apprehended and interrogated concerning a housebreaking and rape.29 Without conducting an investigation, as required by statute,30 the juvenile
court judge transferred Kent to the criminal jurisdiction of the circuit
court. Kent was found guilty of housebreaking and sentenced to the
psychiatric ward of the local hospital. The case was eventually appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which held that although a
minor has no constitutional right to be treated in a separate juvenile
court system, once such a system is authorized by statute a juvenile
may not be transferred away from it until due process requirements are
met.31 The court in Kent asserted that the waiver process has tremendous consequences for the juvenile, thus due process requires that no
transfer to criminal court should occur without a hearing, ceremony, or
32
a statement of reasons.
In its decision, the court did not specifically enumerate the reasons
which should be considered before a juvenile judge transfers a minor to
the adult criminal system. However, the decision cited the eight standards for review of waiver which were included in the appellee's appen27.
28.
29.

30.
31.

314 So. 2d 573 (1975).
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
Id. at 543.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-914 (1961). This is set forth at 383 U.S. at 547-48.
383 U.S. at 557.

32. Id. at 554.
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dix.33 These standards came from the District of Columbia courts and
are as follows: 3 '
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the offense was against persons or against property.
4. The merit of the complaint.
5. Where the codefendants are adults, the desirability of trying the entire
action at one trial.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile.
7. Previous contact with juvenile court.
8. The likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile.
These District of Columbia standards have been adopted in subsequent judicial decisions" and state statutes." Florida adopted these
standards almost verbatim and in 1975 incorporated them into their
statutes. 7 These standards have gone a long way to protect the basic
33. Id. at 565-67.
34. Id. at 566-67.
35. See, e.g. State v. Lemmon, 110 Ariz. 568, _, 521 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1974);
Miklousky v. State, 54 Wis. 699, 196 N.W.2d 748 (1972).
36. The Pennsylvania Juvenile Act Pub. L. 1464, No. 333, § 28(4), 11 Pa. Stat.
50-325(a) (1972).
37. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(c)1-8 as amended in 1978 states as the criteria for
transfer:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection of the community is best served by transfering the child for adult
sanctions.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury
resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint.
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when
the child's associates in the alleged crime are adults or children who are to be
tried as adults who will be or have been charged with a crime.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the child, as determined by consideration
of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the child, including:
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premise of our juvenile court which is, whenever possible, a minor
should be treated, not punished, and that rehabilitation, not retribution
is the goal to be attained.3 8
In the instant case, the threshold question becomes: what effect
does prosecutorial discretion, as created by § 39.04(2)(e)4, have on the
Kent guidelines for transferring juveniles to criminal court? The answer is clear. The statute permits the state to file an information
against a juvenile and thrust the minor into adult criminal court, without ever considering the Kent standards. Should the Florida Supreme
Court have sanctioned such power?
Consider the effects of this discretion. First, the state attorney operates free and unrestrained in making his decision regarding waiver.39
Second, he is the only party who evaluates that decision; as most courts
have held, the prosecutor's use of this discretion is non-reviewable.' °
Third, the juvenile court judge, a neutral and detached arbiter of justice, is required by Florida Statute 1 to consider the eight Kent guidelines before effectuating waiver. Yet, the state attorney, who is an advocate within the system, may bypass these standards, subjecting the
a. Prior periods of probation or community control;

b. Previous contacts with the department, other law enforcement agencies,
and courts;
c. Prior adjudication that the child committed a delinquent act or violation
of law, greater weight being given if the child had previously been found
by a court to have committed a delinquent act involving an offense classified as a misdemeanor; and
d. Prior commitments to institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child, if he is found to have committed the alleged
offenses, by the use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to
the court.
38. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967); TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967); FLA. STAT. § 39.001(l)(2)(3)
(1979).
39. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)4 (1979 & Supp. 1980) reads in part that: "The
state attorney may. . . file an information when in his judgment and discretion the
public interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed."
40. See Woodward v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977); Russel v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir.
1972); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965).
41. See FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(c) (1979).
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minor to the adult system by the single act of filing an information.
Are these effects compatible with the Kent holding that a decision
of such tremendous consequences should not be rendered without a
hearing, ceremony, or a statement of reasons? Does prosecutorial discretion safeguard the basic premise of the juvenile system which is
treatment, not punishment; rehabilitation, not retribution? Will the
state attorney, as an adversary, consider the welfare of the accused in
making his waiver decision, or will he seek transfer of juveniles in response to political pressure or society's demand for retribution? It is
suggested that these questions answer themselves.
The Florida Supreme Court should have, at least, endeavored to
reconcile the statute directly with Kent. Instead, the court attempted to
evade Kent, holding that its safeguards were applicable only to judges
in judicial proceedings and not to prosecutors. 42 It indeed seems puzzling to assert that procedural safeguards should be applicable to a
judge, who is a neutral magistrate, and yet contend that these same
safeguards do not apply to the prosecutor, who is an advocate. Should
not procedural requirements be more carefully guarded when the unfet43
tered prosecutor is the decision maker?
Judge Skelly Wright, dissenting in United States v. Bland,4 wrote
that the statutory vesting of waiver authority in the prosecutor could
only be created to countermand the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Kent.4 He stated that such a statute played fast and loose
with fundamental rights and concluded that this blatant attempt to
evade the force of the Kent decision should not be permitted to succeed." One can conclude, therefore, that the Florida Supreme Court's
sanctioning of prosecutorial discretion through § 39.04(2)(e)4, rests
upon questionable grounds.
The justices in Cain bolstered their finding of statutory constitutionality by stating that the minor loses very few advantages when he is
transferred to adult criminal court.'7 This statement underestimates the
advantages offered by the juvenile justice system.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

381
See
Id.
383
472
381

So. 2d at 1365-66.
United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
U.S. 541 (1966).
F.2d at 1341.
So.2d at 1366-67.
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Flexibility is an asset unique to juvenile court. There are a myriad
of different programs to which a juvenile offender can be directed.
Those include projects centered around diversion, 48 plans directed at
reinforcing family support 9 and community based programs.50 The justices in Cain suggested that the adult criminal court is not precluded
from resorting to these programs.5 1 However, the statute presently in
issue provides that a prosecutor should file an information when he
feels adult sanctions should be imposed against the juvenile.52 It must
be concluded, that once in the adult criminal system, the juvenile will
be deprived of access to these valuable programs.
Statistics clearly suggest that shorter periods of incarceration exist
in the juvenile system. 3 In Kent, the maximum period of incarceration
the defendant would have received as a juvenile would have been five
years, while as an adult, the maximum would have been life imprisonment. In conjunction with this fact, two prominent sociologists have
conducted studies which indicate that longer periods of incarceration
create greater criminality among juveniles."
Finally, it must be remembered that the intent of the juvenile system is treatment and rehabilitation. The adjudication of a minor in the
juvenile system turns not upon the issue of guilt,55 but upon such factors as the child's maturity, his susceptibility to rehabilitation, and the
needs of society. When the juvenile is projected into the adult criminal
court system, these factors, unlike the paramount issue of guilt, are
56
absent from consideration.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See Juv. & Fain. Court J. 53 (August 1980).
See Juv. & Fam. Court J. 49 (May 1980).
Id. at 54.
381 So. 2d at 1367.
FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)4 (1979 & Supp. 1980).

53. Supra note 49.
54. Yochelson and Samenow reported these studies in Juvenile & Family Court
Journal 24 (May 1980).
55. 383 U.S. at 554-55.
The theory of the District's Juvenile Court Act, like that of other jurisdictions, is
rooted in social welfare philosophy rather than in the corpus juris. The juvenile
court is theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the child and of society
rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of guidance... not to fix guilt.
56. 472 F.2d at 1349.
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It is clear that the juvenile system, by design, offers many opportunities to the juvenile that simply don't exist in the adult criminal system. Any statement by a court to the contrary is groundless.
The Florida Supreme Court has sanctioned prosecutorial waiver of
juveniles into the adult criminal court system. It has done so with perplexing statements and doubtful logic. The effect of the supreme court's
action will be that many 16 and 17 year olds will be sent to adult
prisons where they will serve time with hardened criminals. 57 As Judge
Wright states, these children will be sentenced without any meaningful
inquiry into the possibility of rehabilitation through humane juvenile
disposition. 58 He states further that we will hear from these juveniles
again, and that the kind of society we have in the years to come will
59
depend, in no small measure, upon our treatment of them now.
Tim Day

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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The Fate Of A Non-Resident Personal Representative:
In re Estate of Greenberg

In re Estate of Greenberg' addresses the constitutionality of Florida's
laws on administration of estates. The central issue is whether a nonresident, unrelated to the testator, can act as personal representative of
the decedent's estate. Reaffirming the states' power to control the administration of estates of their citizens and recognizing the legislative
origin of the right to dispose of property after death, the court upheld
the constitutionality of Florida Statutes §§ 733.3022 and 733.304.3
1. 390 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1980). The United States Supreme Court dismissed this

case for lack of a substantial federal question. 49 U.S.L.W. 3633, 3642 (March 3,
1981). Since Hicks v. Miranda,422 U.S. 332, 334 (1975), any case dismissed for lack
of a substantial federal question constitutes a disposition on the merits. Therefore, the
constitutionality of sections 733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes has been upheld. See generally Lewis, Is the Supreme Court Creating Unknown and Unknowable
Law? The InsubstantialFederal Question Dismissal, 5 NOVA L.J. 11 (1980).
2. FLA. STAT. § 733.302 (1979) provides:
Subject to the limitations in this part, any person sui juris who is a citizen of
the United States and a resident of Florida at the time of the death of the person
whose estate he seeks to administer is qualified to act as personal representative
in Florida. A person who has been convicted of a felony or who, from sickness,
intemperance, or want of understanding, is incompetent to discharge the duties
of a personal representative is not qualified.
In In re the Estate of Fernandez, 335 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1976), we held that
the United States citizenship requirement contained in section 733.302, Florida
Statutes (1975), was invalid because such requirement violated the equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution. Therein, we recognized that the
statutory requirement that a person appointed as an administrator be a resident
of Florida guaranteed the basic ability of one to perform the duties of a personal
representative, but we held that the additional requirement of United States citizenship had no bearing on ability. In 1979, the legislature amended section
733.302 to eliminate the requirement of United States citizenship. Chapter 79343, Laws of Florida (1979). The amendment deleted only the language, "is a
citizen of the United States and," but left the remainder of the statute
unchanged.
Id. at 41 n.1.
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In reaching its conclusion, the supreme court affirmed the trial
court's decision denying Meyer Pincus' petition for appointment as copersonal representative to Leo Greenberg's estate. Mr. Greenberg died
a resident of Florida. In his will, he named his son and accountant copersonal representatives of his estate and Mr. Pincus as successor personal representative. Before Mr. Greenberg moved to Florida, Meyer
Pincus had acted as his attorney and tax advisor. When the accountant
renounced his right to serve as co-personal representative, Mr. Pincus
agreed to replace him. However, the court denied permission since Mr.
Pincus was neither a relative of the testator as defined by section
733.304 nor a resident of Florida as required by section 733.302.'
Greenbergillustrates the supreme court's endorsement of the constitutionality of the Florida Statutes controlling the administration of
the estates of Florida citizens. According to the court these statutes
withstand challenges that they violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment 5 and the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution.6 In Greenberg, Mr. Pincus alleged that these statutes denied the
testator's fundamental right to choose the person to administer his es§ 733.304 (1977) provides:
A person who is not domiciled in the state cannot qualify as a personal
representative unless the person is:
(1) A legally adopted child or adoptive parent of the decedent;
(2) Related by lineal consanguinity to the decedent;
(3) A spouse or a brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece of the decedent; or
(4) The spouse of a person otherwise qualified under this section.
Id. n.2. In 1979 this section was amended. Clause 3 now reads "a spouse or a brother,
sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece of the decedent, or someone related by lineal consanguinity to any such person." Id. (1979).
4. See text of statutes as set forth in notes 2 & 3 supra.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
3.

FLA. STAT.
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tate. Futher, Mr. Pincus argued that these statutes abridge the testator's fundamental right to travel. Finally, Mr. Pincus argued that the
statutes abridged his fundamental right to pursue a livelihood.'

I.

EQUAL PROTECTION

A.

Brief History

The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the states from denying to any person within their jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. 8 In modern equal protection cases, the
key is to identify the proper standard of judicial review. The rational
basis or minimum scrutiny test, generally applied in cases involving
equal protection challenges, allows any imaginable state of facts to uphold the legislative enactment as reasonable for achieving a legitimate
legislative purpose. 9 A statutory classification will be held "unconstitu7. Answer Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Florida Bar, Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law Section at 5, In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Answer Brief].
8. See note 5 supra.
9. The Court in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)
stated the rules by which this contention must be tested:
1. The equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from
the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the
exercise of a wise scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only
when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that
clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that
state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of
showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary (citations omitted).
In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court stated that its business
did not include determining whether a regulation is wise, only that it best fulfills the
relevant social economic objective. "[T]he equal protection clause does not require that
a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the
problem at all. It is enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from
invidious discrimination." Id. at 487 (citations omitted).
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tionally violative of the equal protection clause under this test if it

causes different treatment so disparate" that the classification is "wholly arbitrary."10 The burden of showing there is no rational basis for the
classification is on the party attacking the statute."' However, this burden is practically insurmountable for there is almost always some basis
for the legislative judgment that the measure promotes public
interest.12
On the other hand, application of the strict scrutiny test usually
nullifies the presumption of constitutionality and "is almost always fatal in its application."1 s This test requires the state to justify its classification as a necessary means to achieve a compelling state interest when
either (a) a suspect classification1 4 or (b) a fundamental interest1 5 ex-

10. 390 So. 2d at 42.
11. See note 9 supra.
12. E.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952);
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); McDonald v. Board
of Election, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
13. 390 So. 2d at 42-43. Cf. note 9 supra (when rational basis test is applied the
statute is generally upheld).
14. The Supreme Court has identified two types of classification as suspect, calling for strict judicial scrutiny: (1) race, see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954) and (2) alienage, see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
15. The Supreme Court has identified two fundamental interests which, if invaded, call for strict scrutiny: (1) equal access to voting, see, e.g., Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist. Number 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); and (2) a cluster of interests related to marriage and procreation, see, e.g.,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
The Court has also found discrimination against exercise of constitutional rights
may invade a fundamental right of privacy, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). The Court has
also examined discrimination in the context of (1) the right to travel, see, e.g., Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250 (1974); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1
(1978); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); (2) the right to pursue a livelihood,
see, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); and (3) first amendment rights, see,
e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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plicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution is present in the
case.
B. Mr. Pincus' Argument
Realizing the futility of presenting his challenge under the rational
basis test, Mr. Pincus argued that the strict scrutiny test should be
applied. This test would have been applicable had the statutes actually
impinged upon the testator's fundamental right to appoint his personal
representative, penalized his fundamental right to travel or abridged
Mr. Pincus' fundamental right to pursue a livelihood. 17 However, the
United States Supreme Court has carefully and narrowly defined the
list of fundamental rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution. Therefore, unless Mr. Pincus' allegations involved either a
suspect classification or a recognized fundamental right, the rational
basis test had to be applied.18
"Mr. Pincus characterize[d] as fundamental the testator's right to
appoint a personal representative; thus impelling application of the
strict scrutiny test."19 However, Pincus attempted to bootstrap the
right to appoint a personal representative to the definition of "liberty"
in Meyer v. Nebraska20 and the recognized fundamental right which
protects family relationship,21 thereby creating a new fundamental in-

16.

See note 15 supra.

17. Id.
18. The Court has confronted other classifications arguably suspect in nature,
but has not yet held them to be suspect. These classifications include: illegitimacy, see,
e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); gender, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313 (1977); wealth or indigency, see, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); and age, see, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.

Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). The Court also refused to extend the list of fundamental
interests to other important areas such as adequate housing, see, e.g., Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); welfare assistance, see, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970); employment, see, e.g., Idaho Dep't of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S.
100 (1977).
19. In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d at 43.
20.
21.

262 U.S. 390 (1973).
See note 15 supra.
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22
terest which would protect an "individual's family decisions.
The Florida Supreme Court held that this right to appoint a personal representative was not a fundamental right and properly followed
United States Supreme Court precedent establishing that "the Supreme Court does not pick out particular . . . activities, characterize
them as fundamental, and then give them added protection." 23 The
United States Supreme Court emphasized that it is not within its
"province to create substantial rights by guaranteeing equal protection." 2 ' Further, the Court declared that it is not sufficient to characterize a right as fundamental "just because state legislation affects a
matter gravely important to society. ' 25 "The Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill and the Supreme Court will only recognize an established constitutional right and
give to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself
demands. 26
The Constitution does not govern the right to control inheritance,
descent, or distribution. The power to create rules establishing, protecting and strengthening life, as well as regulating the disposition of property, is reserved to the legislatures of the states.27 The vague generalities of the equal protection clause are not applicable. 28 Therefore, since
the power is reserved to the states, "nothing forbids the legislatures
from limiting, conditioning or even abolishing the power of testamentary disposition of property within their jurisdiction."2

22. Brief for Appellant at 8, In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d (Fla. 1980).
23. 390 So. 2d at 43. See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973).
24. 390 So. 2d at 43. "The Supreme Court of the United States has refused to
expand fundamental rights beyond those explicitly guaranteed by the constitution." Id.
25. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972).
26. 390 So. 2d at 43.
27. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971).
28. Id. at 538-40. See also Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 490, 493 (1850).
Now the law in question is nothing more than an exercise of the power which
every state and sovereignty possesses, of regulating the manner and term upon
which property real or personal within its dominion may be transmitted by last
will and testament, or by inheritance; and of prescribing who shall and who shall
not be capable of taking it.

Id.
29.

390 So. 2d at 43. See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977).
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The Florida Supreme Court reemphasized this position stating
"that the power to alienate any species of property by a last will and
testament has never been an inherent right in the citizen, but is derived
from legislation." 30 In most jurisdictions, statutes create the decedent's
right to name a personal representative to administer his estate. However, since this right is created by statute, the requirements must be
strictly complied with.3 1 State legislation has established that courts
have no jurisdiction to issue letters of administration to the personal
representative nominated in the will unless such discretion is granted
by statute.3 2 Thus, sections 733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes specifically disqualify Pincus from serving as personal representative, since he is not related to the testator or a resident of Florida.33
In certain instances, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the right to domestic travel as a protectable fundamental interest,
requiring the strict scrutiny analysis, which cannot be abridged by the
states." Whether it is protected against congressional action may be an
open question in light of the deferential treatment given to such legislation by the United States Supreme Court.35 The right to foreign travel
The Court there stated that orderly disposition of property at death is a matter particularly within the competence of the state.
30. Thomas v. Williamson, 51 Fla. 332, _,40 So. 831, 834 (1906) (Taylor, J.,
concurring). See also In re Sharp's Estate, 133 Fla. 802, 183 So. 470 (1938); Taylor v.
Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615 (1944), appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 666 (1944).
See generally REDFEARN,

WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN FLORIDA

§ 20.13 (5th ed.

1977).
31. State v. North, 159 Fla. 351, _, 32 So. 2d 14, 18 (1947).
32. Id. See also In re Crosby's Estate, 218 Minn. 149, _, 15 N.W.2d 401, 505
(1944). "The legislature has the unquestioned power to qualify a testator's right of
appointing an executor and may even wholly deprive the testator of that right, for the
right to make a will is purely a statutory right, subject to the complete control of the
legislature." Id. (citations omitted).
33. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
34. See note 15 supra.
35. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 286 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring):
"[A]s against the reserved power of the states, it is enough that the end to which
Congress has acted be one legitimately within its power and that there be a rational
basis for the measures chosen to achieve that end." See also, McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819): "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the court, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adopted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Consti-
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is protected against congressional invasion by the due process clause of
the fifth amendment."8
This right to travel has been protected as a fundamental right only
when a durational residency requirement is imposed by a state as a
condition precedent to receiving the privileges and benefits of a state, 7
and when the requirement serves to penalize the exercise of that right
to travel. 38 However, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned
that an appropriately defined and uniformly applied residency requirement will be upheld. 9 But generally "the right to interstate travel must
be seen as insuring new residents the same right to vital governmental
benefits in the state to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other residents" of that state. 0
Mr. Pincus alleged that sections 733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes violate the testator's right to travel in that the testator
should be allowed the same rights and privileges in Florida as he enjoyed in the state from which he came. The United States Supreme
Court has specifically rejected such a proposition. 41 The Court reasoned
that "the broader implications of this transposition, in other areas of
substantive law, would destroy the independent power of each state
tution, are constitutional."
36. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); cf Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965)
(Congress can constitutionally authorize the President to deny passports for travel to
designated areas where justified by national security concerns).
37. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972): "We emphasize
again the difference between bona fide residence requirements and durational residency
requirements." "Obviously, durational residency laws single out the class of bona fide
state and county residents who have recently exercised this constitutionally protected
right, and penalize such travelers directly." Id. at 338. See also, e.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974); McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976); Califano
v.Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
38. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 261 (1974).
39. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972); cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393 (1975) (a one-year residency requirement as a condition on seeking a divorce in
state courts is valid). See also Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
40. 415 U.S. at 261.
41. In Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 (1978), the Court stated that the right
to interstate travel does not require that a person who travels from one state to another
be given benefits superior to those enjoyed by residents of states to which he travels
merely because he enjoyed those rights in the state from which he came.
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under the Constitution to enact laws uniformly applicable to all of its
'
residents."42
Sections 733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes do not contain a durational residency requirement and nothing prohibits a nonresident personal representative from taking up residence in Florida prior
to qualifying as a personal representative. 43 Thus, these statutes do not
penalize the testator's right to travel as defined by the United States
Supreme Court where it has applied the strict scrutiny test.
Further attempting to invoke the strict scrutiny test, Mr. Pincus
contended that his fundamental right to pursue a livelihood 44 was violated by the statutes at issue. In Hicklin v. Orbeck,'5 the United States
Supreme Court held that an Alaskan "hire law," which contained a
one year durational residency requirement before non-residents could
work on the Alaskan pipeline, violated the non-resident's right to pursue a livelihood. However, in Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game
Commission,' the Court stated that (1) it did not decide the full range
of activities sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the nation and (2) that
the states may not interfere with a non-resident's participation without
similarly interfering with a resident's participation.
The Florida Supreme Court held that, since there was no fundamental right to appoint a personal representative explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the United States Constitution,' 7 there was no fundamental right to serve as a personal representative. 48 Mr. Pincus' argument did not persuade the court. He claimed that serving as a personal
representative and earning an incidental fee was equivalent to the fundamental right to pursue a livelihood. 4 9 Moreover, Pincus was not li-

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 4-5.
Answer Brief at 15.
See note 15 supra.
437 U.S. 518 (1978).
436 U.S. 371, 381 (1978). See also Davis v. Rose, 97 Fla. 710, 122 So. 225

(1929).
47. In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d at 43.
48. Id. at 45.
49. This court [should] have little sympathy for that sideline to the practice of law, just as it would regard real estate commissions generated by a
lawyer's law practice if he held a brokerage license, as a part of his livelihood entitled to protection as a fundamental right. Moreover, in instances
which a testator's attorney is named a personal representative, it is with
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censed to practice law in Florida. 0
Similar to the fundamental right to travel, residency requirements
also have been considered when analyzing the fundamental right to
pursue a livelihood. When confronted with the question of whether a
residency requirement for admission to the Puerto Rico Bar unconstitutionally deprived an individual of his right to pursue a livelihood, the
Court in Ward v. Board of Examiners,51 held that residency is not a
suspect classification. The Court further stated that the actual residency requirement did not burden a fundamental right. The Court utilized the rational basis analysis and upheld the non-durational residency requirement for admission to the bar. In Greenberg,the Florida
Supreme Court expressly recognized the state residency requirement of
section 733.302 of the Florida Statutes.5
Since the legislation in question affected neither a suspect class
nor a fundamental right, the rational basis or minimum scrutiny test
invalidated this equal protection challenge.5 Utilizing this test, the
Florida Supreme Court held that the statutes bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state objective and therefore did not deny Mr.
Pincus the right to pursue a livelihood."
the thought that administration expenses will be saved by virtue [of] combining the personal representative and the personal representative's attorney into one office. In the typical example in which the testator migrated
to Florida having named his northern lawyer as personal representative,
the assumption that the testator had made in naming the lawyer would be
no longer valid, because the lawyer's inability to practice law in the State
of Florida would prevent the saving in administration expenses that had
been contemplated.
Answer Brief at 17.
50. Id.; see also Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
51. 409 F. Supp. 1258, 1259 (D.P.R. 1976). In re Estate of Fernandez, 335 So.
2d 829 (Fla. 1976).
52. 390 So. 2d at 45.
53. Id.
54. Cf. Fain v. Hall, 463 F. Supp. 661 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (The court applied
strict scrutiny analysis and held blood requirement for qualification of non-resident personal representative was unconstitutional). But see 390 So. 2d at 43, where the court

stated that "[n]otwithstanding the decision of the federal district court in [Fain],
which [they found] to be wholly unpersuasive. . . that the right to appoint a personal
representative is not one of the fundamental rights implicating utilization of the strict
scrutiny test."
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What then are the legitimate state interests? The state "recognized that the administration of a decedent's estate is an intensely localized matter requiring the personal representative to be thoroughly
informed on local matters and to be available to the court, beneficiaries
and creditors of the estate. ' 5 5 Even though availability is used in a
broader sense than when the word is used in reference to service of
process, 8 the search for a legitimate state interest could have ended
here. The United States Supreme Court held that if there exists a reasonably conceived state of facts, the classification of a law will be sustained. 7 Amenability to service of process has been recognized as a
legitimate state interest for upholding the residency requirement in section 733.302 of the Florida Statutes, 8 and has passed the strict scru59
tiny test.
Nevertheless, the state also declared
that these statutes serve the valid function of insuring that the personal
representative, if not a relative of the testator, is close enough in proximity to the Florida estate to protect the rights of the creditors, insure that
the estate will be probated without needless delays caused by travel, and
reduce the cost of representation to the estate by reducing travel costs or.
preventing the need to associate an in-state representative.Y
The dissent agreed that the rationality standard of review was appropriate, but argued that the state's interest in reducing "delay in the
administration of estates," and costs incurred through "travel and the
association of an in-state representative" and insuring "proximity to
the interests of the Florida estate to protect interested parties' rights"
did not pass the rational basis test.61 It argued that the "state's classification for qualified non-resident personal representative [was] arbitrary
and irrational . . . denying equal protection of the laws. 62 On one

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

390 So. 2d at 45.
Answer Brief at 23A. See generally FLA. STAT. § 733.612 (Supp. 1980).
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
In re Estate of Fernandez, 335 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1976).
Id. at 831.
390 So. 2d at 45, 46.
390 So. 2d at 49, 50 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 49.
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hand, the dissent wanted to act as a super-legislature 3 and strike down
the residency statute. On the other hand, it called on the legislature to
gather its collective mind and make the statute applicable to personal
representatives, resident and non-resident."
However, "[e]qual protection does not require a state to choose
between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking it at
all. ....,5 Further, a statutory classification will not be set aside if
any set of facts may reasonably be conceived to sustain the classification. 6 Additionally, the dissent cannot overlook decisions of its own
court which reiterate the same propositions.67 The Florida Supreme
Court has stated that "it is not unreasonable for an exception to be
created for non-resident relatives because, more than likely, the nonresident relative will also be a beneficiary of the decedent's estate.6 8
Furthermore, the argument that the statute has not gone far enough to
provide equal protection of the laws was specifically rejected by the
United States Supreme Court.69
In summary, since none of Pincus' arguments fall within the definition of a suspect class or a fundamental interest the rational basis test
must be applied. In the application of this test, the court held that sections 733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes bear a reasonable
relationship to a legitimate state objective. Hence, these sections do not
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
II.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

Additionally, Pincus contended that the operation of the residency
requirement in the challenged statutes violated the privilege and immu70
nities clause of article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court hgs upheld as permissible "[s]ome
63.

See note 9 supra.

64.

390 So. 2d at 51 (dissenting opinion).

65.

390 So. 2d at 46; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).

66.

Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).

67. See, e.g., Newman v. Carson, 280 So. 2d 426, 429 (Fla. 1973); Finlayson v.
Conner, 167 So. 2d 569, 571 (Fla. 1964); Liquor Store Inc. v. Continental Distilling
Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 384 (Fla. 1949).
68. 390 So. 2d at 46.

69. 397 U.S. at 487.
70. See note 6 supra.
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distinctions between residents and nonresidents [which] merely reflect
. . . that this is a nation composed of individual states. . .

."

On the

other hand, the Court prohibits those distinctions which hinder the formation, purpose, or development of a single union.~
The Florida Supreme Court explained that the privileges and immunities clause secures for the citizens of a state the same freedoms
existing in other states as to the acquisition and enjoyment of property,
72
pursuit of happiness and guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
Thus, the privileges and immunities clause secures to citizens of each
state those virtues of their status as citizens which are common to the
citizens in other states under their constitution and law.7 3 "Performing
the task of personal representative does not rise to the level of a privilege or immunity bearing upon the vitality of the nation as a single
entity' 74 and certainly is not common to all states. 5 Therefore, the
residency requirement for personal representatives does not violate the
privileges and immunities clause.
III.

DUE PROCESS OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (IRREBUT-

TABLE PRESUMPTIONS)

During the 1970's, the United States Supreme Court employed a
new form of heightened scrutiny to review statutory classifications
which contained rules denying a benefit or placing a burden on all individuals possessing a certain defined characteristic. This scrutiny was
characterized as an irrebuttable presumption 76 (e.g., all women after
their fifth month of pregnancy are incapable of working).
Under equal protection standards and other standards utilizing
strict scrutiny, a perfect meeting between the purpose of the state statute and the classification created by the statute is not required. The
71. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
72. Hoadley v. Insurance Comm'r, of Fla., 37 Fla. 564, , 20 So. 772, 775
(1896).
73. Id.
74. 390 So. 2d at 49. See In re Mulford, 217 Ill. 242, _, 75 N.E. 345, 346
(1905).
75. Answer Brief at A-6 & A-7 (see survey of eligibility of non-resident personal
representative statutes).
76. Note, The Irrebutable Presumption Doctrine In The Supreme Court, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1534 n.7 (1974).
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irrebuttable presumption analysis was a furtive maneuver, under the
guise of due process, to impose "extraordinarily strict safeguards on
overinclusive classification." "In practice, the application of this analysis invalidated the generalization and produced a requirement for individualized hearings. "78 The Court in Vlandis v. Kline, held that if it is
not necessarily or universally true in fact the basic fact implies the presumed fact, and the statute's irrebuttable presumption denies due pro79
cess of law.
However, as rapidly as the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
emerged in the early 1970's, its decline was not far behind. Chief Justice Burger wrote in his dissenting opinion in Vlandis that this doctrine
represented a transfer of the compelling state interest test from the
equal protection area into the due process area.80 He further stated
that the Court's function in constitutional adjudication is "not to see
whether there is some conceivably less restrictive alternative to the
statutory classification under review since all legislation might be improved by such an individualized determination."81 In Cleveland Board
of Education v. LaFleur,82 Mr. Justice Powell (concurring in result)8
and Mr. Justice Rehnquist (dissenting) 8" espoused similar views.
Finally, in Weinberger v. Salf,85 the Court addressed a claim that
a federal statute violated due process. The majority stated the issue as
"whether Congress, [concerned] . . . by the possibility of an abuse

which it legitimately desired to avoid, could have rationally concluded
both that a particular limitation or qualification would protect against
its occurrence,-and that the expense and other difficulties of individual
determinations justified the inherent imprecission of a prophylactic
rule."8 6 Two years later in Ulsery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,87 the
77. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 969 (10th ed. 1980).
78. Id. at 970.
79. 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
80. 412 U.S. 441, 459-60 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
81. Id. at 460.
82. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
83. 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in result).
84. 414 U.S. 632, 657 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
85. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
86. Id. at 777.
87. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Court further clarified its holding in Weinberger and applied the rational basis analysis to uphold a federal law containing two irrebuttable
presumptions."
The Weinberger and Turner Elkhorn decisions illustrate that
"[j]ust as.

.

.severe limitations [were] placed upon the strict scrutiny

test in equal protection cases, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
' . * has now been limited

. . .

so that legislation that creates an ir-

rebuttable presumption will be examined by the deferential test of a
rational relationship in matters of economic legislation."8' 9 A strict
scrutiny analysis will only be applied when a classification is at least
arguably suspect' 0 or when there is an interest that is at least arguably
fundamental. 1
In this instance, Pincus had no fundamental right compromised
and he did not belong to a suspect class. Therefore, the rational basis
analysis was proper in light of Weinberger and Turner Elkhorn. Hence,
sections 733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes do not violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment since they represent a
rational means of accomplishing a legitimate state goal.
IV.

THE,CONTENTION OF AMICUS CURIAE - DUAL PROBATE

The Florida Supreme Court properly concluded that sections
733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes are constitutional. The
court arrived at this decision based upon principles established by the
United States Supreme Court under the privileges and immunities
clause and the equal protection and due process clauses of 2the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.9
However, this lengthy analysis may have been unnecessary had
consideration been given to an argument put forth in the answer brief
of amicus curiae. 8 This well taken argument deals with the concept of
dual probate which vitiates all constitutional arguments made by Mr.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

422 U.S. 749 (1975).
Answer Brief at 34.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
390 So. 2d at 49.
Answer Brief at 3.
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Pincus. 9"
As previously set forth, Mr. Pincus alleged that the testator's constitutional right to travel and his fundamental right to choose a personal representative were denied. Additionally Mr. Pincus' own right to
earn fees for administering the estate was prohibited by sections
733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes which disallow an unrelated non-resident from becoming a personal representative in Florida.
The concept of dual probate has been widely employed by other
states and was adopted in Florida in 1978.11 In essence the original
probate of the will of a decedent, domiciled in Florida at the time of
death, will be simultaneously probated in Florida and New York. The
New York administration, with Mr. Pincus as personal representative,
could have disposed of most or all of the decedent's estate, including all
of the personal property owned by the decedent even though it was
96
situated in Florida at the time of death.
Dual probate should not be confused with the concept of ancillary
administration. Ancillary administration applies when a person dies
leaving real property in another state. Primary administration takes
place in the state of the decedent's domicile and ancillary administra94. Id.at 5.
95. FLA. STAT. § 731.106(2) (Supp. 1980):
When a non-resident decedent who is a citizen of the United States or a citizen
or subject of a foreign country provides in his will that the testamentary disposition of his tangible or intangible personal property having a situs within this
state, or of his real prqpery in this state, shall be construed and regulated by the
laws of this state, the validity and effect of the dispositions shall be determined
by Florida law. The court may, and in the case of a decedent who was at the
time of his death a resident of a foreign country the court shall, direct the personal representative appointed in this state to make distribution directly to those
designated by the decedent's will as beneficiaries of the tangible or intangible
property or to the persons entitled to receive the decedent's personal estate under
the laws of the decedent's domicile, as the case may be.
96. N.Y. [EST., POWERS & TRusTs] LAW § 3-5.1(h) (Consol. 1979):
Whenever a testator, not domiciled in this state at the time of death, provides in his will that he elects to have the disposition of his property situated in
this state governed by the laws of this state, the intrinsic validity, including the
testator's general capacity, effect, interpretation, revocation or alteration of any
such disposition is determined by the local law of this state. The formal validity
of the will, in such case is determined in accordance with paragraph (c).
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tion takes place in the state where the real property is situated.97 On
the other hand, "[i]n a typical dual probate estate, a Florida [domiciliary could] have all his personal property, tangible and intangible, probated by an unrelated non-Florida resident [e.g., the decedent's tax advisor or attorney], in another state, under the judicial supervision of the
other state."98
In other words, a person emigrating to a foreign state could direct
in his will that all property, wherever situated, be subject to administration in the state from which he emigrated. This tactic is useful especially where the named personal representative cannot qualify under
the new state's residency statute. For instance, Mr. Pincus could not
qualify as a personal representative in Florida and had Mr. Greenberg
so directed in his will, Mr. Pincus could have administered the bulk of
Greenberg's estate in New York even if it was situated in Florida. Had
Greenberg chosen this tactic, "the only assets subject to the simultaneous original probate in Florida would [have been] the real property located in Florida which in many instances passes outside of probate by
virtue of joint ownership."99
CONCLUSION

Florida Statutes sections 733.302 and 733.304 do not prevent the
estate of a Florida resident from being probated within the state from
which he emigrated. 100 Therefore, in applying the statutes to Mr.
Greenberg's case, no violation can be found of his "fundamental" right
to appoint Mr. Pincus, an unrelated non-resident, as successor personal
representative to his estate. Moreover, this application would preclude
any alleged impingement on the testator's fundamental right to travel.
In addition, these Florida Statutes contain no provisions to prevent
such an unrelated, non-resident personal representative from earning a
personal representative's commission approved by the court of a foreign
state.1 1 "It is only if the decedent or his family chooses to forego dual
97.

See generally REDFEARN, supra note 30, at § 20.13.

98. Answer Brief at 3.
99.

Id. at 5.

100. Id.
101. See note 96 supra.
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probate and submit all the intangible personal property to probate in
' 10 2
the Florida Court that sections 733.302 and 733.304 will apply.
Since Mr. Greenberg chose to submit his estate to the laws of
Florida, sections 733.302 and 733.304 of the Florida Statutes were applied. In light of a challenge that the Florida Statutes violate the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment and
the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 of the
United States Constitution, the Florida Supreme Court properly applied the United States Supreme Court precedent and upheld the constitutionality of the Florida law.
Peter S. Broberg

102.

Answer Brief at 5.
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Loftus, E., Eyewitness Testimony. Harvard U. Press,
1980, pp. 253, $15.00
Reviewed by Mark M. Dobson*

I dissociate myself from the implication ... that there is some-

thing insignificant or unreliableabout a rape victim's observation during the crime of the facialfeatures of her assailantwhen that observation lasts "only 10 to 15 seconds.",
The inferences contained in the above quotation explain why all trial
court judges and trial lawyers should read Eyewitness Testimony. As
every law student soon learns, verdicts usually hinge on facts found by
juries or judges after hearing witnesses testify as to what they have
seen, heard, touched or smelled. One commonly pictures an "eyewitness" as the pedestrian on the street corner who saw two automobiles
collide or the drug store clerk who was robbed at gunpoint. That jurors
and judges place much weight on the testimony of such witnesses can
scarcely be denied. As such, many prosecutors would agree that the
persuasive value of a positive eyewitness is even greater than that of the
proverbial "smoking gun."
Why, then, are so many lawyers-and law students demonstratively
ignorant of this important subject? Go to any busy courthouse and
watch some trials. Sooner or later, you will observe the epitome of a
poor eyewitness cross-examination. Assume the witness has identified
the accused as the robber. The cross-examination must attack and destroy or at least neutralize the witness. Chances are this is how it might
be done:
Lawyer: "You testified it was Mr. Jones who robbed your store."
* A.B., Georgetown University, 1970; J.D., Catholic University, 1973; LL.M.,
Temple University 1977; Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota Law
School, 1977-80 (on leave 1980-81); Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law, 1980-81.
1. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 234 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Witness: "Yes."
Lawyer: "Now, had you ever seen Mr. Jones before that night?"
Witness: "No."
Lawyer: "You didn't notice anything unusual about the robber when he
entered your store?"
Witness: "Not really."
Lawyer: "You certainly didn't expect to be robbed, did you?"
Witness: "No."
Lawyer: "And you weren't particularly paying any attention to him
before he pulled the gun."
Witness: "No."
Lawyer: "And this startled you?"
Witness: "Yes."
Lawyer: "And you wanted to do just what he told you?"
Witness: "Yes, of course. I wanted to get it over as fast as possible."
Lawyer: (flushed with victory in his grasp): "But, in spite of all this,
you're sure the person you saw in the store that evening with the gun
was my client, Mr. Jones?"
Witness: "Yes, I'll never forget his face."
Lawyer: (now fully deflated): "No further questions, your honor." 2
While the above cross-examination would probably not be considered
bad if conducted by a fledgling third-year law student, few attorneys
would say it accomplished its purposes. The attorney has scored some
points, but how can he be certain the jury understands their significance? The witness has survived, and unless other evidence is produced,
Jones will probably be convicted.
Criticism of the American legal profession for ignoring the psychological aspects of eyewitness testimony is not new. In 1909 John Henry
Wigmore, the noted evidence scholar, demonstrated the legal profession's unfamiliarity with the available psychological literature.3 Wigmore's criticism took place under the guise of a fictitious libel suit
2. The last question and answer are the result of two shortcomings on the attorney's part. The first is a mistake in cross-examination technique, referred to as the "one
question too many" syndrome. See Younger, A Letter in Which Cicero Lays Down the
Ten Commandments of Cross-Examination, 3 LITIGATION 18 (Winter 1977). The second is the failure to understand that once a witness has testified to an event, it is
extremely unlikely he/she will retract the statement.
3. Wigmore, Professor Muensterberg and the Psychology of Testimony, 3 ILL.
L. REv. 399 (1909).
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brought by the American bar against Dr. Hugo Munsterberg for allegedly charging the law with ignoring what psychologists had recently
discovered about the inaccuracy of eyewitness testimony.' The bar wins
damages of one dollar, but the judge's closing remarks indicate much
truth existed in the defendant's claim.
It is impossible to claim that innocent people have not been the
victims of miscarriages of justice. In 1932 Professor Edwin Borchard
described sixty-five cases in which innocent people were convicted as a
result of mistaken identification, circumstantial evidence (from which
erroneous inferences were drawn), perjury, or some combination of
these factors.5 Most startling of these convictions may have been that
of Adolf Beck.6 Identified by ten witnesses as the man who defrauded
them of jewelry, Beck was convicted in 1896, served five years in
prison, and was wrongly charged again with the same offense in 1904.
Fortunately, this time the police found the real swindler. Beck was subsequently pardoned on the earlier charge.
Aberrations of this nature are not a phenomena of the past. Recently the Minneapolis Tribune described the plight of Bruce T. Werner, who was jailed four months on a rape charge. As the story relates,
"[w]hat happened to him is not supposed to happen in the criminal
justice system, but it sometimes does. It is a classic case of mistaken
identity." Werner did not match the victim's description, nor did he
have the scratches she claimed to have infficted on her assailant. He
also passed a lie detector test; however, because he had been selected at
a lineup, his prosecution and conviction seemed imminent. Fortunately,
while Werner was in jail, the true rapist was apprehended and confessed to the crime. Both men were remarkably similar in appearance. 8
Psychologists have long known the dangers of eyewitness testimony. Unfortunately, however, few legal practitioners realize just how
fragile such an identification can be. Why is this so? Perhaps a failure
4.

For the full description of Professor Munsterberg's claim, see H. MUNSTER-

BERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1908).
5. E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932).

6. Id. at 7-13.
7. Minneapolis Tribune, Dec. 30, 1979, § A, at 1.
8. The Minneapolis Tribune story includes photographs of Werner and the real
assailant. As stated by one police officer in the article, "They'd pass for brothers." Id. §
A at 9, col. 1.
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of communications between the two disciplines is the answer. As recently stated,
[p]sychologists need to translate significant experiments (e.g., attribution
and exchange or perception and cognition theory) into language available to the legal profession. For example, many legal problems related to
eyewitness identification process suffer precisely because the psychological 'stuff' in perception or memory is simply not translated or made
available in ways useful to lawyers.9
Likewise, much of the legal literature on eyewitness identification has
centered on such legal doctrines as the sixth amendment right to counsel or the fourteenth amendment right to procedural due process without explaining how these rights relate to possible identification defects.
Eyewitness Testimony, however, is instructive, for it begins, in language understandable to both lawyers and lay persons alike, the long
overdue integration of knowledge between the legal and psychological
professions. 10
Professor Loftus begins her book with a discussion of how mistaken identifications may have contributed to miscarriages of justice in
the past. After a brief description of the Sacco-Vanzetti murder trial
and the role suggestive police identification procedures may have
played in obtaining what was arguably a questionable conviction,1" Loftus discusses the Sawyer brothers' case, from which one may reasonably conclude that the accused were innocent and their identifications
erroneous. 2 The author ends the chapter with the theme of the remain9. PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 1 (B. Sales ed. 1976).
10. Besides EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, Professor Loftus has authored numerous
articles in psychological and quasi-legal periodicals. In a recent article, Loftus, The
Eyewitness on Trial, 16 Trial 30 (October 1980), Loftus briefly summarizes many of
the experiments and conclusions discussed in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY.
11. Numerous books have been written discussing the Sacco-Vanzetti trial and
its verdict. See F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1927); E. LYONS, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1927); G. LAUGHEN & E. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO AND VANZETrI (1948); R. MONTGOMERY, SACCO-VANZETTI, THE MURDER AND THE MYTH (1960); F. RUSSELL, TRAGEDY IN DEDHAM
(1962); R. FEURUCHT, JUSTICE CRUCIFIED (1977). THE SACCO-VANZETrI CASE,
AMERICAN TRIALS (0. Fraenkel ed. 1931).
12. In referring to the Sawyer Brothers case, Loftus makes a pointed comment
on the legal system's inability to determine the actual frequency of wrongful convic-
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der of her book: "[E]yewitness testimony is not always reliable. It can
be flawed simply because of the normal and natural memory processes
that occur whenever human beings acquire, retain, and attempt to retrieve information."' 3
In chapter two, the author describes several studies relating the
impact of eyewitness testimony on the jury's mind. One particular experiment, conducted by Loftus herself, is especially revealing. Three
sets of fifty jurors each read accounts of a rQbbery and the evidence
available to prove such. Without any eyewitness testimony, only eighteen percent of the jurors would have convicted the defendant. With
one eyewitness, the conviction rate skyrocketed to seventy-two percent.
Even when cross-examination showed the witness was not wearing
glasses the day of the robbery, had only 20/400 vision and could not
have seen the robber's face, astonishingly, sixty-eight percent of the
jurors would still have reached a guilty verdict. The chapter also discusses those factors which lead juries to believe one eyewitness over
another: e.g., witness likeability, motive to falsify, and powerful versus
powerless speech.14 Loftus' conclusion, that "the way in which a witness gives testimony can affect the potential monetary award,"' 5 is instructive; for it indicates that attorneys may maximize their chances
for success if they teach their witnesses the most effective ways to answer questions."
In the next three chapters, the book's heart, the author presents
the results of her own as well as other experimenters' works. She demonstrates that memory is not a simple process, but is composed of three
separate stages: perception, retention, and retrieval. Chapter three fotions: "These are not easy to come by, since someone else must later confess or some
bit of evidence must later be produced that will exonerate a once-identified person." E.
LoFrus, EyEwiTNEss TESTIMONY 4 (1980).
13. Id. at 7.
14. According to Loftus, powerless speech has six possible characteristics: (1)
frequent hedging, (2) rising intonation in declarative statements, (3) repetition, indicating insincerity, (4) intensifying adjectives, (5) empty adjectives, and (6) frequent quotation, indicating a deference to authority. Id. at 15.
15. Id. at 16.
16. Theodore Koskoff, past president of the American Trial Lawyers's Association, is a disciple of Professor Loftus's earlier work. Koskoff has suggested that trial
lawyers consider Loftus's conclusions when conducting a direct examination. See Koskoff, The Language of Persuasion, 3 LITIGATION 27 (Summer 1977).
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1

cuses on error at the perception stage. Two sets of factors, events factors and witness factors, affect the ability to perceive an event accurately. Among event factors are such items as exposure time, frequency
of exposure, detail salience and the type of fact perceived. Loftus mentions that psychological studies have demonstrated that people overestimate the amount of time it takes for an event to transpire, and that the
speed of automobiles is particularly difficult to judge; yet, the law of
evidence permits witnesses to testify as to these events with little, if
any, protective safeguards.17 Witness factors include such things as the
stress which an event produces, expectations based upon personal and
cultural prejudices, the activity engaged in by the witness while making
an observation, and expectations as to what might be observed. Loftus
disputes the notion that stress is usually a clarifying factor tending to
remove distortion. She argues that one type of stress, weapon focus, is
particularly intrusive on good perception: "The weapon appears to capture a good deal of the victim's attention, resulting in, among other
things, a reduced ability to recall other details from the environment, to
recall details about the assailant, and to recognize the assailant at a
later time."18
Chapter four focuses on the retention stage of memory. Loftus
concisely states the chapter's premise as follows: "Post event information can not only enhance existing memories but also change a witness's memory and even cause nonexistent details to become incorporated into a previously acquired memory."19
The author shows that suggestive questioning may not only enable
a witness to remember what was forgotten, but can also introduce into
the memory process, and ultimately courtroom testimony, facts or oc17.

Estimates of speed are commonly allowed, if based on first hand observation.

See Kotlikoff v. Master, 345 Pa. 258, 27 A.2d 35 (1942); Kelly v. Vuklich, 111 Kan.

199, 206 P. 894 (1922). The Federal Rules of Evidence allow opinions by lay witness if
"(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." FED. R. EVID. 701.

Arguably, jurors could be instructed that in considering a witness's testimony, they
may, but are not required, to consider that people often overestimate the amount of
time it takes for an event to occur. To this reviewer's knowledge, no jurisdiction has
currently adopted such an instruction.
18. LoFirus, supra note 12, at 35.
19. Id. at 55.
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currences never before perceived. In one of her experiments, Loftus explains how a number of witnesses, after being subjected to a series of
verbal suggestions, recalled a green car to be blue and a stop sign to be
a yield sign. According to Loftus, non-verbal influences may also create
distortions:
A police officer may tell a witness that a suspect has been caught and the
witness should look at some photographs or come to view a lineup and
make an identification. Even if the policeman does not explicitly mention
a suspect, it is likely that the witness will believe he is being asked to
identify a good suspect who will be one of the members of the lineup or
set of photos. It is here that nonverbal as well as verbal suggestions can
easily be communicated. If the officer should unintentionally stare a bit
longer at the suspect, or change his tone of voice when [asking which
20
number suspect it might be] the witness's opinion might be swayed.
Two other aspects of retention seem especially dangerous: guessing
by witnesses in identifications and the freezing effect such an identification may have. Loftus believes that in an honest effort to help, witnesses often guess at identification when not certain. Once such a tentative identification has been made, it grows stronger with time until it
becomes absolutely positive. As such, a pre-trial identification or
description of an event (e.g., at a preliminary hearing or deposition)
may have such a freezing and reinforcing effect on a witness's memory
as to preclude his/her ability to recollect the originally perceived event
21
at the time of trial.

Chapter five completes the discussion of the three-fold memory
20. Id. at 73-74.
21. Freezing of the memory process may occur in another way. After a witness
makes what police consider to be an accurate identification, the police may later confirm the suspect's identification. The expected result will be that later in court, the
witness will remember not only the crime and the subsequent identification, but also
the police confirmation, thus attributing to an even more positive identification. Courts
have refused to supress identification testimony despite such police confirmations. See
State v. Richie, 110 Ariz. 590, 521 P.2d 1136 (1974) (after picking out suspects from
six photographs but prior to a preliminary hearing, the victim was advised by police
that he had chosen the correct pictures, and that the defendant was already in custody); State v. Ponds, 227 Kan. 627, 608 P.2d 946 (1980) (detective's confirmation
that victim correctly picked the defendant's photograph was "not suggestive since it
followed the photo identification. . . ." Id. at ._, 608 P.2d at 949).
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process by detailing problems in retrieving once stored information
from a person's memory. Loftus maintains that the retrieval environment can have a major effect on the witness's power to recall. Although
admitting it may be somewhat impractical, the author suggests that
more accurate recollections would take place at the scene of the crime
or accident, rather than at the police station, where identifications are
commonly made. Evidently, placing the witness back at the scene of
occurrence somehow serves as a jog to help recall once forgotten information. Loftus also suggests that the wording of questions may be extremely important. Examining three types of questions commonly used
to interview witnesses, (narrative, controlled narrative and interrogatory), she recommends that to achieve the highest degree of both
accuracy and completeness, interrogators should "let the witness tell
the story in his own words, and when he has finished, then ask specific
22
questions.1
The remaining and most interesting part of Eyewitness Testimony
links these psychological findings to their effect on the legal system.
Chapter seven deals with the inherent problems associated with the
identification process and what can be done to remedy them. Two
problems in recognition are particularly troublesome. Cross-racial identifications are shown to be highly inaccurate, even when a witness has
23
had significant contact with the racial group of the identified person.
Likewise, unconscious transference "in which a person seen in one situation is confused with or recalled as a person seen in a second situation," 2' can also lead to misidentifications. This problem is particularly
associated with lineups. Loftus suggests that the real or functional size
of a lineup may be less than the numbers of persons it actually contains. This occurs when the individdals in the lineup are dissimilar with
respect to critical characteristics mentioned by the witness, as well as
height, weight, race, and other common physical attributes. In addition, lineups may be photo-biased if they follow a photo-identification.
"Almost invariably only one person is seen in both the photographs and
the lineup. It is unlikely that a witness will identify in the lineup any-

22.
23.
24.

LoFrus, supra note 12, at 92.
This seems to hold true for all racial groups without exception.
LoFrus, supra note 12, at 142.
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one other than the person who was chosen from the photospread."''
The chapter concludes by offering suggestions as to how attorneys can
use psychological testing devices to determine the functional size of a
lineup and whether photo-bias has occurred.
Chapter ten attempts to relate how the courts have unsuccessfully
dealt with the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications 2 This
chapter is probably the most important and interesting to the legal
reader; however, for a variety of reasons, it is the most disappointing.
Professor Loftus' description of the current legal doctrines dealing with
eyewitness identification is sometimes misleading, extremely simplistic,
and, most discouragingly, incomplete.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall
trilogy,2 7 in which the Supreme Court first addressed the problems associated with eyewitness identifications. Loftus correctly analyzes
Stovall as dealing with eyewitness identification problems from a due
process rather than a sixth amendment right to counsel approach.28
Also accurate, is her description of Wade and Gilbert, in which the
Court held that if a line-up is conducted at a critical stage of the proceedings without defense counsel present, any subsequent in-court identification of the defendant by the witness is forbidden, unless the prosecution can show the witness's identification has an "independent
origin" apart from the line-up. Surprisingly, however, the author fails
25. Id. at 32.
26. Courts have utilized two constitutional doctrines in examining identification
problems. The sixth amendment right to counsel guarantees the presence of counsel,
absent waiver, whenever an accused is exhibited at a lineup or showup during a "critical stage" of the criminal process. The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments guard against suggestive identifications in general. The United States Supreme Court has three times employed the sixth amendment to suppress certain identification testimony. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977). It has applied the
fourteenth amendment right to due process, however, only once in suppressing such
testimony. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). This suggests that as a practical
matter, due process protections against erroneous identifications are more theoretical
than actual.
27. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
28. Stovall declared a petitioner would be granted relief only if "the confrontation conducted

. . .

was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mis-

taken identification that he was denied due process of law." 388 U.S. at 301-02.
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to question whether such an "independent origin" is psychologically
possible, although her earlier discussion of retention and retrieval suggests that the line-up identification, rather than the identification made
at the scene of the incident, may be what the witness is actually
recalling.
Loftus errs, however, in stating that these cases (Wade, Gilbert,
and Stovall) "apply only to those crimes where the police had to establish the identity of the perpetrator by means of photo identification, a
showup . . . or a lineup .... "I Wade and Gilbert both dealt with

lineups, and Stovall dealt with a one person showup in a hospital room
where the victim was being treated, but none of these cases dealt with
photographic identifications.
Perhaps two reasons explain Professor Loftus' error. First, while
both Wade and Gilbert analyzed the problems of eyewitness identification under a sixth amendment right to counsel approach, Stovall examined the same issues under a due process clause analysis. By discussing these cases together, the author has mixed two legal doctrines and
their applicability. Secondly, although Professor Loftus separates the
two doctrines later in her discussion, she fails to mention United States
v. Ash,30 in which the Court held that "the sixth amendment does not
grant the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by the
Government for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender." 81
Loftus must also be criticized for concluding her discussion of the
sixth amendment cases with Kirby v. Illinois32 In that case, it was
found that a suspect in a robbery case did not have the right to have
counsel present at a stationhouse showup because he had not yet been
indicted and was thus not in a critical stage of the proceedings. Initially, many courts believed Kirby made "indictment" a magic word in
a sixth amendment right to counsel analysis. As Loftus points out, after
Kirby, police delayed in indicting defendants so that lineups could be
conducted without defense counsel present. However, in 1977, the
29.

LoFrus, supra note 12, at 180.

30. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
31. Id. at 321. Ash recognized that even though the sixth amendment did not
apply to photographic identifications, due process violations could still exist, requiring
the suppression of eyewitness testimony.
32. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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Court clarified Kirby in Moore v. Illinois.3 Moore was identified at a
preliminary hearing after the victim had signed a formal complaint
against him. The state argued that because Moore had not yet been
indicted, he had no right to have counsel present at the hearing. Justice
Powell, however, declared that "[s]uch a reading cannot be squared
with Kirby itself, which held that an accused's rights under Wade and
Gilbert attach to identifications conducted at or after the initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings, by way of formal charge [or]
preliminary hearing."34 Thus, since Moore, the right to counsel under
the sixth amendment has been determined not by whether one has been
indicted, but by whether adversary judicial proceedings have begun.
Why the author fails to recognize this is somewhat perplexing: Loftus
ends her discussion of the due process identification cases with Manson
v. Brathwaite3 5 decided the same year as Moore; and Moore was decided in 1977, long before Eyewitness Testimony was published! For
whatever reason Moore was not addressed, the discussion suffers from
its absence.38
The remainder of chapter ten examines four methods of guarding
against mistaken identification: excluding unreliable eyewitness identification, requiring corroboration before a conviction can be based on eyewitness testimony, giving cautionary jury instructions, and allowing expert psychological testimony on the reliability of eyewitness
identifications. Loftus dismisses the first two suggestions as having too
many problems, but states that the third does not go far enough. She
believes cautionary instructions do "not supply the jury with any information that it can use in the task of evaluating the reliability of any

33. 434 U.S. 220 (1977).
34. Id. at 228 (quoted in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 689).
35. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
36. Since EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY was published, the Supreme Court has decided three more eyewitness identification cases: United States v. Crews, - U.S. _., 100
S. Ct. 1244 (1980); Watkins v. Sowders, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 654 (1981), and Sumner
v. Mata, - U.S. _, 101 S. Ct. 764 (1981). In Watkins, the Court held that the Due
Process Clause does not require in every case a hearing outside the jury's presence to
determine the admissibility of identification testimony. Justice Brennan's dissent cites
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY five times.
Professor Loftus cannot be criticized for failing to anticipate these developments.
However, these cases point out the need for frequent revisions of EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY.
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particular eyewitness account"8 7 and wonders whether the instructions,
themselves, may be so complicated as to preclude their comprehension
by the jury.
Loftus believes that allowing expert testimony is the best safeguard. The remainder of her book is devoted to building a case for its
use. Loftus freely admits that expert testimony may lead to some procedural problems, such as a potential battle of experts," but argues
that it is the best alternative available. To illustrate its use, she devotes
the final chapter to discussing an actual murder case in which she testified as an expert and offers an edited version of her testimony to the
reader in an eighteen page appendix.
Why read Eyewitness Testimony? Several reasons have already
been presented. For the concerned citizen, law student, or judge, it contains a wealth of information. For the police, it should suggest ways to
minimize incorrect identifications. For the lawyer, it will suggest better
ways to present direct testimony and attack eyewitness identifications
in criminal cases. Some prosecutors may cringe at the effect an increased understanding of this subject matter may have on the conviction rate, but considering the benefits which may inure to society in
reducing the number of unjust convictions, such is really in the public
interest. Discounting a few shortcomings in her legal discussion, Loftus
has done an admirable job of presenting, in a readable fashion, information about this most significant subject. Hopefully, other writers will
follow in her footsteps. Likewise, if the legal system is truely concerned
with the administration of justice, many of Eyewitness Testimony's
criticisms and suggestions should be seriously considered.
As Ephraim Tutt said, "The lawyer no more than his client can
forget the past." 89 Maybe not, but with the help of Eyewitness Testimony we can learn from it and prevent its repetition.

37.

LoFrus, supra note 12, at 190.

38. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide a means of dealing with this problem
by allowing the court to appoint experts where appropriate. FED. R. EvID. 706.
39. A. TRAIN, YANKEE LAWYER, THE AuTOBIoGRAPHY OF EPHRAIM TuTT, 343
(People's Book Club ed. 1944).
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Denning, L., The Discipline of Law. London:
Butterworth's, 1979.
Reviewed by Geoffrey F. Powell*

Seldom, if ever, can a judge have aroused so much popular acknowledgment in his time as the author of this book, Lord Denning.1
D.S.O.; M.A., Pembroke College, Oxford, 1932; Visiting Professor of Law, Valparaiso University, School of Law.
This review is, in part, a response to Professor Michael Richmond's review of Lord
Denning's book published at 4 NOVA L.J. 327 (1980). Both reviews were selected for
publication in the JOURNAL to accomodate the classic scholarly tradition of discussion
and debate. Of Professor Richmond's review, Mr. Powell had this to say: "It was with
great interest and admiration that I read the review by Michael Richmond of Lord
Denning's 'The Discipline of Law.' It is unusually talented and perceptive. Yet I disagree with what I conceive to be his main conclusions, I ask myself why should this be
so?
The answer is in my different experiences with Lord Denning's work, and in my
understanding of the law's usefulness to society. For much the greater part of my life, I
was a legal practitioner in England where Lord Denning's decisions had effect, and,
quite apart from any reaction of mine to these, I believe that the hope of any advanced
society in legal practice and theory is to be found not in its courts and judges, but in
the 'constructive practitioner.' By that I mean a lawyer who keeps his client advised
well in advance of the client's activities: whether in the boardroom, or in designing
trusts and wills, or in drawing a commercial agreement, or in making the best of the
margin of activities permitted by the Internal Revenue or Anti-Trust Acts. For the
constructive lawyer, a measure of certainty and stability in his legal system is essential.
Whatever the benefits expected to flow from Lord Denning's activities and reforms,
certainty and stability are not among them. I have tried to express these notions more
fully in this review of my own, which condenses the reactions of almost a professional
lifetime exposed to Lord Denning's concepts."
1. Rt. Hon. Lord Denning, Baron Alfred Thompson Denning, born 23 Jan. 1889;
educated at Magdalen College, Oxford; called to the bar, Lincoln's Inn, 1923; King's
Court, 1938; Judge of the High Court of Justice, 1944; a Lord Justice of Appeal, 194857; a Lord Appeal in Ordinary, 1957-62; Master of the Rolls, 1962-; Chairman, Committee on Legal Education for Students from Africa, 1962-; President, Birkbeck College; Treasurer, Lincoln's Inn, 1964; Head of Security Enquiry, 1963; Hon. Bencher,
Middle Temple, 1972; member, Athenaeum Club; Hon. D.C.L. [Oxford], 1965; Hon.
D.C.L. [Columbia], 1976. See also Intl Who's Who 304 (44th ed. 1980).
*
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Certainly Lord Denning has done some unusual things in his
time--quite apart from his decisions. Having been made a Judge of the
High Court of Justice in 1944, he became a Lord Justice of Appeal in
1948. Lord Denning continued occasionally to take cases at first instance (that is, not on appeal) to keep his hand in as a trial judge. He
became a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary2 in 1957 but in 1962 demoted
himself, as it were, to the Court of Appeal, and became Master of the
Rolls8 to give himself more work. He became 82 years of age on January 23, 1981.
Yet in spite of Lord Denning's remarkable record, his enormous
gift for work, his scholarship, and his quite unusual command of the
English language, there is a section of lawyers who have some reserva2. The Lords of Appeal in Ordinary are the legal judges of the House of Lords,
which constitute the final court of appeal in Great Britain. An appeal in civil cases
from County Courts and the High Courts of Justice, and in criminal cases from the
Crown Courts, lies to the Court of Appeal and then to the House of Lords. See 1
EUROPA, YEAR BOOK 1980, at 1358 (1980).
3. David Walker in The Oxford Companion of Law 816 (1980) defines Master
of the Rolls as follows:
The office probably originated in the Chancery clerk whose duty was to oversee
the scribes who composed the Chancellor's Roll. In the Middle Ages, the title
was Clerk or Curator of the Rolls, and he was one of the Masters in Chancery
who assisted and acted for the Chancellor.
With the development of Chancery jurisdiction, the judicial duties of the Masters in Chancery increased and a large part of these fell on the Master of the
Rolls; as early as the mid-sixteenth century he was sometimes called vice-chancellor, and some jurisdiction was delegated to him by special commission. By the
early seventeenth century, he heard causes in the absence of the Chancellor and
became the Chancellor's general deputy.
In 1729, it was provided that all orders made by the Master of the Rolls should
be valid, subject to an appeal of the Lord Chancellor, and thereafter he sat regularly as a Chancery judge. In 1833, his jurisdiction was extended and it was
enacted that he should sit continuously, but his orders were subject to appeal to
the Lord Chancellor and after 1851 to the Court of Appeal in Chancery. He
could also, and frequently did, sit in the Court of Appeal in Chancery.
Since 1875, the Master of the Rolls has been President of the Court of Appeal.
Until 1958 he had the general responsibility for the public records (a responsibility then transfered to the Lord Chancellor) and is still responsible for the records
of the Chancery of England.
The Master of the Rolls also has certain duties relating to Solicitors of the Supreme Court.
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tions. They are exemplified by the struggling British lawyers who prac-

ticed the law during Lord Denning's judicial career. After World War
II, many lawyers 4 returned to practice after some seven years in the
fighting services. Those who had practices before the war found that
their connections had disappeared and that they were returning to a
business and professional life which, whatever lip-service it might pay,
found it inconvenient and uncomfortable to have them back in a world
which had succeeded in doing without them. These lawyers most often
came back without a business, without clients, money or a startingpoint--except the necessity of taking a refresher course in ordinary
professional law. Their present. was bleak; their future worse than uncertain. Imagine the dismay of most of them when they read of the
decision, in the depths of their general discomfiture, given by Lord
Denning in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House
Ltd.5 Had the doctrine of consideration ceased suddenly to exist, after
the early mastery of it followed lately by its reaffirmation in refresher
courses? Had it not also been learned that judges were supposed to be
even stricter than students in observing principles of law which had
4. In England, an attorney is either a barrister or solicitor.
Barrister is the term used in England and Wales since the 15th Century and in
countries with legal systems modelled on that of England for a person who has
been called to the Bar, i.e. admitted to practice in the Superior Courts and entitled [in those courts] to represent a party to a cause in court. * * * The work
within the ordinary scope of a Barrister's practice is advising on questions of law,
drafting pleadings, conveyances, and other legal documents, and advocacy in
court. Barristers have exclusive rights of audience in the Superior Courts and in
inferior courts, concurrent rights of audience with solicitors. When appearing in
court, counsel [barristers] wear wigs, gown, and bands.

Id. at 115-16.
In contrast, a solicitor is a person trained in the law who prepares cases from
beginning to end, drafts briefs to barristers to appear in court, sometimes drafts pleadings, consults with and carries on without exception all the business of the law.
Whether connected with the courts or general practice, only a solicitor can deal with
the public, run a business office, and move freely through the law's business: "[Solicitors] are not members of the bar and are not heard in the superior courts; and the
power of admitting them to practice, and striking them off the roll, has not been given
the Inns of Court;" but to their professional body, the law society. As to the barrister/
solicitor distinction in America, see, Ballentines's Law Dictionary 1193 (3d ed. 1969),
see e.g., In re Ricker, 66 N.H. 207, 9 A. 559 (1890).
5. [1947] K.B. 130; [1956] 1 All E.R. 256.
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been firmly established by precedent over the centuries? It already was
difficult enough to advise clients constructively on what they should,
and should not, do. Was one now to tell them that one simply did not
know what the law was; could not even hazard a forecast because a
judge could apparently decide what he liked quite arbitrarily? They
were hard days for war-weary, war-torn lawyers and morale was none
too high. Lord Denning's decision certainly did nothing to raise it.
The value of The Discipline of Law and, it may be said, of Lord
Denning's judicial career, 'altogether depends upon the view taken as to
the ways in which, and the principles on which, judges may properly, in
the words of the publisher's note, "mould and shape the principles of
law laid down by the judges in the 19th century to meet the needs and
opinions of today."'
So much depends on this and the personal element involved in a
wide judgment of the issues, that it is worth starting from a classical
source for serious assessment.
Sir Henry ,Maine in his Ancient Law7 writes:
With respect to that great portion of our legal system which is enshrined
in cases and recorded in Law Reports, we habitually employ a double
language, and entertain, as it would appear, a double and inconsistent set
of ideas. When a groupof facts come before our English court for adjudication, the whole course of discussion between the judge and the advocates assumes that no question is, or can be raised which will call for the
application of any principles but old ones, or of any distinctions but such
.as
have long since been allowed. It is taken absolutely for
granted that
there is somewhere a irile of known law which will cover the facts of the
dispute now litigated," and that if such a rule be not discovered, it is only
that the necessary patience, knowledge, or acumen is not forthcoming to
detect it. Yet the moment th jidgment has been rendered and reported,
we slide unconsciously or unavowedly into a new language and a new
train of thought.' We' ow admit that the decision hag modified the law.
The rules applicable have-to use the very inaccurate expression sometimes employed-become more elastic; in fact, they have been changed.
A clear addition has been made to the precedents, and the canon of law
elicited by comparing the precedents is not the same as that which would
have been obtained if the series of cases had been curtailed by a single
6.
7.

LORD DENNING, THE DIscIPLINE OF LAW
SIR H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 35 (1908).
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In commenting on this passage William Geldart writes in Elements of English Law:$
I think that neither of these views is the whole truth ....

In the ab-

sence of clear precedents which might govern a question, we find judges
relying on such considerations as the opinions of legal writers, the practice of conveyancers, the law of other modern countries, the Roman Law,
principles of "natural justice" or public policy. The proper application of
these may be a matter of dispute or difficulty but in any case the judge is
applying a standard; he shows that he is not free to decide, as a legislator would be, as he pleases; he is bound to decide according to principle.
There is much more in the same vein making it clear beyond any
doubt that judges are not given the authority to usurp the functions of
the legislature. Further support is to be found, if it were needed, in
"Palm Tree Justice in the Court of Appeal,"$ an article written by Dr.
Morris of Magdalen College, Oxford. Dr. Morris wrote this after the
decision, In Re Jebb,10 where the court including Lord Denning held
that 'child' meant "adopted child." Dr. Morris went on to criticize:
By departing from the established rules of law the Court of Appeal
seems to have usurped the functions of the legislature,.The decision will
require the rewriting of the whole of the chapter on gifts to children in
the text-book on wills, unless the editor has the courage to say that it is
manifestly wrong ....

It is submitted that rules of law binding on the

court cannot be evaded merely by calling them technical."
Clearly, Dr. Morris and the somewhat disillusioned lawyer re,
turning from the wars had something in common with their feelings for
judges who engaged in holy wars about what the law ought to be. In
these days the legislators have quite enough to do and say in this field.
"Palm Tree Justice" has a very real meaning for those who exper8. W. GELDART, ELEMENTS OF ENGUSH LAW 12-3
Holdsworth & H. G. Hanbury 1960) (emphasis supplied).
9. 82 L.Q. REV. 196 (1966).
10. [1965] 3 W.L.R. 810.
11. Morris, supra note 9, at 202.
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ienced the days of the British Empire. It brought to mind a young District Officer sitting under a palm tree in a trackless, sun-scorched desert trying to decide a dispute between two nomadic tribes about a well
which produced a few drops of water less than once a year. He is probably little trained in law but, in his way, has to act as a judge in matters important to those around him. Soon he finds that the arguments
concern systems of law of which he has no knowledge and date back to
the days of the Prophet Mohammed. He has lost his way in a morass of
words and, possibly, non-applicable laws. What shall he do? Why, of
course, give a commonsense decision based on what he considers fair.
That is palm tree justice and a very good form of justice in primitive
conditions. Lawyers do not really care which system prevails-but
please let them know which it is to be. And all know, in their hearts,
that a sophisticated, industrialised, highly social system needs a stable
rule of law so that men do not wait to pick up the pieces when something has gone wrong but are advised on, and conform to, the law as it
is known at the time of their actions.
Primitive society may well need mainly advocates, courts and
judges: but civilization does not. It needs the constructive legal adviser
at hand in the board room, the Ministry or the testator's study. Thus
the course of action proposed can be tested against the law's requirements and trouble-particularly litigious trouble-avoided by good interpretation and judgment. Without that sort of law civilization cannot
properly survive-but it could-and in some ways does by turning over
its disputes to Ministry officials. In Lord Denning's own words, "I
would simply ask: Which method is to be preferred?""2
This is a book about Lord Denning, for Lord Denning, by Lord
Denning. That is not to decry it or to suggest that it is anything but
extremely readable to the lawyer. It is beautifully written and full of
vitality for those who like to picture the fast-changing face of the law
in the hands of its judges. It is also, up to a point, a modest book. But
there are undoubtedly, also, glimpses of self-deification:
"My protest carried some weight with Lord Radcliffe. He had the
best mind of anyone of his time."1' s
12. DENNING, supra note 6, at 4.
13. Id. at 14.
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"It was argued by Mr. Robert Fortune on the one side. . and Mr.
Ronald Hopkins on the other, a sound and sensible advocate. They argued it well but they had not the reserves at their command as I had. I
delivered judgment straight off the reel with a tidying up afterwards for
'
the Law Reports." 14
"This time I had a good common lawyer sitting with me, Winn,
L.J., and a Chancery lawyer who was endowed with unusual commonsense, Danchwerts, L.J."' 15

The book is forthrightly claimed to be an account of the author's
personal contribution (no false modesty here) to the changing face of
English law in this century. Thus, it leaves no margin for any reflections that it may be a dispassionate and impartial commentary on
changes of that sort. It is a personal account of a Mein Kampf of a
very individual sort (for a judge) and-as has been suggested
before-none the worse for that as readable material.
The seven main parts or fields of law in which it is suggested that
Lord Denning has made contributions towards marked changes are: the
construction of documents; misuse of ministerial powers; locus standi;
abuse of "Group" powers; high Trees; negligence and the doctrine of
precedent.
Dealing with the construction of documents-one of the longer
and, it is submitted, most interesting parts-Lord Denning summarizes
the progress (as he sees it) with statutes, wills and other unilateral documents and contracts. It is reasonable, perhaps, in a work admittedly
written with a personal bias to omit here and there an argument contrary to the admitted bias. Yet, in this respect, Lord Denning does
seem to go much further than necessary or desirable in discussing attitudes in the construction of wills.
The developed lines of argument centre around (and this is something of an over-simplification of the complexities) the question
whether it is only the words the testator has used which may be construed or whether the construction may be applied to the intention of
the testator in a broader measure. The authority for the traditional
view-that only the words which the testator has actually used may be
14. Id. at 12.
15. Id. at 27. By such comments Lord Denning appears to be saying: I usually
have very inferior intellects with me?
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6 which was confirmed by
construed-is Abbott v. Middleton"
modern
1
Morgan:
v.
authorities in Perrin

The fundamental rule in construing the language of a will is to put on
the words used the meaning which having regard to the terms of the
will, the testator intended. The question is not, of course, what the testator meant to do when he made his will, but what the written words he

uses mean in the particular case-what are the expressed intentions of
the testator 18
Certainly, there is nowadays another view, expressed so freely and
clearly by Lord Denning for example, In re Jebb9 in which he refers
contemptuously to "technical rules [which] have only too often led the
court astray .... -20 This other view lays down unequivocally that
technical rules may be rejected and that the court must look to see
simply what the testator intended. Lord Denning went on to say:
Looking at this will in the light of the surrounding circumstances it

seems to me quite plain that when the testator spoke of the "child or
children of my said daughter" his intention was to refer to the adopted
child, Roderick, or any further adopted children that she might have. 21
What Lord Denning significantly omits is the background of the
older view which explains it. The point is that legislation requires certain formalities which must accompany the expression of testamentary
intentions. A leading example of this sort of formality is that the will
must be in writing. So far as it is not in writing there is no will to
construe and, in consequence, it was ordinarily felt in the past-and
still is by most lawyers-that regard may be paid only to the words
used by the testator and embodied in the form prescribed by the statute
to the exclusion of any intention to be found otherwise than in the formal requirements.
A reference to this basis for the traditional view might have been
16. [1859] 7 H.L. 68.
17.
18.
19.

[1943] A.C. 399, [1943] - All E.R. 187.
Id. at -, [1943] All E.R. at 190 (emphasis supplied).
In re Jebb, Ward-Smith v. Jebb, [1965] 3 All E.R. 358, [1966] 1 Ch. 666.
20. DENNING, supra note 6, at 27.
21. Id. (emphasis supplied).
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just mentioned-indeed should have been-when the author leaves the
subject of wills with this passing appearance of fairness:
So I leave the subject with this question: Are we to construe wills according to their grammatical construction as propounded in previous
cases? Or are we to mould them in accordance with the intention22of the
testator in the particular case, irrespective of earlier precedents?
If the question is to be asked after reasonable enquiry surely the
enquiry should necessarily include a not unreasonable argument over a
century old. Principles and arguments in support of it are not necessarily wrong because they are old; nor are they necessarily right because
they are new. There are times when Lord Denning hardly seems to
accept this but to believe that anything new is good and all that is old
is bad.
Aside from this questionable omission, this part, so far as it deals
with contracts, at any rate, is recommended -reading for any serious
student of the law of contract. So also is the part dealing with negligence-so far as concerns the student of the law of torts. Both-and
this applies to the whole book-are beautifully written in elegant English, full of scholarship and yet easy to read. The point is not whether
Lord Denning has some great talents and gifts-for these he most certainly possesses-but rather whether he makes a proper use of these
great qualities.
Of all the developments in 20th century jurisprudence, insofar as
development can be attributed to judges, Lord Denning suggests that
their greatest contribution is in the law of negligence. He refers to the
old forms of action from which the rules of law were derived. Many
lawyers consider that too little is known about these forms of action
today and that a greater understanding of them might well have its
advantages. Not so, naturally, Lord Denning. He has condemned them
in court and writes here that they were "old and technical [always a
bad word with Lord Denning] and expressed in Norman-French. 23
Many words and phrases still are so expressed in English common law,
and Norman-French was the language of the King's Courts-although
not always of reports-until about the Restoration in 1660. In any
22. Id. at 31.
23. Id. at 227.
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event, the rules formulated by the judges of the 19th Century about
duties in tort, Lord Denning tells us, did not satisfy the social necessities and social opinions of the 20th Century. No time is spent on discussing whether the opinions and necessities of the 1970's are really
better than those of the 1870's-some might beg leave to doubt it-but
it is certainly true that we swept on in 1932 to the tort of negligence as
an independent wrong.
It is highly informative to read of the dissenting judgment in Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.,2 4 and its approval fifteen years later

by the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.25 as told by the inventor of the particular duty of care outlined in those two cases. Lord Denning writes:
[I] return to the sequel to Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. It came
about in a case which has become as famous as Donoghue v. Stevenson
(1952) A.C. 562. It was Hedley Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners
Ltd. Whereas Donoghue v. Stevenson dealt with negligent acts Hedley
Byrne dealt with negligent statements. I was invited to sit in the Lords
on the appeal, but I knew that my dissenting judgment in Candler would
come under review. So I declined . . .The merchant bankers (Heller &
Partners) had headed their report "without responsibility." On that account they were held not liable. But the House of Lords, in a series of
obiter dicta, considered the decision in Candler. I was gratified to find
that they approved of my dissent and gave reasoning on the same lines.
They held that a professional man was liable for negligent statements
when he knew they were going to be acted upon; and they were acted
upon. I will not pause here to quote from their judgments. Their influence will be apparent from the succeeding cases. (i.e. Rondel v. Worsley
(1967) I Q.B. 443; Saif All v. Sidney Mitchell (1978) 3 W.L.R. 849;
Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office (1969) 2 Q. B. 412 and Anns v.
Merton Borough Council (1977) 2 W.L.R. 1024).11
The whole story of the aftermath of Hedley Byrne is not told here-the
speculations, the worries and the wild ideas. They still exist, however,
and form one of the leading difficulties in the law of torts throughout
the Commonwealth and not only in the United Kingdom. Many law-

24.
25.
26.

[1951] 2 K.B. 164.
[1964] A.C. 465.
DENNING,

supra note 6, at 245.
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yers seem to think that the line of reasoning developed in these cases is
a sort of catch-all, in the sense that any form of wrong, if it does not fit
in neatly under some approved heading of liability, will at least be
caught by Hedley Byrne. Has it all been worth while starting this particular hare which every lawyer now has to chase some of his time? It
is a little too early, it seems, to say with conviction that Hedley Byrne,
approving the dissent in the Candler case, has truly on balance played
an altogether happy part in the development of common law. As events
have occurred, might it not have been better if either the new principles
had been put firmly into words in legislation? Or, if the House of Lords
were really going to spend all the time they did on obiter dicta in Hedley Byrne, might they not profitably have done a little bit more to be
specific about the exact nature of the duty they had in mind?
Further mandatory reading is suggested by part five, which deals
with the High Trees case. This was again very much one of the many
inspirations of the Master of the Rolls. Lord Denning deliberately asks:
did it abolish consideration? And, to reply, Lord Denning quotes himself at length in Combe v. Combe2 7 which, unfortunately, lawyers did
not have before them when this dreadful question arose-now, it seems,
so long ago. Combe v. Combe dealt with a case where a husband,
through his solicitor, undertook to pay his divorced wife one hundred
pounds a year free of tax. He did not pay; presumably since she had an
income bigger than his. The wife sued the husband six years later, for
six hundred pounds in arrears. The judge at first instance thought he
should apply the principle of High Trees. The Court of Appeal, however, with Lord Denning, declined to extend the principle in this way.
Lord Denning said:
Much as I am inclined to favour the principle stated in the High
Trees case, it is important that it should not be stretched too far, lest it
should be endangered. That principle does not create new causes of action where none existed before. It only prevents a party from insisting
upon his strict legal rights when it would be unjust to allow him to enforce them, having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties.....
Seeing that the principle never stands alone as giving a cause of action in
itself, it can never do away with the necessity of consideration when that

27.

[1951] 2 K.B. 215. [1951] 1 All E.R. 76.
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is an essential part of the cause of action. The doctrine of consideration
is too firmly fixed to be overthrown by a side-wind. Its ill-effects have
been largely mitigated of late, but it still remains a cardinal necessity of
the formation of a contract, though not of its modification or discharge. I
fear that it was my failure to make this clear which misled the judge in
the present case. He held that the wife could sue on the husband's promise as a separate and independent cause of action by itself, although, as
he held, there was no consideration for it. That is not correct. The wife
can only enforce it if there was. consideration for it. That is, therefore,
the real question in the case; was there sufficient consideration to support
the promise?2 8
The mental processes in reaching the implementation of this particular kind of lawmaking are, as revealed by Lord Denning, quite fascinating. They can be traced frequently in the pages of this book and
there follows a summary of the processes preparatory to the High
Trees decision itself. In October 1922, Lord Denning became a pupil in
chambers at No. 4 Brick Court, Temple and soon after he started
came, apparently, upon a pathway which led to the High Trees case. In
his commercial work one important factor seemed to him that a contract for the sale of goods of ten pounds or more in value had to be in
writing. Another important factor was that no promise was binding
without consideration for it. There was considerable resort to subtlety
to defeat these rules which young Denning considered unjust.
While still a pupil Denning was influenced by Hartley v. Hymans 9 and noted it in pencil on his Anson's Contract, adding, "Suggest estoppel." In the Hartley case, Mr. Justice McCardie reviewed
many authorities and made reference to Hughes v. MetropolitanRailway Co.,30 which had been overlooked for half a century. Hughes and
Birmingham District Land Co. v. London and North-Western Railway
Co.,"1 led Lord Denning along his pathway, but he found many obstacles en route. Two particular obstacles were that estoppel applies only
in respect of representations of fac 2 and that a representation, in or-

28. DENNING, supra note 6, at 207 (citing Combe v. Combe).
29. [1920] 3 K.B. 475.
30. [1877] 2 A.C. 439.
31. [1888] 40 Ch. D. 268.
32. Jordan v. Money, [1845] 5 H.L.C. 185.
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der to work an estoppel, must be one of fact and not of law. Lord Denning writes:
In order to leap these fences I needed a good horse. It turned up. It was
the Report of the Law Revision Committee on the Doctrine of Consideration. It came out of 1937 when I was in very busy practice as a junior. I
had no time to read it then. [But he read it later in life and found that]
. .. it exposed the injustice of the rule that estoppel only applies to
statements of fact, and of the rule that payment of a lesser sum is no
consideration for the discharge of a larger sum. The Committee recommended the abolition of both those rules. They made this recommendation. It got me over the fences which obstructed the way to High Trees.u
Another step in his path was a case in which he was engaged as a
King's Counsel-Marquessof Salisbury v. Gilmore." However, in this
case, Lord Justice Mackinnon found the fences "too high for him"
since he considered the division of the House of Lords in Jordan v.
Money to be binding on the Court of Appeal-not an unreasonable
conclusion for a judge. Not so Lord Denning, who, four years later, saw
his chance in High Trees.3 5 Quoting his very thin line of authority, 6
Lord Denning says simply: "In my opinion, the time has come for the
validity of such a promise (a promise intended to be binding, intended
to be acted upon and in fact acted on) to be recognized.13 7 FiatJustitia and the law has been changed to what Lord Denning always
thought it should be since his early days in chambers as a pupil. Can
that really be the way to make law?

The advice given in The Discipline of Law is on surer ground
when aspirants for the legal profession are told to learn properly the
tools of the trade: good English, with a full command of it, both written
and spoken; be well-groomed and neatly dressed; have a pleasing voice;
show respect. Lord Denning certainly does not even hint at this, but are
33. DENNING, supra note 6, at 202.
34. [1942] 2 K:B. 38, [1942] 1 All E.R. 457. Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway,
[1877] 2 A.C. 439.
35. High Trees, [1947] - K.B. 130.
36. Hughes v. Metropolitan Ry., [1877] 2 A.C. 439; Birmingham and District
Land Co. v. London & N.W. R.R., [1888] 40 Ch. D. 268; Salisbury (Marquess) v.
Gilmore, [1942] 2 K.B. 38, [1942] 1 All E.R. 457.
37. DENNING, supra note 6, at 205.
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not a good impression, a good voice and, if possible a little charm
equally important with, if not more so than, all the legal authorities in
the world? In convincing a judge you are dealing with a human being
who, surely, is as susceptible to human qualities as to professional skills
and knowledge and perhaps more susceptible.
All in all, The Discipline at Law is a book to read with pleasure
and instruction if you are really, really keen on the law. Some of us
prefer our law a bit watered down with other draughts of life. Maybe
those who cannot find the law wholly sufficient in itself do not have a
vocation--only a profession. Denning says: "I sit in court every day of
the week. Five days a week. I spend my weekends writing reserved
judgments." 8 We are again reminded of the importance and majesty
of the law. Those of us who are less committed will have to bear with
our shortcomings and extraneous pleasures with all the cheerfulness we
can find.
Two more sources throw light on the real difficulty of assessing the
value of this sort of book-and this sort of principle. It is not easy to
separate the two things. If you believe in the aims and objects of Lord
Denning you automatically believe much more in what he writes in The
Discipline of Law.
Mr. Jonathan Sumption writing in the Sunday Telegraph in a review of another legal work, The Judge by Patrick Devlin 9 writes:
[J]udges have such immense power that it seems to social reformers a
tragedy that they cannot use it to propel the law in the "right" direction.
What those well-intentioned enthusiasts really want is the enlightened
despotism of some 18th-Century German princes and most 20th-Century
Socialists; a despotism administered by the only people in a liberal society who have the power to command and enforce instant obedience,
namely the judiciary.
The great power of the judges would, however, be intolerable if it were
not used in accordance with settled principles. Judicial power is not despotic precisely because it is bound (not hidebound) by a body of law
which appears stable and permanent, greater than the individuals who
administer it.

38. Id. at 316.
39. LORD DEVLIN, THE JUDGE (1979). Lord Devlin is a former Lord of Appeal
in Ordinary.
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If we must be ruled by laws and not men it is important that the law
should change only at a stately pace, receiving new ideas slowly and
from sources other than the whim of individual judges. It is for parliament, juries, lay arbitrators and the like to inject change into the system,
not judges. For them conservatism is not an unavoidable vice but the
supreme judicial virtue.'0
comes a profound cri de coeur:
Or finally and even more appealingly,
41
from Miss Frances J. Sieber:
Sir,
With the greatest respect to the Master of the Rolls, would his lordship
kindly refrain from changing any more laws before the law examination
in August.
Yours truly
Frances Jane Sieber
As from 1st year, College of Law.

40.
41.

-

The Sunday Telegraph (London) - ( ).
THE TIMEs (London) - (July 26, 1975).
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